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ABSTRACT

During the lastfifteen years, there has been a growing interest in litigation transcending national borders. Yet, both in the United States and
in Europe, where this interest is much older, a comprehensive intellectual
framework to deal with this type of litigation is hard to find. In fact,
courts and procedurallaw reformers still approach transnationalcases in
the same fashion as purely domestic ones, adjusting the concepts of domestic law where they believe it necessary. This has created significant
problems both for litigants seeking justice in transnational cases and for
lawmakersfashioning policy specificallyfor the transnationalsetting.
In light of recent developments in international trade law and in the
European Union, this Article argues that, as a normative matter, we
should begin to treat transnational litigation as a distinctfield. It suggests that in-depth procedural comparison and international relations
theory would have much to contribute to such afield. It uses a case study
on judicial cooperation in Germany for litigation in the United States to
demonstrate various ways in which lawmaking for transnationallitigation is interconnected beyond national borders. The Article concludes
that procedural law reformers who continue to disregard insights from
both internationalpolitics and comparative procedure are apt to lose control over their lawmaking efforts to savvy groups, to internationaltrade
regimes such as the IATO and NAFTA, and to lawmakers abroad.
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INTRODUCrION

Judicial procedure plays a powerful role in the making and application of law. Despite prominent attempts to relegate "adjective
law"' to the status of a "handmaid of justice," 2 students of procedure have long since realized, 3 and empirical studies have con1 Roscoe Pound, The Etiquette of Justice,3 PRoc. NEB. ST. B.A. 231 passim (1908)
(referring to procedural law as "adjective law").
2 Charles Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297 (1938); see also
Edson R. Sunderland, An Inquiry Concerning the Functionsof Procedurein Legal Education, 21 MicH. L. REV. 372, 381-82 (1922) (describing procedure as "secondary
and derivative" and as merely serving to make substantive law operative). On
the sentiment of Pound, Clark, and others involved in the movement for uniform
federal rules of civil procedure and earlier reform movements that what was
needed were simplified rules of procedure that would be subservient to the just
application of substantive law, see Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered
Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedurein HistoricalPerspective, 135 U. PA.
L. REV. 909,945-46,952-56,962-63 (1987).
3 See, e.g., Phyllis Tropper Baumann et al., Substance in the Shadow of Procedure:
The Integration of Substantive and ProceduralLaw in Title VII Cases, 33 B.C. L. REV.
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firmed, 4 that no matter what its features, procedural law affects the
rights and the behavior of groups and individuals - including
those involved in the administration of justice. It is therefore important that those in charge of applying and devising procedural
rules continuously reflect upon the values that those rules serve or
ought to serve.5 Equally important, procedural lawmakers must
211 (1992) (exploring interrelation between substance and procedure in Title VII
cases); Robert G. Bone, StatisticalAdjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a World
of Process Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. REV. 561 (1993) (analyzing the effect of statistical
sampling on case outcomes); Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH.
L. REV. 1463, 1471-76 (1987) [hereinafter Burbank, Costs of Complexity] (discussing
the effect of procedural rules on substantive law). For a treasure trove (although
partially dated) of comparative and interdisciplinary research, see also ACCESS TO
JUSTICE, vols. I-IV (Mauro Cappelletti gen. ed., 1978-79) and ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND
THE WELFARE STATE (Mauro Cappelletti ed., 1981). In fact, Charles Clark himself
actively pursued the idea of procedure as an instrument of social control, see
Subrin, supra note 2, at 966-68, while William Howard Taft and other conservatives participated in, indeed spearheaded, the work to create simplified procedural rules to advance their own political goals, see id. at 955-56.
4 See, e.g., STEPHEN B. BURBANK, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION: THE REPORT OF THE
THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11 (1989) (presenting empirical findings, conclusions, and recommendations with regard to the use
of Rule 11 in the Third Circuit); DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION
DILEMMAS, PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN (2000) (analyzing a large
number of damage class actions and presenting ten case studies); E. ALLEN LIND &
TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988) (reviewing
current theory and empirical research on procedural justice and exploring its implications for legal, political, interpersonal, and work-related settings); JAMES S.
KAKALIK ET AL., INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, DISCOVERY MANAGEMENT: FURTHER ANALYSIS

OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT EVALUATION DATA (1998) (examining civil discovery abuse and providing policy recommendations); THOMAS E. WILLGING ET
AL., DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE PRACTICE, PROBLEMS AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE

(1997) (researching the use of discovery and discovery-related problems and
evaluating the need for rule changes); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg,
Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 119 (2002) (summarizing existing, and presenting new, empirical data on six phases of a civil suit); Michael Selmi, The Price
of Discrimination:The Nature of Class Action Employment Discrimination Litigation
and Its Effects, 81 TEx. L. REV. 1249 (2003) (examining the effect of complex employment discrimination cases on corporate behavior and plaintiff benefits); Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and DisclosurePractice Under
the 1993 FederalRule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 425 (1998) (surveying discovery
and disclosure practice, its costs, benefits, and problems).
5 See, e.g., Burbank, Costs of Complexity, supra note 3, at 1466. For a valuable
collection of articles to stimulate reflection on process values, see ROBERT COVER &
OWEN FISS, THE STRUCTURE OF PROCECURE (1979). See also Robert G. Bone, Agreeing
to FairProcess: The Problem With ContractarianTheories of ProceduralFairness,83 B.U.
L. REV. 485 (2003) (positing a theory of procedural fairness); Jonathan T. Molot, An
Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 27 (2003) (positing a traditional model of adjudication).
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regularly assess the effectiveness of our approaches to civil litigation in furthering the chosen process values. Such an assessment is
particularly urgent with regard to the quickly growing class of civil
cases that transcend national borders. In this Article, I want to
pursue the question whether our approaches to civil litigation are
adequate to deal with this expanding class of transnational cases.
Closely related, I want to know whether the presence of a transnational element, such as a foreign party or evidence located abroad, 6
does more than add an interesting twist to an otherwise fairly typical domestic case.
These are important queries. Both the demise of the Cold War
and the revolution in communications technology have heightened
our awareness of the limits of national borders and of the concomitant importance for our own law-making enterprises of social, economic, and legal developments elsewhere. This awareness has led
to a sense among some that our traditional methods of dealing
with litigation transcending national borders are inadequate. It is a
sense that has culminated in two new projects undertaken by the
American Law Institute ("ALI") - an effort to draft Transnational
Rules of Civil Procedure 7 and a project to improve international
cooperation and understanding in transnational insolvency procedures 8 -and in an international attempt to create a worldwide
convention on jurisdiction and enforcement of foreign judgments, 9
6

See infra note 24 and accompanying text.

7 PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE

(Proposed Final
Draft 2004) [hereinafter 2004 Draft]; PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF TRANSNATIONAL
CIVIL PROCEDURE (Preliminary Draft No. 2, 2000); PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF
TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE (Preliminary Draft No. 1, 1998) [hereinafter 1998
Draft].
8 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE ("ALI"), TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY PROJECT:
PRINCIPLES OF COOPERATION IN TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY CASES AMONG THE

MEMBERS OF THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (Tentative Draft 2000);
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY PROJECT: INTERIM REPORT
(1999); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY PROJECT,
INTERNATIONAL STATEMENT OF MEXICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW (Tentative Draft 1998);
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY PROJECT, INTERNATIONAL
STATEMENT OF U.S. BANKRUPTCY LAW (Tentative Draft 1997) [hereinafter U.S.
STATEMENT];

AMERICAN

LAW INSTITUTE,

TRANSNATIONAL

INSOLVENCY PROJECT,

INTERNATIONAL STATEMENT CANADIAN BANKRUPTCY LAW (Tentative Draft 1997).

9 Hague Conference on Private International Law, Summary of the Outcome
of the Discussion in Commission II of the First Part of the Diplomatic Conference
6-20 June 2001, Interim Text, available at http://hcch.e-vision.nl/upload/
wop/jdgm-pdl5e.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2004). For scholarship on the proposed
Hague Convention, see A GLOBAL LAW OF JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS: LESSONS
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10
which in turn has spawned another ALI project. Moreover, international trade regimes, such as the World Trade Organization
("WTO") and North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"),
and supranational organizations, of which the European Union
("EU") is the most prominent example, have begun significantly to
11
affect the content of the law of transnational litigation. Within the
European Community ("EC"), this has occurred so swiftly and so
frequently during the last few years that some scholars have advocated caution, flagging an urgent need for scholarship to12 assess the
larger implications of these transnational reform efforts.

FROM THE HAGUE (John

J. Barcel6 III et al. eds., 2002);

SAMUEL P. BAUMGARTNER,

Ti-E PROPOSED HAGUE CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND FOREIGN JUDGMENTS,

TRANS-ATLANTIC LAWMAKING FOR TRANSNATIONAL LrIGATION (2003) [hereinafter
BAUMGARTNER, HAGUE CONVENTION]; Samuel P. Baumgartner, The Proposed Hague

Convention on Jurisdictionand Foreign Judgments: Where We Are and the Road Ahead, 4
EuR. J.L. REF. 219 (2002); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Thoughts About a Multinational
Judgments Convention: A Reaction to the von Mehren Report, 57 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 289 (1994); Arthur T. von Mehren, Drafting a Convention on InternationalJurisdiction and the Effects of Foreign Judgments Acceptable World-wide: Can the Hague
Conference Project Succeed?, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 191 (2001) [hereinafter von Mehren,
Drafting]; Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments:
A New Approach for the Hague Conference?, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 271 (1994);
Linda J. Silberman, Comparative Jurisdictionin the International Context: Will the Proposed Hague Judgments Convention Be Stalled?, 52 DEPAuL L. REV. 319 (2002); Russel
J. Weintraub, How Substantial is Our Need for a Judgments-Recognition Convention
and What Should We BargainAway to Get It?, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 167 (1998).
10 ALI, INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS PROJECT (Discussion
Draft 2002) [hereinafter ALI Draft]; ALI, INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND
JUDGMENTS PROJECT (Report 2000); see also Linda J. Silberman & Andreas
Lowenfeld, A Different Challengefor the ALl: Herein of Foreign Country Judgments, an
International Treaty, and an American Statute, 75 IND. L.J. 635 (2000) (proposing and
describing the development of a draft statute and commentary concerning recognition of foreign country judgments).
11 See infra text accompanying notes 283-308.
12 See, e.g., Burkhard HeS, Der Verordnungsvorschlag der franzosischen
Ratsprasidentschaftvom 26. 6. 2000 fiber einen "Europdischen Besuchstitel," 20 PRAXIS
DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT- UND VERFAHRENSRECHTS [IPRAx] 361, 363 (2000) (lamenting lack of scholarship); Haimo Schack, The New International Procedure in
MatrimonialMatters in Europe, 4 EUR. J.L. REF. 37, 55-56 (2002); Astrid Stadler, Das
Europfische Zivilprozessrecht - Wie viel Beschleunigung vertrdgt Europa?, 24 IPRAx 2
(2004) (criticizing the speed and lack of research with which procedural law reform proceeds within the European Community ("EC")). The EC has adopted an
ambitious agenda regarding projects dealing with, or at least affecting, transnational procedure. Aside from a large number of decisions of the European Court
of Justice ("ECJ") interpreting the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1972 O.J. (L
299) 32 [hereinafter Brussels Convention], things really took off with the introduction of the competence of the EC to create secondary Community law regarding
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Unfortunately, the foundations of this area of law have largely
remained untouched by systematic scholarship. This is not for lack
of scholarly attention. In fact, the distinct issues raised by transnational cases have inspired a growing number of casebooks and
treatises that capably map the terrain, suggest textual analyses, and
identify recurrent patterns of response. 13 Correspondingly, within
the last decade, a new course of study named transnational (or international civil) litigation has emerged in the curriculum of U.S.
law schools. 14 In other countries, particularly in German-speaking
Europe, both the course and textbooks accompanying it have been
around much longer. 15 However, both in the United States and
inter-community procedure in 1999. See infra note 290 and accompanying text.
Since then, the EC Council, upon suggestion by the Commission, has passed a
considerable number of regulations in this area.
See, e.g., Parliament
and Council Regulation 805/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 143) 15 ("European Enforcement
Order for Uncontested Claims"); Council Directive 2002/8/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 26) 41
("Improvement of Access to Justice in Cross-border Disputes by Establishing
Minimum Common Rules Relating to Legal Aid for Such Disputes"); Council
Regulation 1206/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 174) 1 ("Cooperation between the Courts of the
Member States in the Taking of Evidence in Civil or Commercial matters"); Council Regulation 44/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1 ("Jurisdiction and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters") [hereinafter Brussels Regulation] (replacing the Brussels Convention); Council Regulation
1346/2000, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 1 (concerning insolvency proceedings); Council Regulation 1348/2000, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 37 (relating to the service in the Member States
of the of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters);
Council Regulation 1347/2000, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 19 (regarding jurisdiction and the
recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and in matters
of parental responsibility for children of both spouses). Aside from these traditional matters of international procedure, both the ECJ and the Commission have
increasingly utilized substantive trade rules and decidedly non-procedural provisions of the EU Treaty to circumscribe the duties of the Member States in matters
relating to transnational cases. See infra text accompanying notes 290-295.
13 See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES
COURTs (3d ed. 1996); ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LmGATION AND
ARBITRATION (2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION];
RALPH G. STEINHARDT, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION (2002); LOUISE ELLEN TEITZ,
TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION (1996); RUSSEL J. WEINTRAUB, INTERNATIONAL
LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION: PRACTICE AND PLANNING (3d ed. 2003).
14 In a review of the on-line course schedules for the top 30 U.S. law schools
as identified by the latest U.S. News & World Report ranking (for lack of a better
method to circumscribe my research), I was able to locate a specific course on
transnational or international civil litigation at fifteen schools. Eight out of those
fifteen are among the top ten schools (last visited Nov. 5, 2004).
15 See, e.g., F. MEILI, DAS INTERNATIONALE CIVILPROZESSRECHT (1906) (Switzerland) (treatise of international civil procedure); ERWIN RIEZLER, INTERNATIONALES
ZIVILPROZESSRECHT (1949) (Germany) (providing German materials for the study
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elsewhere suggestions of a comprehensive intellectual framework
that would provide definition to the cases and materials thus covered are hard to find. Equally rare are studies on any distinct factors that might affect lawmaking for transnational litigation.
Under these circumstances, one may wonder whether transna16
tional litigation is "a distinct field." Until relatively recently, the
prevailing view seems to have been that it is not -at least not in a
functional sense.' 7 As Professor Burbank put it over a decade ago,
transnational litigation should instead be understood,
as part of a process of cross-fertilization in which (1) doctrine and techniques developed in the context of domestic
cases are brought to bear on problems presented in international litigation, and (2) the increasingly international dimensions of litigation in our courts prompt changes in doctrine and techniques, which are then applied in domestic
18
cases.

of international civil procedure);

GUSTAV WALKER,

STREITFRAGEN

AUS

DEM

INTERNATIONALEN CIVILPROZESSRECHTE (1897) (Austria) (discussing issues of inter-

national civil procedure). In France and other Romanic countries, some aspects of
transnational litigation have usually been treated as an add-on to the general
course on private international law. See, e.g., HENRI BATrIFOL & PIERRE LAGARDE, II
667-753. (8th ed. 1993) (France) (standard treatise
DROrr INTERNATIONAL PRIVt
But see PROSPERO FEDOZZI, DiRrrrO PROCESSUALE
law).
international
on private
CIVILE INTERNAZIONALE

(1905) (Italy).

Stephen B. Burbank, The World in Our Courts, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1456, 1458
(1991) [hereinafter Burbank, World] (reviewing GARY B. BORN & DAVID WESTIN,
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS (1989)).
17 While Professor Burbank was persuaded that transnational litigation is a
nominal field, one that "'can... be justified by the heuristic needs of the profession,"' Burbank, World, supra note 16, at 1457-58 (citing to Michael S. Moore, A
Theory of Criminal Law Theories, in 10 TEL AVIV STUD. IN LAW 115, 131 (Daniel Friedmann ed., 1991)), he did not consider it a field of a functional kind, one that tries
"'to realize some underlying kind of justice.'" Id. at 1459; see also HEINRICH NAGEL
16

&

PETER

GOTI'WALD,

INTERNATIONALES

ZIVILPROZESSRECHT

2 (5th ed. 2002)

(suggesting that the term "international civil procedure" does not identify a cohesive body of rules, but rather refers to a host of different issues that may arise in
litigation that for one reason or another transcends national borders).
18 Burbank, World, supra note 16, at 1458. Professor Burbank there responded
to a claim by the authors of the first casebook/treatise on the market in the United
States that what they called "international civil litigation" was about to be a distinct field of law. See BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 3. In making that claim,
Mr. Born and Mr. Westin suggested their own framework for analysis by identify-
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This analytical model nicely captures what courts and lawmakers have been doing both in the United States and in Europe. 19 In
practice, however, this approach has created serious difficulties
both for litigants seeking justice in transnational cases and for
lawmakers fashioning policy for transnational procedure. 20 It is
therefore time that we develop an analytical framework for transnational litigation that takes sufficient cognizance of the international interconnectedness of these cases, both factual and legal, and
of the way this interconnectedness affects the process of making
law for transnational proceedings. In this sense, I submit, we need
to view and treat transnational litigation as a distinct field.
Fortunately, the last decade has witnessed the emergence of interdisciplinary cooperation between scholars of international law
and international political scientists. 21 The fruits of this cooperaing five themes that recur in international civil litigation: balance of interest, foreign relations, federalism, public international law, and comity. Id. at 3-18.
Rather than adapting this scheme in later editions so as to meet Professor Burbank's powerful argument, they apparently chose to yield to it by omitting this
opening chapter altogether. See GARY B. BORN & DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL
CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS (2d ed. 1992); BORN, supra note 13.
19 With respect to the United States, Professor Burbank has elsewhere explained this phenomenon as a motive or psychological "disposition to assimilate
international to domestic interjurisdictional cases," which derives from "a complex of structural, historical, and cultural factors," one of which consists of "a history of accommodating the perceived needs of [state] sovereignty under constitutional language long on aspiration but short on details," and which is "reinforced
by the very powerful impulse of modern American procedural law, including for
these purposes choice of law, to apply the same rules to all cases." Stephen B.
Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration,the Proposed Hague Convention and Progress in
National Law, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 203, 208-09 (2001) [hereinafter Burbank, Equilibration]. Notice, however, that as a matter of fact, transnational cases may be treated
differently from domestic cases to some extent. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont &
Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophelia in American Courts, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1120 (1996)
(finding that foreigners, both as plaintiffs and as defendants, fare significantly better than Americans in U.S. federal courts); Kimberly A. Moore, Xenophobia in
American Courts, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1497 (2003) (finding anti-foreigner bias in U.S.
patent litigation).
20 See, e.g., infra Section 3.
21 For an illuminating categorization of this scholarship and for suggestions
of new directions for joint research, see Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., International
Law and InternationalRelations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 367 (1998). See also THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS (Michael Byers ed., 2000); Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of InternationalDispute Resolution, 45 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1229 (2004) (positing expressive theory of international dispute
resolution); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International
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tion are highly valuable for the purpose of developing a better understanding of the factors that affect the process of making law for
transnational procedure. Thus, I will use some of this recent international law and international relations scholarship to shed some
light on the complex interplay among lawmaking for transnational
litigation, transnational actors, and lawmaking abroad.
My central claim is this: the law applicable to transnational litigation affects the behavior of transnational actors -groups and individuals who are both subject to the laws of more than one sovereign and have access to more than one sovereign to have their
interests counted. 22 Those actors, in turn, may affect the international as well as domestic law of transnational litigation both
Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113 (1999) (using international relations theory and case
study to craft a theory of customary international law); Jonathan D. Greenberg,
Does Power Trump Law?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1789 (2003) (discussing relationship between state power and international law); Andrew T. Guzman, A ComplianceBased Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1825 (2002) (positing a theory of
compliance with international law); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties
Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002) (exploring the impact of human rights
treaties on state behavior); Laurence R. Heifer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human
Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832 (2002) (providing Caribbean case study of
overlegalization); Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law, International Relations and Compliance, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 538
(Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2002) (exploring state compliance with international
law); John K. Setear, Responses to Breach of a Treaty and RationalistInternationalRelations Theory: The Rules of Release and Remediation in the Law of Treaties and the Law of
State Responsibility, 83 VA. L. REV. 1 (1997) (analyzing functionality of rules of release and remediation); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International
Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997) [hereinafter Koh, Why Obey?] (reviewing ABRAM
CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995) and THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995)); Judith Goldstein et al., Introduction: Legalization and World Politics, 54 INT'L ORG. 385 (2000) (introducing special
issue on legalization and world politics).
22 For many of us, this is increasingly true to some extent some of the time.
My concept of transnational actors is thus a fluid one. It may be most interesting
to study those transnational actors with a particular transnational purpose, such
as multinational organizations, certain non-governmental organizations, advocacy
networks, and epistemic communities (networks of experts and scientists pursuing policy goals based on profound knowledge in a particular issue or area), because they are the ones with the most measurable impact. See, e.g., Thomas Risse,
TransnationalActors and World Politics, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
supra note 21, at 255, 255-56 [hereinafter Risse, TransnationalActors]. As the case
study in Section 3 of this Article demonstrates, however, it would be a mistake to
exclude from the analysis transnational actors that do not self-consciously pursue
a transnational purpose.
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abroad and at home in the future. If those in charge of making and
applying the law of transnational litigation want to be in control of
their efforts, they need to be aware of this interplay between lawmaking and transnational actors and of how particular procedural
choices may influence it in the long run. They also need to reflect
on the values they want to and can usefully promote within this
scheme, realizing that simply advancing their domestic procedural
preferences in the short run may implicate their own values of
transnational justice in the future.
Once we appreciate this need, it becomes evident that, although courts and lawmakers have occasionally considered one or
the other of these factors in making their decisions on transnational
litigation, they have not paid much attention to the big picture just
described, largely overestimating the power of unilateral lawmaking. What is even more striking from this view is the lack of any
in-depth procedural comparison guiding their work. After all, as
we shall see, one of the most pervasive difficulties with understanding the forces that affect the law relating to transnational litigation lies in the complexity of procedural law and its strong control by local ideational values and the concomitant lack of
information on foreign approaches to transnational cases. Thus, I
contend that, together with international relations theory, comparative procedural analysis is perhaps the most important building block in the construction of a distinct field of transnational litigation.
After setting out briefly the traditional model of lawmaking for
transnational litigation in Section 2 of this Article, I will proceed, in
Section 3, to a case study to pinpoint important factors that the traditional model has largely ignored. As a distinct example of what
can happen if we merely approach our subject from domestic doctrines without paying systematic attention to transnational litigation as a field, I will trace the development of judicial cooperation
in Germany for litigation in the United States. This German-U.S.
example supplies ample material with which to examine my claim
that transnational litigation in one country may affect that in another and vice versa. In Section 4, I will then suggest a larger analytical framework. The case of Germany also provides abundant
evidence that decision-making based on ignorance about other
procedural systems is apt to yield unpleasant surprises and that, in
the long run, it may hurt rather than advance the distinct values
we have chosen to pursue in transnational litigation. Thus, in Sec-
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tion 5, I will return to comparative procedural analysis and explore
its potential to serve, together with further research in international
relations, as the basis of a discrete field of transnational litigation.
2.

THE TRADITIONAL MODEL

According to the traditional view, transnational litigation, as
civil procedure, is primarily controlled by domestic law. At least
this is what European textbooks like to point out in order to clarify
for students of "international civil procedure," as the subject is
known in continental Europe, 23 that the "international" label does
not necessarily refer to the source of the principles and rules that
those students are about to explore, but to the fact that these prina
ciples and rules apply to cases with an international element - 24
abroad.
located
evidence
or
proceeding,
foreign party, a foreign
This view serves students as a helpful rule of thumb to gain a first
conceptual orientation to transnational litigation. As such it is
likely to be shared in the United States, where treaties have long
been neglected as a source for lawmaking in private international
law 25 and where customary international law26 is not generally credited with playing much of a role in this area.
But what exactly does it mean to say that domestic law primarily controls transnational litigation? Unfortunately, practitioners
and law reformers have largely been left to their own devices in
answering this question. Without profound analysis of larger issues of transnational litigation, they have mostly proceeded from
the assumption that it means just what it says, namely that, absent
controlling treaty provisions, "a sovereign state may fashion domestic law as it deems fit."2 7 Seemingly straightforward, this view
23
24

See authorities cited supra note 15.
See, e.g., ANDREAS BUCHER, I/1 DRoIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVt SUISSE 17 (1998);

GIUSEPPE CAMPEIS & ARRIGO DE PAULI, IL PROCESSO CWILE ITALIANO E LO STRANIERO
1 (1996); REINHOLD GEIMER, INTERNATIONALES ZIVILPROZESSRECHT 4-5 (4th ed. 2001);
HAIMO SCHACK, INTERNATIONALES ZIVILVERFAHRENSRECHT 1 (3d ed. 2002); GERHARD
WALTER, INTERNATIONALES ZIVILPROZESSRECHT DER ScHwEIz 47 (3d ed. 2002).
25 See, e.g., BAUMGARTNER, HAGUE CONVENTION, supra note 9, at 16-46; Stephen

B. Burbank, The Reluctant Partner: Making Procedural Law For International Civil
Litigation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 127-39 (1994) [hereinafter Burbank, Reluctant Partner].
26 See, e.g., Burbank, World, supra note 16, at 1464-65, 1496-97 (doubting
whether customary international law ever played a role or even should play a role
in U.S. courts).
27 MAX
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is often based on
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positivist, 28
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and primarily in Europe, formalist 29

assumptions as well as by the further traditional belief that there is

ZrIVLPROZESSRECHT DER SCHWEIZ 1 (1951).
28 Positivism emerged in response to the natural law theories that for centuries had assumed that law is shaped and determined by metaphysical powers
such as deity or human reason. In much-cited passages, John Austin (1790-1859)
described the basic tenets of positivism thus:
Every positive law (or every law simply and strictly so called) is set, directly or circuitously, by a sovereign individual or body, to a member or
members of the independent political society wherein its author is supreme. In other words, it is set, directly or circuitously, by a monarch or
sovereign number, to a person or persons in a state of subjection to its
author.
JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 29 (Wilfrid E. Rumble
ed., Cambridge University Press 1995) (1832). And:
The existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit is another.
Whether it be or be not is one enquiry; whether it be or be not conformable to an assumed standard, is a different enquiry. A law, which actually exists, is a law, though we happen to dislike it, or though it vary
from the text, by which we regulate our approbation and disapprobation.
Id. at 157. In modem positivist theory, these two theses live on as the "social thesis" and the "separability thesis." The latter intends to distinguish legal rules
from other norms (such as moral or religious standards) in society. The former
seeks to explain the normativity of law. See, e.g., Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1138, 1141-42 (1999) (reviewing ANTHONY SEBOK,
LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1998)). Of course, Austin further
concluded that international law does not constitute law because it is not enforced
by sovereign coercion. Later positivist international lawyers disagreed and concluded instead that norms of international law must be deduced from the collective state will. See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury, Legal Positivism as Normative Politics:
International Society, Balance of Power and Lassa Oppenheim's Positive International
Law, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 401, 423-26 (2002); Bruno Simma & Andreas L. Paulus, The
Responsibility of Individualsfor Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A Positivist
View, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 302, 303-04 (1999). But see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAW 209 (1961) (arguing that "[tihe question 'Is international law really law' can
hardly be put aside").
29 See, e.g., infra notes 78, 85, 229 and accompanying text for examples of formalism in German jurisprudence. Formalist theories are theories about adjudication, that is, theories about how law is and how it should be applied to decide
cases. They hold that law is reasonably determinate, so that a court or other
agency applying the law to a particular case can engage in a relatively mechanical
syllogistic exercise guided by the logic of legal rules. Thus, the law applier has
little, if any discretion, and may not have recourse to reasoning extant to law. See,
e.g., Leiter, supra note 28, at 1144-46. In the United States, formalism was utterly
discredited by the anti-formalists and legal realists in the early part of the last century and has never fully recovered. See, e.g., NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 32-299 (1995).
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a clear line dividing domestic and international law.30 In addition,
traditional international law doctrine, with its strong state-centric
outlook, has envisioned for international law a role only on the
31
state-to-state level.
In the United States, these assumptions have increasingly been
interpreted to mean that, on the one hand, international law can
have domestic effect only to the extent that it has been implemented by domestic legislation 32 - whereby Senate advice and con30 See, e.g., I/1 GEORG DAHM ET AL., VOLKERRECHT 102-03 (1989) (suggesting
that, today, not even the monists generally claim that international law renders
inapplicable, inconsistent domestic law within the domestic legal sphere); Harold
G. Maier, The Authoritative Sources of Customary International Law in the United
States, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 450 (1989). At least for non-Americans, Professor
Maier's piece, id., is particularly interesting because it mixes a strongly antiformalist, partly antipositivist, McDougal-inspired process view of international law
with a strict positivist-based distinction between lawmaking authority for domestic and international law.
31 See, e.g., S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 ("International law governs relations between independent States."); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 1, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (mentioning
only nation states as legal subjects capable of entering into international treaties);
1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 21-22 (2d ed. 1912) ("[T]he Law
of Nations is based on the common consent of individual States, and not of individual human beings. States solely and exclusively are the subjects of international law."); DAHM ET AL., supra note 30, at 23, 102-03 (noting that states are the
subjects of international law).
32 Contrary to traditional view (see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 111 cmt. d, 115 cmt. e (1987) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT (THIRD)] (stating that customary international law is federal law);
Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 238-39 (2d
ed. 1996) (claiming that customary international law is federal common law)), a
number of scholars have recently argued that customary international law is not
automatically the law of the United States. The arguments differ. Professor
Maier, for example, has suggested that even where a U.S. court "applies" customary law, the source of authority is its decision and thus U.S. law rather than international law because its decision to interpret the international law rule in a particular fashion represents the "will of the United States body politic." Maier, supra
note 30, at 455. Others have argued that customary international law cannot be
federal common law and thus cannot be applied by U.S. courts unless authorized
to do so by the federal political branches. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the
Modem Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 816 (1997); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts and the Incorporationof International Law, 111 HARV. L. REV.
2260 (1998) (responding to critiques of their work). But see Harold Hongju Koh, Is
InternationalLaw Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998) (critiquing Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law as FederalCommon Law: A Critique of
the Modern Position, supra); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary
International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 371 (1997); Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary InternationalLaw as
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sent under Article II, Section 2(2) of the U.S. Constitution may not
be sufficient 33 - while, on the other hand, there is little in interna34
tional law that prevents domestic law, including procedural law,
from being applied transnationally. 35 While the former view has
been under attack within the area of human rights, 36 the latter has
Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393 (1997) (offering historical support
for the traditional position).
33 This is due to the concept of the "non-self-executing" treaty-that is, the
treaty provisions which cannot be invoked by individuals before U.S. courts because either the treaty itself or the circumstances surrounding U.S. ratification indicate that the Executive or Congress considered prior implementing legislation
necessary. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 32, § 111(4). Indeed, some
have recently suggested that, as originally understood, the Constitution of the
United States requires all treaties to be implemented by Congress before they can
regulate the conduct of private parties. See John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding,99 COLUM. L. REV.
1955 (1999). But see Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding,and Treaties as "Supreme Law of the Land," 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095
(1999) (responding to Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution, supra); Carlos Manuel
Vazquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154 (1999) (refuting claims in
Yoo, supra).
34 See, e.g., infra Section 3.2 and text accompanying notes 200-209.
35 See, e.g., Burbank, World, supra note 16, at 1459-66; Maier, supra note 30, at
465-68. The contrary aspiration of the Restatement's drafters, see RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 32, § 403 cmt. a (claiming that the Restatement's mandate of a
reasonableness inquiry "has emerged as a principle of international law"), was
dealt a severe blow by the U.S. Supreme Court in HartfordFire Ins. Co. v. California,
509 U.S. 764 (1993).
36 See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 2002 WL 31063976, at *11 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying "international law as developed in the decisions of international criminal
tribunals"), reh'g en banc grantedand vacated Doe v. Unocal Corp., 2003 WL 359787
(9th Cir. 2003); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d Cir. 1995) (relying on the
settled proposition that federal common law incorporates customary international
law); Filartiga v. Pena Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 886 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying customary
international law); Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga'sFirm Footing: International Human Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463 (1997);
Kathleen Kedian, Customary InternationalLaw and Human Rights Litigation in United
States Courts: Revitalizing the Legacy of The Paquete Habana, 40 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1395 (1999); Harold Hongju Koh, TransnationalPublic Law Litigation, 100 YALE
L.J. 2347 (1991); David Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties: Exposing a Constitutional
Fallacy, 36 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 1 (2002) (opposing the modern doctrine of non-selfexecuting treaties). But see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human
Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 439-67 (2000) (arguing that
declarations of non-self execution by the political branches are valid under the
U.S. Constitution); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Current Illegitimacy
of International Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 319 (1997) (arguing
that international human rights law cannot be treated as federal law without authorization by the political branches). In interpreting the subject-matter jurisdiction of federal courts under Section 1350 of the U.S. Code, Title 28, in Sosa v. Alva-
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had considerable staying power, most recently through theories of
globalization and transnationalism that in effect claim that the time
for countries to invoke national sovereignty against the unilateral
38
37
actions of other nations is over.
In the United States and elsewhere, the respective views and
assumptions have operated to focus the attention of courts, commentators, and lawmakers on domestic law and policy in transnational litigation. Not surprisingly, the result has often been a distinct preference for domestic solutions, including in the
interpretation and application of international law.39 All of this has
spawned a long list of false starts and misconceived policies. 40 The
resulting differences among lawmakers and courts of various
rez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004), the Supreme Court now charts a middle
ground, holding that "federal courts should not recognize private claims under
federal common law for violations of any international law norm with less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the 18th-century paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted." Id. at 2765.
37 Traditionally, liberals in the United States have been concerned primarily
about what they consider to be unwarranted claims of national sovereignty
against the ability of U.S. courts to do justice, whereas conservatives have primarily fought suggestions that the President and Congress should be so limited in the
exercise of their constitutional powers. Cf Paul B. Stephan, A Becoming Modesty U.S. Litigation in the Mirror of InternationalLaw, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 627, 628 (2002)
("Commentators who wish U.S. judges to take on a broader role in addressing international injustice often deplore U.S. unilateralism by the Executive or Congress.
The reverse is also true: skeptics of collective security, typically jealous of national
sovereignty, express alarm at bold judicial action affecting foreign affairs.").
38 See, e.g., infra notes 349-355; cf In Re Automotive Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litigation, 358 F.3d 288, 304 (3d Cir. 2004) (alleging that "there is no reason
to assume that discovery under the Federal Rules would inevitably offend Germany's sovereign interest because presumably Germany, like the United States,
would prohibit the alleged price-fixing conspiracy and would welcome investigation of such antitrust violation to the fullest extent"); Ugo Mattei, American Law ina
time of Global Interdependence: U.S. National Reports to the XVIth International COngress of Comparative Law, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 87, 96 (Supp. 2002) (noting that American "legal parochialism.., can easily be explained within the Globalization =
Americanization equation").
39 See, e.g., Burbank, Reluctant Partner,supra note 25, at 123 (citing the concern
of some members of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules regarding a proposed amendment to FED. R. Civ. P. 26 in 1990 that deference be expressed in the
rule to "diplomatic efforts that are undertaken and accomplished by other
branches of government," and "[aifter expressing that deference -I don't mean as
a complete ritual, but after expressing that deference, then proceed with what we
need to do to do justice"); see also Patrick M. McFadden, Provincialismin United
States Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 4 (1995) (exploring the reasons for the marginal
role played by international law in U.S. courts).
40 See, e.g., infra Section 3.
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countries go deeper than many of them realize. Not surprisingly,
the negotiations for a multilateral treaty on jurisdiction and judgments at the Hague have been stalled. 41 The reason for all this, as a
fresh look at the subject reveals, is that the traditional view fails to
capture the richness and complexity of interrelations between the
international and the domestic levels of lawmaking and among
groups, individuals and governments acting transnationally. As it
turns out, there is a closer connection between the foreign elements
that characterize a certain type of case as "transnational" 42 and the
law applicable to it than one might at first assume.
3.

THE CASE STUDY: GERMAN JUDICIAL COOPERATION FOR
LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES

To see why this is so, I present a case study concentrating on
the ways in which the conduct of transnational litigation in one
country, through various channels, affects the conduct of transnational litigation in another and vice versa. In what follows, I analyze the way in which transnational litigation in the United States
affected judicial cooperation for litigation in the United States (including judgment recognition) in Germany from the 1950s to the
mid-1990s. Judicial cooperation is the performance of a judicial act
by one court on its territory upon the request and for the benefit of
another. 43 The need for such cooperation is based on the notion
that the power of national courts is limited, among other things by
national sovereignty. 44 What makes judicial cooperation especially
interesting for our purposes are the considerable disagreements between the United States and a number of civil law countries on the
extent to which national sovereignty limits the power of domestic
courts and on how to properly grant judicial cooperation. These
41 For the reasons of the difficulties, see generally BAUMGARTNER, HAGUE
CONVENTION, supra note 9. The project currently proceeds on a much narrower

basis as a treaty on jurisdiction and judgments recognition where there is a forum
selection clause. See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Draft on Exclusive Choice Court Agreements, Working Document 110 E (May 2004), available
at http://www.hcch.net/doc/jdgm-wdll0e.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2004).
42 See supra text accompanying note 24.
43 See, e.g., BRUNO A. RISTAU, 1 INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE § 1 (1984);
Harry Leroy Jones, InternationalJudicial Assistance: Chaos and a Programfor Reform,
62 YALE L.J. 515,515 (1953).
44 On the historical origins of this notion, see BAUMGARTNER, HAGUE
CONVENTION, supra note 9, at 48-53.
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disagreements are based largely on differences in domestic procedural concepts and on disparate views on how best to approach
45
transnational cases.
The case of Germany is particularly interesting because the
relevant actors were steeped in the traditional approaches to transnational litigation sketched above.46 The concentration on Germany within continental Europe is also apt because in that country,
one finds a well documented record of the relevant events, influences, and legal views during what Germans have termed the
Justizkonflikt (judicial conflict)47 with the United States.
The analysis that follows is based on mostly published materials as well as on personal conversations with some of the individuals involved in what has become known in Germany as the "judicial conflict" with the United States. 48 One caveat remains,
however. For various reasons, the minutes of legislative committee
meetings and much of the materials of administrative decision
making are either shrouded in confidentiality or have otherwise
become unavailable. 49 It may well be that knowledge gained from
45 See, e.g., id. §§ 2-3.

See supra Section 2.
See, e.g., DER JUSTIZKONFLIKT MIT DEN VEREINIGTEN STAATEN VON AMERIKA
(Walther J. Habscheid ed., 1986) [hereinafter JUSTIZKONFLIKT] (containing essays
on the judicial conflict between the United States and Europe); PETER SCHLOSSER,
DER JUSTIZKONFLIKT ZWISCHEN DEN USA UND EUROPA (Walter de Gruyter ed., 1985)
[hereinafter SCHLOSSER, JUSTIZKONFLIKT]; see also Peter Gottwald, Grenzen
zivilgerichtlicher Massnahmen mit Auslandswirkung, in FEsTSHcRIFT FOR WALTHER J.
HABSCHEID 119 (1989) (speaking of Justizkrieg [judicial war]). Although the rhetoric of Justizkonflikt has since subsided somewhat, many of the underlying probSee, e.g., HERAUSFORDERUNGEN DES INTERNATIONALEN
lems have not.
ZIVILVERFAHRENSRECHTS (Andreas Heldrich & Toshiyuki Kono eds., 1994) (containing contributions to a Japanese-German-Swiss symposium considering problems in transnational cases involving the United States). European complaints
about American procedural imperialism have flourished anew in the wake of the
Cold War's demise and of U.S. litigation against continental European firms regarding their roles in the Nazi Holocaust. See, e.g., Burkhard HeS, Entschddigung
Jfir NS-Zwangsarbeit vor US-amerikanischen und deutschen Zivilgerichten, 44
AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 145, 145-46 (1999) (discussing issues of Holocaust-related
ligitation). For a concise review of that litigation by one of the plaintiff's chief protagonists, see Burt Neubome, Preliminary Reflections on Aspects of Holocaust-Era
Litigation in American Courts, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 795 (2002).
48 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
49 For example, the central authorities in Germany do not keep any copies of
materials supporting requests for judicial cooperation. Thus, finding out what
happened in a particular case is all but impossible to discover after the fact. See,
e.g., Harald Koch, Zur Praxis der Rechtshilfe im amerikanisch-deutschenProzeflrecht 46

47
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such materials would change the analysis to some degree.
3.1. The German Developments
Disagreements about the proper method of judicial cooperation
between Germany and the United States are nothing new. There
was a lengthy diplomatic exchange as early as 1874 when imperial
Germany saw itself forced to defend its newly obtained sovereignty against perceived U.S. intrusions. 50 While post-World War
II West Germany was relatively forthcoming to unilateral U.S. interests in its approach to judicial cooperation, 51 the country quickly
reverted to its prewar position after U.S. occupation ended in
53
1955.52 The position, similar to that of other civil law countries,
briefly stated, is: that the performance of judicial acts by foreign
officials, such as the service of process and the taking of evidence,
are not permitted on German territory without the previous permission of German authorities; that the proper way to obtain such
judicial acts on German territory is to request a German court,
through diplomatic channels, to perform them; and that, in executing such a request, usually called a letter rogatory or letter of request, 54 a German court will generally apply German law, including limitations on the collection of evidence that are considerably
tighter than in the United States.55 This position and its various
ramifications had been developed through transnational cases that

Ergebnisse einer Umfrage zu den Haager Zustellungs - und Beweisibereinkommen, 5
IPRAx 245, 245 (1985).
50 See BORN, supra note 13, at 849 (describing German diplomatic protests
against attempts of a U.S. Vice-Consul and an Assistant U.S. Attorney to take
sworn testimony on German territory).
51 In judging how voluntarily Germany really cooperated with U.S. authorities, one needs to be aware not only of the function of the United States as an occupying force but also of the fact that several of the cases at issue concerned German suits to reclaim property from the U.S. Alien Property Custodian under the
Trading with the Enemy Act. For an example of such a case, see Jones, supra note
43, at 532.
52 See ABBO JUNKER, DISCOVERY IM DEUTSCH-AMERIKANISCHEN RECiTSVERKEHR
221 (1987). See generally Bundesministerium der Justiz, Rechtshilfeordnung fdr
Zivilsachen, Oct. 19, 1956 [hereinafter ZRHO]; Hans Arnold, MONATSSCHRIFT FOR
DEUTSCHES RECHT 385 (1957) (describing the German position).
53 See, e.g., BORN, supra note 13, at 774-77, 847-49 (discussing civil law views).
54 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1781 (2002).
55 See, e.g., BORN, supra note 13, at 774-77, 847-49; JUNKER, supra note 52, at 21822 (discussing the German approach).
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mostly involved other countries of the European continent, countries with which Germany shares a good deal of legal history and
procedural approaches as well as traditions regarding the territorial limits of state action in private international law.5 6 Countries,
moreover, with which Germany had concluded a staggering number of treaties on judicial cooperation,5 7 thus further harmonizing
58
approaches.
How this historically grown German position should be applied in detail to cases involving the United States with its entirely
different litigation system and different views on judicial cooperation is a question that began to vex governmental authorities,
courts, and, after a while, academics beginning in the late 1970s,
when German companies, having invested heavily in the United
States, increasingly became involved in U.S. litigation.5 9 The response both under German domestic law and, since 1979,60 under
the Hague Service 61 and Hague Evidence 62 Conventions, has been a
steady and relatively rigid application of the traditional German
position, thus leading to recurrent frictions with U.S. courts and
litigants searching for ways to serve process on, and receive evidence from, German nationals without having to go through the
time-consuming and often unproductive letter-of-request proce-

56
57

See, e.g., BAUMGARTNER, HAGUE CONVENTION, supra note 9, at 47-67.
See, e.g., NAGEL & GOTTWALD, supra note 17, at 7-8 (listing sixteen treaties).

See also Jones, supra note 43, at 516 (noting that civil law countries "have covered
the globe with a network of treaties to assure judicial assistance" among them).
58 On the harmonizing effect of bilateral recognition compacts between continental European states, see Gerhard Walter & Samuel P. Baumgartner, General Report: The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Outside the Scope of the

Brussels and Lugano Conventions, in 3

CIVIL PROCEDURE IN EUROPE: THE RECOGNITION
AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE BRUSSELS AND

LUGANO CONVENTIONS 1, 6-8 (Gerhard Walter et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter Walter
& Baumgartner, Recognition].
59 See infra Section 3.1.1.
60 Between Germany and the United States, the two conventions entered into
force on June 26, 1979, with their ratification by Germany. See Convention on the
Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T.
361, 658 U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter Hague Service Convention]; Convention on the
Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, Mar. 18, 1970, 23
U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter Hague Evidence Convention]. The
United States had ratified the Hague Service Convention in 1967 (with effect in
1969) and the Evidence Convention in 1972.
61 Hague Service Convention, supra note 60.
62 Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 60.
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dure insisted on by Germany. In addition, starting in the late
1980s, German courts began to decide more or less difficult questions of recognition law against U.S. judgment creditors.
While a certain liberalization has taken place since,63 these
German developments are as striking for what did not happen as
for what did. To this day, the regular German exposure to transnational litigation in U.S. courts has not led to an alteration of the
traditional German position on judicial cooperation that would
even come close, if perhaps only under certain circumstances, to
providing litigants in U.S. courts with the evidence they need. It
also has not led German authorities to abandon a seemingly outdated interpretation of national sovereignty regarding the service
of process and the taking of evidence on and from German territory or at least to modify that interpretation so as not to require the
costly, and time-consuming, letter-of-request procedure in most
cases. 64 And finally, the exposure to U.S. litigation has not led to a
recognition practice that would oppose the recognition of U.S.
judgments only in the most exceptional of cases.
The reasons for these German developments are manifold, including prominently the behavior of transnational litigants and the
actions of U.S. courts and governmental authorities in cases involving German nationals and their reactions to the German position
just described. A closer analysis suggests that, on the most basic
level, the following factors were important: (1) a sustained effort by
German industry to achieve protection from mushrooming U.S.
litigation that threatened to inflict costs of a magnitude these industries could hardly imagine from their experience with domestic
German litigation; (2) a distinct, historically grown view of law and
procedure in general and of the mandates of international law and
of appropriate approaches to transnational litigation in particular;
(3) a lack of understanding of the very different views and approaches in the United States on those subjects; and (4) a perceived
need to protect German law and sovereignty from unwarranted intrusions by U.S. courts and litigants. As the following analysis
shows, these factors interacted in specific ways to cause what is
generally known in Germany as the Justizkonflikt,65 suggesting a
number of assumptions about the way the lawmaking process in
63
64
65

See infra text accompanying notes 156-167.
See infra Section 3.1.2.
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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transnational litigation works.
3.1.1.

Initial Stages

From 1955 to 1970, judicial cooperation for litigation in the
United States was not much of an issue in Germany. There were
few U.S. cases that required the procurement of service or evidence
on or from German territory, and in such cases as did occur, acceptable solutions were often available. Not that the German approach was satisfactory from a U.S. point of view. Far from it, not
only was it usually necessary to file a letter rogatory with the appropriate German authorities, who would then apply their own
law to execute the request, 66 but also those authorities who nevertheless refused (and still refuse in the absence of an applicable
treaty 67 today) to apply any measures of compulsion. 68 On the basis of an exchange of diplomatic notes from 1955-56, never published in Germany, U.S. consular officers were allowed to question
persons residing in Germany. 69 Although the consular officers,
too, were prevented from applying any means of compulsion, 70
they could at least make needed evidence available in a form that
could be used in U.S. court.7 '
Obviously, this arrangement was both fragile and complicated
and therefore could not be expected to work for more frequent or
66 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
67 The two most important treaties containing an obligation of the requested
state to apply compulsion, where necessary, to serve process or to take evidence
are the Hague Service and Evidence Conventions. See infra note 112 (discussing
improvements brought about by the Conventions).
68 ZRHO, supra note 52, §§ 70(2), 83(1). This is based on the theory that any
application of compulsion by the state requires a basis in parliamentary legislation. The ZRHO, which regulates judicial assistance, is, however, merely a regulation issued by the executives of the federal and state governments. See, e.g., Rolf
Stimer, Die Gerichte und Behorden der U.S.A. und die Beweisaufnahme in Deutschland,
81 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR VERGLEICHENDE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFr 159, 202 (1982) [hereinafter Stfirner, Beweisaufnahme].
69 Agreement Relating to the Taking of Evidence, Feb. 11, 1955-Oct. 8, 1956,
U.S.-F.R.G., 32 U.S.T. 4181.
70 The Notes provided that U.S. consular officers could question West German and other non-U.S. nationals, without compulsion of any kind, with an opportunity for the person questioned to be accompanied by counsel, at the consular
premises or (upon the express request or express consent of the person to be questioned) at the home or place of business of the person to be questioned. Id.
71 See, e.g., ULRICH DROBNIG, AMERICAN-GERMAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
340 (2d ed. 1972).
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larger litigation. Not surprisingly, then, even this time period did
not remain without frictions. The attempt by the U.S. Justice Department ("DoJ") to break up a cartel in the international shipping
industry and the DoJ's concomitant order to German and other
companies to produce a large number of documents in the United
States, for example, elicited a sharp diplomatic protest from Germany in 196072 and resulted in a German blocking statute applicable to high seas shipping enterprises. 73 However, at the time, this
was considered primarily a political incident based on opposing
views on economic policy rather than as an elementary issue of judicial cooperation. Thus, it did not interrupt the period in which
judicial cooperation for litigation in U.S. courts was a relatively
rare, calm, and low-key operation of little interest to courts, government officials, and academics.
This changed in the 1970s, when U.S. product liability, private
antitrust, and securities litigation came into full swing, engulfing
German,74 as well as U.S. companies. 75 Grasping the extent of their
vulnerability under U.S. procedural rules as applied to foreign defendants, German companies quickly began to ask the German
governmental agencies for help while presenting the traditional
German approach on judicial cooperation to U.S. courts. 76 Yet,
their efforts, however determined, largely failed to produce the
72 In re Grand Jury Investigation of the Shipping Indus., 186 F. Supp. 298, 318
(D.D.C. 1960) (discussing the objections of several nations, including Germany,
regarding the production of documents).
73 Gesetz Ober die Aufgaben des Bundes auf dem Gebiet der Seeschiffahrt, v.
24.5.1965 (BGB1. II S.835-36) [Law on the Tasks of the Federal Government in the
Area of High-Seas Shipping].
74 Apparently, an extraordinarily favorable currency-exchange rate had
unleashed a wave of German investment in the United States in the early 1970s,
thus further increasing German exposure to U.S. litigation. See Abbo Junker, Der
lange Arm amerikanischerGerichte: Gerichtsgewalt, Zustellung und JurisdictionalDiscovery, 6 IPRAx 197, 198 (1986).
75 U.S. companies also perceived (or at least found it convenient to assert)
that the new onslaught of litigation had taken on crisis proportions and thus began to push strongly for tort and procedure reform, initiating the first tort reform
movement that was carried by prominent judges, justices, and practicing attorneys as well as by corporations themselves. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Reading the
Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About
Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 6-11 (1983) (exploring perceptions that the United States was overly litigious in the 1970s and
1980s).
76 See, e.g., Hermann H. Hollmann, Diskussion, in JusTIzKoNFLIKT, supra note
47, at 138, 140.
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governmental support they had hoped for. While the German
government did intervene diplomatically or file aide-memoires in
support of German litigants in those cases in which a violation of
German sovereignty, and thus of international law was clearly impending under the traditional German view. 77 However, it was not
until the early 1980s that concern for German industry began to affect German judicial cooperation for litigation in U.S. courts in the
large number of cases in which things were less clear.
Why did it take so long for those interests to make a difference?
Essentially, we can identify two factors. First, there is a formalist
view of the process of law-application by courts and governmental
authorities. This view prevented the German government from
diplomatically intervening in U.S. litigation simply to support its
domestic industry without clear evidence of a violation of international law or German national sovereignty, actual or impending.
Second, German authorities lacked any information on U.S. civil
procedure and on U.S. approaches to transnational litigation. Initially, this led to the assumption that, however different U.S. procedure may be from its German counterpart, U.S. courts would
generally recognize international law and German sovereignty as
seen from the point of view of the traditional German approach.
Accordingly, German authorities were willing to give the benefit of
the doubt to the U.S. legal system, rather than to a German industry that had an apparent interest in protecting itself from exposure
to liability litigation in the United States. 78 As time wore on, how77 See, e.g., Volkswagenwerk AG v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d, 503
(1973). In this case, the Superior Court for the County of Sacramento had ordered
the deposition of various Volkswagen employees and ordered Volkswagen to
permit inspection of its plant in Wolfsburg, Germany, on consecutive working
days, both clear violations of the traditional rule that any taking of evidence on
German territory without prior assent of the German government violates German judicial sovereignty. See supra text accompanying notes 53-55; see also Ernst
C. Stiefel, "Discovery": Probleme und Erfahrungen im Deutsch-Amerikanischen Rechtshilfeverkehr, 25 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT [RIW] 509, 515 (1979)
(citing two unpublished cases in which similar orders of federal courts to permit
discovery on German territory led to diplomatic interventions by the German
government); Diplomatic Note Dated September 27, 1979, from the Embassy of
the Federal Republic of Germany to the U.S. Department of State, reprinted in
BORN, supra note 13, at 777 (protesting the use of direct mail to serve process on
German defendants).
78 See, e.g., Hollmann, supra note 76, at 139 (complaining that the industry's
requests for help and information on how to proceed in U.S. litigation was often
met with "lack of knowledge, lack of interest, or even a playing down of the problems").
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ever, and as incidents of both U.S. court orders and individual attorney behavior in violation of the traditional German view became more frequent, this lack of information allowed German industry representatives, a number of whom had a good grasp of the
relevant U.S. law, 79 to put their spin on how U.S. procedure was
perceived in Germany.
The latter development was aided by information gained from
newly published decisions and their subsequent scholarly discussion. While German activity in the early U.S. cases against German
corporations, including those few that had led to diplomatic interventions, had occurred largely within the confines of the Foreign
Office and the justice ministries of the individual Linder governments, 80 the published reports of three cases between 1978 and
1981 brought home to a larger audience of German lawyers the
perceived realities of some aspects of U.S. law that in-house counsel of German companies had long lamented: large, from German
standards virtually inconceivable, damage awards handed down
by unpredictable juries; 81 expensive, 82 party-driven discovery with
comparatively immense scope and scant protection of trade and
business secrets; 83 and a willingness of at least some U.S. courts to

79 Some had acquired LL.M. degrees from U.S. law schools.
80 See, e.g., Peter Schlosser, InternationaleRechtshilfe und RechtsstaatlicherSchutz
von Beweispersonen, 94 ZErrscHRIrFr FOR ZIvILPROZESS [ZZP] 369, 370 (1981) [herein-

after Schlosser, Rechtshilfel (noting that before the entry into force of the Hague
Service and Evidence Conventions, judicial assistance had been conducted exclusively by the justice ministries of the Lander under § 9 ZRHO, supra note 52, thus
failing to create published opinions). But see Hans-Viggo von Htilsen, Vorlage von
Dokumenten und Zeugenvernehmungen ffir US-Zivilprozesse [Pre Trial Discovery], 20
AUSSENWIRTSCHAFTSDIENST DES BETRIEBS-BERATERS [AWD] 315 (1974) (reporting on
Volkswagenwerk, supra note 77).
81 This aspect was brought home by a brief student note, based on an article
in the Wall Street Journal, reporting on a domestic U.S. case in which a California
jury had handed down a $128.5 million verdict against Ford Motor Co., including,
at $125 million, one of the largest punitive awards in a product liability case at the
time. See Peter C. Heesch, Amerikanisches Gericht verhdngt 125 Mio. $ Strafschadenersatz, 33 JURISTENZEITUNG UZ] 247 (1978). On remittitur, the trial judge reduced
the award to $3.5 million, and this was upheld by the Court of Appeals (both of
which remained unreported in Germany). See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119
Cal. App. 3d 757 (Ct. App. 1981).
82 Germany follows the loser-pays rule for apportioning attorneys' fees. §
91(1) (ZPO) provides in pertinent part, "The losing party has to bear the costs of
the litigation, including indemnifying the opponent for his costs, as far as they
were necessary for the effective prosecution or defense of the claim."
83 The first published case exemplifying these aspects of U.S. discovery to the
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enforce their procedural rules transnationally in the face of sovereignty objections by the foreign governments involved.8 4 These
aspects of U.S. litigation appeared both crude and threatening.
German legal community involved an antitrust counterclaim, in support of which
the claimant sought to discover numerous documents from two alleged German
co-conspirators as well as the deposition of some of the latters' current and former
executives. The District Court for the Western District of Virginia ordered that the
discovery proceed through the letter-of-request procedure of the Hague Evidence
Convention, then newly ratified by Germany. It thus generated the first (and so
far last) published German decisions on whether, and to what extent, a U.S. letter
of request should be executed under that Convention in Germany. Coming Glass
Works v. Int'l Telephone & Telegraph Corp., OLG MUnchen, 36 JZ 540 (1981), reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 1025, 1025 (1981); Int'l Telephone & Telegraph Corp. v. Bavarian Ministry of Justice, OLG Mthnchen, 36 JZ 538 (1981), reprintedin 20 I.L.M. 1025,
1049 (1981). While the U.S. court in that case appears to have made every effort to
narrow the discovery order so as to meet a high standard of materiality, including
a narrowing of the lines of questioning upon informal request by the Munich district court, see Schlosser, Rechtshilfe, supra note 80, at 373-74 (reproducing the narrowed request in English), the request still went far beyond what is permissible
under German law. Id. at 383. In the Bavarian Ministry of Justice decision, supra,
the Munich court refused to order the production of various documents from
German territory under Article 23 of the Convention without deciding whether
and to what extent the document request would otherwise violate German law.
20 I.L.M. at 1055. In the Coming Glass Works decision, it let the depositions of the
witnesses proceed under questioning of a German judge and in application of
most of the limitations that the German Code of Civil Procedure sets for the scope
of discovery -including a limitation on the questioning to the subject matter contained in the requested documents -but in the presence of a U.S. magistrate judge
and in accordance with the U.S. court's request to administer oaths and to produce a verbatim transcript. 20 I.L.M. at 1032-39. In a sequel to the second decision, the Munich courts later decided that the witnesses to be heard in executing
the letter of request were prevented by German procedural law from divulging
any trade or business secrets. AG Muinchen, 27 RIW 850 (1981); LG Mtinchen, 27
RIW 851 (1981). In a more disturbing case, from a German point of view and also
published in Germany, see Stiirner, Beweisaufnahme, supra note 68, at 161-64. A
California court had ordered Volkswagen to permit "claimant's representatives to
have access to the VWAG facilities at Wolfsburg... on five consecutive days to
inspect and photograph the premises" and to inspect and copy any writings
"which plaintiffs shall designate as bearing upon [their claims]." Volkswagenwerk AG v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 840, 847 (Ct. App. 1981). The California Court of Appeal later granted a petition for mandamus and reversed and
ordered the discovery order to proceed under the Hague Evidence Convention.
Id. at 848.
84 In Volkswagenwerk, the trial court had not thought it necessary to proceed
under the Hague Evidence Convention, although VWAG had produced an aide
memoire issued by the German government describing the traditional German
position on sovereignty (although admittedly under the legal regime controlling
before entry into force of the Hague Evidence Convention) to a California court in
an earlier case in which a similar discovery order had been at stake. See Volkswagenwerk AG, 123 Cal. App. 3d at 855.
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They seemed crude from the point of view of a legal culture that
has spent centuries fine-tuning the balance of interests at stake in
private law and procedure through the promulgation of intricate
rules of decision to be applied by judges well schooled in those
rules. 85 They appeared threatening because of the apparent willingness of U.S. courts to value federal and state procedural rules
above than German sovereignty concerns 86 in a political and economic environment in which the U.S. courts have had the upper
hand and in an equity tradition that provides them with judicial
powers and discretion unparalleled in Germany.
Aided by a change of the controlling law from a dusty adminis88
trative regulation 87 to more interesting international conventions,
these published cases elevated the arcana of judicial cooperation
from the monotonous routines of governmental agencies to a topic
of primary legal concern, resulting in a sudden onset of scholarly
discussion. 89 This early academic discussion, in turn, was instrumental in setting the parameters of the debate both for a larger legal public and for future decisions by courts and governmental
agencies in a culture in which the published works of scholars are
more influential than in the United States.90 Although primarily
85 See, e.g., Joachim Zekoll, Kant and Comparative Law - Some Reflections on a
Reform Effort, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2719, 2743-45 (1996) (describing the German process
of law application in private-law matters).
86 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 77 (discussing the Volkswagenwerk
case).
87 See supra note 52.
88 See Hague Service Convention, supra note 60; Hague Evidence Convention,
supranote 60.
89 See, e.g., F.A. Mann, Anmerkung, 36 JZ 840 (1981) (commenting on
Volkswagenwerk); Rolf Sttirner, Rechtshilfe nach dem HaagerBeweisiibereinkommen fir
Common Law-Lander, 36 JZ 521 (1981) [hereinafter Sttirner, Rechtshilfe]; Schlosser,
Rechtshilfe, supra note 80; Starner, Beweisaufnahme, supra note 68. In-house counsel
of, and attorneys representing German firms also participated in the scholarly
debate. See Hermann H. Hollmann, Auslandszustellungen in US-amerikanischen
Zivil-und Verwaltungssachen, 28 RIW 784 (1982); Hans-Viggo von Htilsen, Gebrauch
und Missbrauch US-amerikanischer "pre-trial discovery" und die internationale
Rechtshilfe, 28 RIW 225 (1982); Hans-Viggo von Htilsen, Kanadische und Europdische
Reaktionen auf die US "pre-trial discovery," 28 RIW 537 (1982); Dirk-Reiner Martens,
Erfahrungen mit Rechtshilfeersuchen aus den USA nach dem Haager BeweisaufnahmeUbereinkommen, 27 RIW 725 (1981).
90 See, e.g., RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAw 715 (6th ed. 1998)
(noting that "courts in civil-law countries show more respect for the scholar's
view than is customary in the common-law world" and that "[w]hen a lawyer in a
'civil law' country has a legal problem which is not definitely settled by statute he
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engaging in German-style, deductive doctrinal reasoning, these
early scholarly articles betray three major concerns in dealing with
judicial cooperation under the Hague Service and Evidence Conventions: (1) a felt need to protect German businesses from these
disfavored U.S. practices on German territory; (2) closely related, a
felt need to protect German law from imports deriving from U.S.
legal culture; and (3) a felt need to protect German sovereignty
from incursion by U.S. court orders.
Not surprisingly, the doctrinal conclusions of these articles,
particularly those on the execution in Germany of U.S. letters of
request under the Hague Evidence Convention, were less than
heartening from the point of view of U.S. litigants. While generally
deploring the German government's decision to enter a reservation
under Article 23 of the convention, which allows a member state to
declare "that it will not execute Letters of Request issued for the
purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents as known in
Common Law countries," 91 scholars simply noted that such was
now the law. 92 Moreover, they did not veer far from German requirements in interpreting the convention's provisions regarding
the execution of requests to depose witnesses. Most importantly,
they concluded that such depositions would have to be conducted
by the judge, as is usual in Germany, 93 respect the privileges
may be satisfied to solve it without reference to decisions, but never without the
literature" (quoting Fritz Moses, InternationalLegal Practice,4 FORDHAM L. REV. 244,
266 (1935)).
91 The German legislation implementing the Hague Evidence Convention
provides that the executive may pass a regulation allowing for the execution of
letters requesting the discovery of documents under circumstances to be specified
by that regulation. Ausfaihrungsgesetz zum Haager Beweisaufnahmeuibereinkommen § 14, v. 1980 (BGBI. II S.1297). Until now, no such regulation has been
enacted. See infra text accompanying note 164.
92 See, e.g., Schlosser, Rechtshilfe, supra note 80, at 394-95; Stirner, Rechtshilfe,
supra note 89, at 522.
93 While some scholars concluded that a request for a U.S.-style examination
of the witnesses by the parties' attorneys could be granted under Article 9(2) of
the Convention, as long as the examination was conducted in German, under the
supervision of a German judge, and with the further limitations noted in the text,
see Schlosser, Rechtshilfe, supra note 80, at 386-90, others thought that such a request could arguably be refused as "impossible... by reason of practical difficulties" under Article 9(2). See, e.g., Stirner, Rechtshilfe, supra note 89, at 524. On the
primary role of the judge in taking evidence, including questioning witnesses in
Germany, see, for example, David J. Gerber, ExtraterritorialDiscovery and the Conflict of ProceduralSystems: Germany and the United States, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 745, 75355 (1986); John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L.
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granted by the German code of civil procedure, 94 particularly its
far-reaching protection of trade and business secrets, 95 and that
execution could be refused when the letter of request did not specify lines of questioning sufficiently narrow or sufficiently substantiated as to clearly indicate that the proponent was not merely fish96
ing for evidence.
While the
availability of U.S.-style depositions was thus controversial, however, those commentators had no objection to German courts administering oaths and creating
verbatim transcripts when requested by the U.S. court under Article 9(2) of the
Convention. See, e.g., Schlosser, Rechtshilfe, supra note 80, at 394-95.
94 Article 11 of the Convention provides: "In the execution of a Letter of Request the person concerned may refuse to give evidence in so far as he has a privilege to give evidence -(a) under the law of the State of execution." Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 60, at 243; see, e.g., Stirner, Rechtshilfe, supra note 89,
at 524.
95 See, e.g., Schlosser, Rechtshilfe, supra note 80, at 402-05; Stirner, Rechtshilfe,
supra note 89, at 523-24. This view is based on Article 9(1) of the Convention,
which provides that "[tihe judicial authority which executes a Letter of Request
shall apply its own law as to the methods and procedures to be followed." Hague
Evidence Convention, supra note 60, at 243. On the scope of the protection of
trade and business secrets in German procedure, see Gerber, supra note 93, at 76467.
96 See, e.g., Mann, supra note 89, at 840; Schlosser, Rechtshilfe, supra note 80, at
384-90; Sttimer, Rechtshilfe, supra note 89, at 521-22. This conclusion is based on
Article 3 of the Convention, the German translation of which is clearly more amenable to such an interpretation than its English original. While Article 3(c) requires that a Letter of Request specify "the nature of the proceedings for which
the evidence is required, giving all necessary information in regard thereto,"
Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 62, at 2558, the German equivalent says
"die Art und den Gegenstand der Rechtssache sowie eine gedrdngte Darstellung des
Sachverhalts" ["the nature and the subject matter of the dispute and a brief exposition
of the facts"I (emphasis added). And while Article 3 further requires that "where
appropriate, the Letter shall specify... (f) the questions to be put to the persons to
be examined or a statement of the subject-matter about which they are about to be
examined," id., the German translation states "[dias Rechtshilfeersuchen enthdlt
ausserdem, je nach Sachlage:... (f) die Fragen, welche an die einzuvernehmende
Personen gerichtet werden sollen, oder die Tatsachen, iiber die sie einvernommen
werden sollen" ["the letter of request shall further contain, depending on the specific
situation .. the questions to be directed at the persons examined or the facts about
which they are to be interrogated"] (emphasis added). The reason for these differences is largely attributable to sloppy drafting at The Hague. Although the
German text is not an authentic text, the French version of the Convention is, and
the German represents a fairly good translation. In any case, some commentators
even suggested that substantial attempts at fishing might violate German public
policy under Article 12(b) of the Convention-see, for example, Schlosser, Rechtshilfe, supra note 80, at 380-84 -and most of them chided the Munich court, supra
text accompanying note 83, for executing a letter of request that, in their view,
clearly represented a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. (Remember that
REV. 823, 826-30 (1985) [hereinafter Langbein, German Advantage].
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Available data indicates that the relevant German decisionmakers largely shared these views. A 1985 survey conducted by
Professor Koch among German Central Authorities 97 revealed that
of the seventy-five letters of request from the United States that
had been received under the Hague Evidence Convention between
1979 and 1984, the majority were considered defective under Articles 398 or 12(b)99 or inadmissible under Article 23.100 Of those,
twelve were refused execution while the rest were executed in a
more limited fashion than requested or were executed to the extent
that the witness in question participated voluntarily. 0 1 With regard to the Hague Service Convention, the survey showed that the
German Central Authorities had received 1,628 requests to effect
service of process, of which, about one fifth were refused execution.1 02 Refusals occurred primarily because requests failed to provide adequate translations of the documents to be served under
Article 5(2),103 or because, it was argued, a U.S. attorney was not an
"authority or judicial officer" for purposes of requesting service
under Article 3(1) of the convention. 10 4 Some of the rejected refrom an American point of view, the requests before the Munich court were considerably narrower than what is usual in an antitrust case. Supra note 83.) For
more on the German rule against "fishing," in its attempting to weed out unjustified intrusions into privacy by requiring the court to be satisfied, either from evidence already available or from a sufficiently specific allegation by the proponent
that a particular line of questioning is likely to produce relevant evidence, see
Gerber, supra note 93, at 762-63, explaining the German standard of relevancy, and
see generally, ROLF STORNER, DIE AUFKLARUNGSPFLICHT DER PARTEEN DES
ZIVILPROZESSES

(1976).

Koch, supra note 49.
98 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
99 See id.
100 Koch, supra note 49, at 247-48. One Central Authority responded that 90%
of requests would have been refused execution under Article 12 had the witnesses
in question not participated voluntarily. Id. at 248.
101 Id. at 247-48.
97

102

Id. at 245-46.

The German Declaration to the Hague Service Convention requires such a
translation. See Declaration of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Convention on the Service of Process in Civil and Commercial Matters, Oct. 3, 1990 [hereinafter German Declaration on Service Convention] ("Formal service... shall be
permissible only if the document ... is written in, or translated into, the German
language.").
104 This ground for refusing service is puzzling since discussions among the
member states of the Convention in 1977 had acknowledged the fact that, in the
United States, service is often initiated by attomeys and thus had agreed that U.S.
103
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quests involved claims by U.S. federal agencies that represented, as
the German Central Authorities reasoned, administrative rather
than "civil or commercial matters" within the meaning of the
Hague Service Convention. 105 In addition, much to the displeasure
of U.S. courts and litigants, some of the German Central Authorities turned out to be exceedingly formalistic in handling requests
for service. 106 Finally, at about the same time, the German government took the opportunity of a diplomatic protest against a
Michigan court's order in violation of the 1955-56 exchange of diplomatic notes 107 in order to press hard for a discontinuation of the
practice of deposing German individuals before U.S. consular officials under that exchange. 108 Subsequently, the U.S. State Departcounsel were permitted to complete letters of request under Article 3 of the Convention. See Report of the United States Delegation, 17 I.L.M. 316 (1978) (reporting that "attorneys are proper 'Applicants' under the Convention, and should be
so regarded by foreign Central Authorities").
105 Koch, supra note 49, at 246. A number of requests were further rejected
because they attempted to have the Central Authority serve interrogatories or
other discovery requests, and thus, in the view of the German Authorities, represented an attempt to circumvent the more exacting requirements of the Hague
Evidence Convention. Id.
106 See, e.g., Rivers v. Stihl, Inc., 434 So. 2d 766, 769 (Ala. 1983) (expressing exasperation with the Justice Ministry of Baden-Wiirttemberg, which had refused
service twice within one-and-one-half years; the first time because the plaintiff's
attorney had failed both to use the official form referred to in Article 3(1) of the
Convention and to provide the German translation on separate sheets of paper
and the second time because the attorney failed to send the documents to be
served in duplicate as Article 3(2) of the Convention requires).
107 See supra text accompanying notes 69-71. The Michigan court had violated
the terms of the agreement because it had ordered depositions before a U.S. consular official in Germany on pain of sanctions. See Brief of the United States as
Amicus Curiae at 8, Volkswagenwerk AG v. Falzon, 461 U.S. 1303 (1983) (No. 821888), reprintedin 23 I.L.M. 412, 416-17 (1984).
108 See id. at 417 n.5 (documenting the exchange of notes). The basic argument of the German government was that the legislation implementing the Hague
Evidence Convention, in its refusal to accept any taking of evidence by diplomatic
and consular personnel against German nationals under Articles 15 and 16 of that
Convention, superseded any prior or subsequent declaration to the contrary by
the Foreign Office, or any other arm of the executive. See id. at 420, 421 (reproducing the German Note Verbale of April 28, 1983 to the American Embassy, Bonn).
While legally correct, see JUNKER, supra note 52, at 349-50, this argument came as
somewhat of a surprise after the Foreign Office had specifically declared to the
U.S. government in 1979 that the understanding from the 1955-56 exchange of
notes was still considered valid after the entry into force of the Hague Evidence
Convention between the United States and Germany. See Judicial Assistance,
Taking of Evidence, Agreements effected by exchange of notes (Oct. 17, 1979)
T.I.A.S. 9938 (documenting the understanding).
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ment apparently advised its consular agents to no longer to depose
German nationals.10 9
3.1.2.

The "JudicialConflict" Emerges

To the extent that these developments were the result of a conscious effort to limit the effects of disfavored U.S. procedure on
German businesses and on German law and to preserve German
sovereignty, 1 0 they turned out to be based on a deficient strategy.
Again, German governmental authorities and scholars had made
assumptions about U.S. practice on the basis of their own procedural and jurisprudential approaches. Although some scholars
had engaged the mechanics of (federal) U.S. procedure,"' their
comparative enterprise was relatively limited and thus left them
unaware of essential tenets of U.S. procedure as well as of the
pragmatism and ingenuity with which U.S. courts and counsel approach new problems. They had also underestimated the willingness of U.S. courts unilaterally to enforce their procedural views in
transnational cases, if necessary in the face of diplomatic protests
and based on questionable treaty interpretations.
This lack of information was crucial for further developments.
For from the U.S. perspective, the Hague Service and Hague Evidence Conventions may have brought some improvements over2
the previous regime governing judicial cooperation in Germany;"
yet, the described German developments imposed severe limitations on the usefulness of the letter-of-request procedure. This was
particularly problematic because, following its traditional posi-

109 See JUNKER,

supra note 52, at 349.

110 See supra text accompanying note 90.
111See Schlosser, Rechtshilfe, supra note 80; Stirner, Rechtshilfe, supra note 89;
StUrner, Beweisaufnahme, supra note 68.
112 The most important improvements were the introduction of the centralauthority mechanism, thus shortening the lengthy diplomatic channels through
which letters rogatory need to travel, see, for example, BORN, supra note 13, at 79899, 897-98 (giving an overview of the Central-Authority mechanism under the
Hague Service and Evidence Conventions); increasing the availability of formal
service, compare supra note 68 and accompanying text with Hague Service Convention, supra note 61, arts. 5 & 13; and improving the availability of compelled
testimony under oath, compare supra note 70 with Hague Evidence Convention,
art. 10. Note, however, that German law does not allow for the compulsion of testimony from parties, thus limiting the usefulness of Article 10 for American litigants. See, e.g., Schlosser, Rechtshilfe, supra note 80, at 380.
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tion," 3 Germany had objected to virtually all forms of serving
process and taking evidence in its territory other than by letter of
request under the two conventions." 4 The effect was most pronounced in the evidence area, where documents would, thus,
largely be undiscoverable and both the access to, and the scope of,
witness testimony would remain severely restricted. Together
with exasperation over the perceived formalism of German Central
Authorities" 5 and with impatience over the expense and delay imposed by the letter-of-request procedure, these German limitations-and related limitations imposed by other civil law countries-led U.S. courts to endorse new interpretations of the two
conventions." 6 Most importantly, U.S. courts gradually changed
from requiring, as a matter of comity, that first resort be the procedures of the Hague Evidence Convention, 1 7 to routinely ordering
See supra text accompanying notes 53-55.
In its declaration to the Hague Service Convention, Germany has objected
to the use of the alternative methods of service in Articles 8 (service through diplomatic or consular agents) and 10 (service by mail and direct service through judicial officers, officials or other competent persons in the state of destination) of
that Convention. German Declaration on Service Convention, supra note 103. In
its Declaration to the Hague Evidence Convention, Germany has allowed the taking of evidence on its territory by commissioners and consular officers under Articles 15-17 of the Convention only upon prior permission and possibly with restrictions, unless the person from whom evidence is to be taken is a national of the
requesting state. Declaration of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters, Mar. 18, 1970
[hereinafter German Declaration on Evidence Convention]. Note also, that even
in the latter case, the Convention does not permit the use of any measures of compulsion. In any case, in implementing the Hague Evidence Convention, the
German legislature, upon suggestion by the German government, further mandated that "[tihe taking of evidence by diplomatic or consular representatives is
impermissible if it concerns German nationals." Gesetz zur Ausftihrung des Haager Ubereinkommens (Ausfuhrungsgesetz), v. 22.12.1977 (BGBl. I. S.3105, 3106).
115 See, e.g., supra note 106 and accompanying text (noting German refusal of
service on technical grounds).
116 As one federal district court remarked, for example: "[Tihe [procedure
under the Hague Evidence Convention] does not appear to be trouble free. Perhaps its most glaring fault... is that Germany has exercised its right not to execute letters of request 'issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of
documents as known in Common law countries.'" Murphy v. Reifenhauser KG
Maschinenfabrik, 101 F.R.D. 360, 361 (D. Vt. 1984).
117 For examples of cases where the court resorted to the Hague Evidence
Convention, see Phila. Gear Corp. v. Am. Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58, 60 (E.D. Pa.
1983); Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 39 Fed. R. Serv. 2d. 211 (N.D. Ill.
1983); Pierburg GmbH & Co. Kg. v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 238 (Ct.
App. 1982); Th. Goldschmidt AG v. Smith, 676 S.W.2d 443 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984);
113

114
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foreign individuals under the court's jurisdiction to produce evidence located abroad for inspection in the United States without
considering the Convention as helpful or even necessary." 8 Some
courts concluded that the Convention did not even apply "to the
production of evidence in this country by a party subject to the jurisdiction of a district court." 119 Similarly, attempts by U.S. plaintiffs to avoid serving foreign defendants abroad by serving their
domestic subsidiary as their involuntary agent, although unsuccessful throughout the 1970s and early 1980s,120 were soon held to
be acceptable under the Hague Service Convention321
The Germans reacted with considerable despair. It seemed as if
U.S. courts were on a collision course, doing whatever it took to
avoid limitations set by international treaty obligations and German sovereignty. To some degree, this was indeed true. In interpreting the Hague Conventions, U.S. courts, particularly federal
courts, did not see why an international treaty, without specifically
stating so, should limit their jurisdiction and thus their powers unGebr. Eickhoff Maschinenfabrik v. Starcher, 328 S.E.2d 492 (W. Va. 1985).
118 See, e.g., In re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1985); In re
Messerschmitt B6elkow Blohm GmbH, 757 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1985); Lowrance v.
Michael Weinig GmbH & Co., 107 F.R.D. 386 (W.D. Tenn. 1985); Slauenwhite v.
Bekum Maschinenfabriken GmbH, 104 F.R.D. 616 (D. Mass. 1985); Laker Airways,
Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 103 F.R.D. 42, 48-51 (D.D.C. 1984); Graco, Inc. v.
Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 517-24 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Murphy v. Reifenhauser KG
Maschinenfabrik, 101 F.R.D. 360 (D. Vt. 1984); Wilson v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 489 N.Y.S.2d 575 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985). However, where the taking of evidence was to take place in Germany or another Convention state that objects to
the taking of evidence outside the Convention's procedures, courts generally concluded that the Convention's procedures must be used. See, e.g., Graco, Inc., 101
F.R.D. at 524 ("The court emphasizes that it is not ordering that any proceeding be
conducted within France.")
119 In re Anschuetz, 745 F.2d at 615, vacated by 483 U.S. 1002 (1987).
120 See, e.g., Richardson v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 552 F. Supp. 73, 78-79 (W.D.
Mo. 1982); Jones v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 82 F.R.D. 334, 335 (E.D. Tenn. 1978);
Dr. Ing. H.C. F. Porsche AG v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 755, 760-62 (Ct.
App. 1981). But see Bollard v.Volkswagenwerke AG, 313 F. Supp. 126 (W.D.Mo.
1970) (holding that common law tort actions may be served on the agent designated for service of process pursuant to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act).
121 See, e.g., Zisman v. Sieger, 106 F.R.D. 194 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Lamb v.
Volkswagon of Am., Inc., 104 F.R.D. 95 (S.D. Fla. 1985); Ex parte Volkswagenwerk
AG, 443 So. 2d 880 (Ala. 1983). On the surface, to be sure, the change was not
primarily one of interpreting the Service Convention. Rather, plaintiffs mysteriously overcame difficulties in proving that the U.S. subsidiaries of certain German
corporations were in fact alter egos of their parents.
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der the Federal Rules (or even state rules) of Civil Procedure
("Federal Rules"), thus providing foreign litigants with significant
advantages over domestic litigants. 122 This attitude, as Professor
Burbank's historical analysis shows, was the result both of decades
1 23
of neglecting foreign concerns in the federal rulemaking process,
and of U.S. negotiators at the Hague, who, in their effort to secure
the advice and consent of the Senate, represented to the American
public that the two conventions "ma[d]e no changes in U.S. procedure necessary and require[d] no major changes of U.S. legislation
or rules," 124 while other countries would have to change their ways
significantly. 25 Nonetheless, this concern with preserving domestic jurisdiction and power under the Federal Rules did not become
outcome-determinative until cases from Germany and other civil
law countries had revealed how fickle the convention procedures
were and, particularly, how seriously limited the access to evidence was under the Hague Evidence Convention's letter-ofrequest procedure. 126
Lacking the necessary information on U.S. law to foresee these
developments, German observers were taken by surprise and con122 See, e.g., In re Anschuetz, 754 F.2d at 606, 611; Laker Airways, Ltd., 103
F.R.D. at 48; Graco, 101 F.R.D. at 519, 522. Interestingly, one of the legal arguments suggested by German scholars in favor of limiting available discovery on
German territory through the Hague Evidence Convention's letter-of-request procedure to German standards was just the converse: parties involved in litigation
abroad who seek to obtain evidence in Germany must not be given an advantage
over parties who seek to obtain the same evidence when litigating in German
courts. See Stirner, Rechtshilfe, supra note 89, at 525.
123 Burbank, Reluctant Partner,supra note 25, at 111-24.
124 Philip Amram, The ProposedConvention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, 55
A.B.A.J. 651, 655 (1969).
125 Burbank, Reluctant Partner,supra note 25, at 129-33. Note, however, that
while this ratification history in the United States may explain the argument that
the Hague Evidence Convention did not mean to limit the operation of the Federal Rules or any other U.S. laws, it does not help in countering the German argument that the taking of evidence on or from German territory violates German
sovereignty as protected by customary international law antedating the Hague
Conventions. See infra text accompanying notes 223-227.
126 See supra text accompanying notes 91-109 (illustrating problems with the
Hague Evidence Convention's letter-of-request procedure from American perspective). In earlier cases involving the Hague Evidence Convention, U.S. courts
had already expressed doubt as to whether that Convention could ever preempt
the Federal Rules or state rules of procedure. But they mandated that, as a matter
of comity, a first use of the Convention procedures be attempted to obtain the requested evidence. See supra note 117 (requiring first attempts to be made through
Convention procedures).
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cluded that Germany was now locked in a judicial conflict with the
United States. A conflict that also seemed to involve other European countries as evidenced by such high-profile cases as the
Laker127 saga and the Uranium Antitrust Litigation. 28 Understanding that the new U.S. interpretations seriously jeopardized their efforts to protect German law, sovereignty, and businesses from U.S.
procedure, these individuals quickly realized that the German approach needed to be modified. Invited by the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals to express its positions on the Hague Evidence Convention in In re Anschuetz, 129 the German government was the first to
react. In its amicus brief, it stated, as it would again two years later
30
in Socijtg Nationale Industrielle Afrospatiale v. U.S. District Court
("Aerospatiale"), any order directing a party or non-party to produce evidence located in Germany for inspection in the United
States without using the Convention's procedures violated both
131
German sovereignty and the Hague Evidence Convention.
German scholars, on the other hand, thought that this statement
went too far insofar as parties were concerned. They pointed out
that German courts, also, occasionally order foreign parties to send
specific documents to Germany for inspection or entered injunctions ordering defendants to perform certain acts abroad. 132 Some
of those scholars had thus previously indicated that similar orders
by U.S. courts, if directed at German parties, 133 neither implicated
the text and purpose of the Hague Evidence Convention nor vio127 See, e.g., Dieter G. Lange, Der Justizkonflikt zwischen den USA und Europa
dargestellt am Beispiel des Falles "Laker," in JUSTIzKoNFLIKT, supra note 47, at 65;
Schlosser, Rechtshilfe, supra note 80, at 370-72. For a concise presentation of the
various cases and the back-and-forth between U.K. and U.S. courts in the Laker
litigation, see LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION, supra note 13, at 118-34, 14446.
128 For background information and excerpts of the relevant parts of the decisions involved in the Uranium litigation, see LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL
LITIGATION, supra note 13, at 780.
129 In re Anschuetz, 754 F.2d at 602, 605.
130 Socistt Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale v. United States Dist. Court,
482 U.S. 522 (1987); see infra note 140 and accompanying text.
131 Brief for the Federal Republic of Germany as Amicus Curiae, In re Anschuetz, 754 F.2d 602.
132 See, e.g., SCHLOSSER, JUSTIZKONFLIKT, supra note 47, at 17-22; Rolf Stirmer,
Der Justizkonflikt zwischen U.S.A. und Europa, in JUSTIZKONFLIKT, supra note 47, at 3,
25-26 [hereinafter Sttdmer, Justizkonflikt].
133 But see Stiimer, Rechtshilfe, supra note 89, at 524 (arguing that even orders
directed at non-party witnesses do not violate German sovereignty).
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lated German sovereignty. 34 Now, however, these academics concluded that U.S. discovery orders directed at German parties properly before them could nevertheless violate German sovereignty by
their sheer intensity; it would thus trigger the country's sovereign
right to protect its citizens from unreasonable demands by foreign
states. 135 When that intensity would be attained was (and still is) a
matter of some controversy. Essentially, the required intensity
would arise from the scope of the discovery order 136 or from its
impending enforcement through (from a German view) draconian
contempt sanctions, 137 thus triggering German sovereignty con138
cerns whenever an order veers too far from German standards.
In short, both government and scholars adapted their positions
to the new U.S. challenge, yet the scholars' position was more tempered. Indeed, some academics unsuccessfully urged the government to adopt their more moderate and thus more credible stance
in representations to the U.S. Supreme Court in Arospatiale.39 The
German government not only stood by its strict stance in its amicus
brief in Afrospatiale,140 it went on to suggest to the Supreme Court

134 Schlosser, Rechtshilfe, supra note 80, at 394; Stirner, Rechtshilfe, supra note
89, at 523.
135 SCHLOSSER, JUSTIZKONFLIKT, supra note 47, at 25; Stirner, Iustizkonflikt, supra
note 132, at 26.
136 Strner, Justizkonflikt, supra note 132, at 26.
137 SCHLOSSER, JUSTIZKONFLIKT,

supra note 47, at 25; Stilmer, Justizkonflikt, supra

note 132, at 49. Professor Leipold would later argue that the impending imposition of criminal sanctions, including criminal contempt, was the only relevant factor distinguishing permissible from impermissible extraterritorial discovery requests against parties under international law. See DIETER LEIPOLD, LEx FORI,
SOUVERANITAT,

DISCOVERY:

GRUNDFRAGEN

DES

INTERNATIONALEN

ZIVILPROZESSRECHT 64-66 (1989).
138 SCHLOSSER, JUSTIZKONFLIKT, supra note 47, at 25; StUrner, Justizkonflikt, supra
note 132, at 49.
139 See, e.g., Stirner, Justizkonflikt, supra note 132, at 49-50. Academics particularly urged that the notion that the Hague Evidence Convention itself (rather than
German sovereignty) prevented courts of member states from ordering the taking
of evidence from (rather than on) foreign territory was untenable given both the
language and the history of the treaty. See, e.g., Ulrich Drobnig, Diskussion, in
JUSTIZKONFLIKT, supra note 47, at 114; Peter Schlosser, Diskussion, in
JUSTIZKONFLIKT, supra note 47, at 111-12.
140 Brief for the Federal Republic of Germany as Amicus Curiae at 2-3, 13-14,
Soci~t6 Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 482 U.S.
522 (1987) (No. 85-1695), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1540 (1986) [hereinafter Brief for
Germany].
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in Volkswagen AG v. Schlunklml a year later that allowing service on
a foreign corporation by serving its wholly owned domestic subsidiary under state law violated the letter and spirit of the Hague
Service Convention.142 This interpretation of the Hague Service
Convention was as unpersuasive, 143 if perhaps not as unacceptable
from a U.S. point of view, 14 as the German position in Arospatiale.
After all, the same German government had represented to its own
legislature ten years earlier that the negotiators at the Hague had
left the question whether, in fact, there was "occasion to transmit a
145 for the
judicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad"
46
domestic law of the requesting state to determine.
Volkswagenwerk AG v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988).
Brief for the Federal Republic of Germany as Amicus Curiae at 2, id. (No.
86-1052).
143 The lack of persuasiveness of the German government's stance opened the
door for the argument that assertions of judicial sovereignty "often have an abstract quality and [that they] do little, in and of themselves, to elucidate the substantive foreign interests at stake" and thus that "assertions of 'judicial sovereignty' may simply illustrate a foreign nation's desire to protect its nationals from
liability, or reflect a preference for its own mode of dispute resolution instead of
ours." Brief for the United States and the Securities and Exchange Commission as
Amici Curiae, at 22, 23, Socitd Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale, 482 U.S. 522 (No.
85-1695). This pushed into the background the legitimate concern that "assertions
of 'judicial sovereignty' may reflect an understandable reluctance to forfeit the
moderating effects of judicial supervision and to expose one's citizens to unpredictable and potentially abusive evidentiary demands." Id.
144 Unlike the German position in A~rospatiale regarding the taking of evidence located on German territory, this posture did not imply that service on the
U.S. subsidiaries of German corporations was impossible, but merely that it had to
proceed through the channels identified by the Hague Service Convention and as
circumscribed by the German Declaration to that Convention.
145 Hague Service Convention, supra note 60, art. 1.
146 Denkschrift der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zum Haager Zustellungsund Beweisaufnahmeiibereinkommen, Bundestagsdrucksache 7/4892 (1977) reprinted in ROLF A. SCHTZE, INTERNATIONALES ZIVILPROZESSRECHT 697, 703 (1980)
[hereinafter Denkschrift]. In fact, as the government explained in its report, the
German delegation at The Hague had tried since 1905 to preempt "notification au
parquet" as practiced by France and other countries influenced by its law by requiring, as a matter of treaty law, that defendants located abroad be served there,
but that these attempts had been strongly resisted by the states practicing "notification au parquet," for they believed -and this is interesting for our purposes that although their system may unduly favor the plaintiff, the German suggestion
unduly favored the defendant, imposing a lengthy waiting period until it was
proven that process had been served through treaty channels. Id. at 700. As the
German government's report continues, these two views were resolved by a compromise in the Hague Service Convention, under which France and other countries could continue to use "remise au parquet," but with the limitations imposed
141
142
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Why, then, did the German government continue to present its
more aggressive position regarding the Hague Evidence Convention to the U.S. Supreme Court in the face of warnings by academics that this could prove counterproductive, and why did it follow
up with an equally aggressive position regarding the Hague Service Convention? To some extent, this was a matter of power.
While law professors were interested in suggesting a workable line
of argument, the German government saw its sovereign power to
control the taking of evidence from German territory and the serving of process on German domiciliaries (through the Linder governments) threatened with the new interpretations given the
Hague Conventions by lower U.S. courts. More importantly, there
was a well-meaning attempt to maximize the by now well-known
interests of the German industry. However, by the mid-1980s,
scholars had enough comparative knowledge of U.S. procedure
and of U.S. approaches to transnational cases to realize that "the
chances that the Supreme Court will .. .[adopt the German government's position] are equal to zero." 147 The government, however, lacked some of that knowledge and chose to ignore the advice. In addition, in the case of the Hague Service Convention,
little had been written in Germany on the new U.S. interpretation.
This left the German government without a full appreciation of
how little sense its position made from a U.S. point of view given
the treaty's history and language as the German government had
itself represented it to its own Parliament. 148 The fact that other
civil law governments presented similar positions to the U.S. Supreme Court in Adrospatiale149 may have created a false sense of security, thus preventing these governments from adopting a betterinformed stance.
by Articles 15 and 16 of the Convention. Id. at 700-01; see also Hans Arnold, Die
Ergebnisse der Zehnten Tagung der HaagerKonferenzffir internationalesPrivatrechtauf
dem Gebiete des internationalenZivilprozeflrechts, 11 AUSSENWIRTSCHAFTSDIENST DES
BETRIEBS-BERATERS 205, 205-06 (1965) (reporting by the German delegate to the
Hague Conference recounting same).
147 Stirner, Justizkonflikt, supra note 132, at 49.
148 See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
149 See e.g., Brief for Germany, supra note 140; Brief of the Republic of France,
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 4-17, Socit6 Nationale Industrielle
Arospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522 (1987) (No. 85-1695), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1540 (1986); Brief of the Government of Switzerland at 8-10,
Socidtj Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale,482 U.S. 522 (No. 85-1695), reprinted in 25
I.L.M. 1549 (1986).
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Given this lack of information, the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in A&ospatiale and Schlunk created another round of consternation. 150 Even those German academics who had earlier cautioned their government to moderate its stance were surprised at
the extent of the U.S. Supreme Court's adulation of the Federal
Rules within the framework of an international treaty in A&ospatiale and at the majority's unwillingness in that case to articulate
principles setting the outer limits on unilateral U.S. discovery in
light of both foreign sovereignty concerns and the purpose of the
treaty enterprise. 151 In regard to Schlunk, reactions were more
mixed. Those knowledgeable about the Service Convention's negotiating history and the German government's earlier statements
152
were more sympathetic to the majority's holding in Schlunk than
53 Yet, here too, there was concern about an interprewere others.1
tation of the Service Convention that would allow a member state
to bypass Convention procedures in most cases by allowing for all
sorts of domestic service on foreigners. 54
In short, it seemed that the judicial conflict was alive and well,
and there was need for a renewed adaptation of the German approach to protect German law, sovereignty, and businesses. In the
area of service, several German Central Authorities reacted by refusing to execute requests for serving punitive-damage claims under the Hague Service Convention, arguing that such claims were
not "civil and commercial matters." 5 5 The courts to which these
decisions were appealed, however, including ultimately the Ger-

150 See, e.g., Abbo Junker, Der Justizkonflikt mit den USA, 42 BETRIEBS-BERATER
1752 (1987) (analyzing Aerospatiale); Harald Koch, US-Supreme Court hilt Haager
Beweisubereinkommenftirfakultativ, 7 IPRAx 328 (1987) (reporting that U.S. Supreme
Court holds Hague Evidence Convention procedures to be voluntary); Harald
Koch, Haager Zustellungsibereinkommen oder "Zustellungsdurchgriff' auf
Muttergesellschaften?, 9 IPRAx 313 (1989) (reporting on Schlunk) [hereinafter Koch,
Zustellungsdurchgrif]; Rolf Stirner, Anmerkung, 42 JZ 988 (1987) (analyzing
Aerospatiale).
151 See, e.g., Junker, supra note 150, at 1752-53; Stirner, supra note 150, at 988-

89.
152 See, e.g., Abbo Junker, Der deutsch-amerikanischeRechtsverkehr in Zivilsachen
- Zustellungen und Beweisaufnahmen, 44 JZ 121, 122-23 (1989).
153 See, e.g., Koch, Zustellungsdurchgriff,supra note 150.
154 Peter Schlosser, Legislatio in fraudem legis internationalis,in FESTSCHRIFT FOR
ERNST C. STIEFEL ZUM 80. GEBURTSTAG at 683,687 (Marcus Lutter et al. ed., 1987).
155 The scope of application of the Convention is limited to "civil and commercial matters." See Hague Service Convention, supra note 145, art. 1(1).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

1336

U. Pa.J. Int'l Econ. L.

[Vol. 25:4

man Constitutional Court,156 all reversed. 157 Whatever their legal
reasoning, the German judges by now knew enough about U.S.
procedure to assume that this approach would merely lead U.S.
courts to accelerate their use of all kinds of Pennoyer-erastatutes to
allow service on foreign defendants by serving a domestic agent,
thus further undermining both the Convention's usefulness and
German control over service on its domiciliaries.158 The refusal of
these German courts to set up a new hurdle to service in Germany
under the Hague Service Convention has given U.S. courts less
reason to support means of avoiding the Convention; the refusal is
thus likely to have been at least partly responsible for the recent
cases in which U.S. courts have held, contrary to earlier postSchlunk decisions, 159 that where state law requires that summons
and complaint be transmitted to the defendant's foreign domicile
for service on a domestic agent to be complete, the Convention's
procedures must be used. 160
156 BVerfGE 91, 335 (F.R.G.), reprinted in 48 NEUE JURISTIScHE WOCHENSCHRIFr
[NJW] 649 (1995), translated in 34 I.L.M. 580 (1995) [hereinafter Constitutional
Court]. But see In re Bertelsmann AG, BVerfGE 108, 238 (F.R.G.) (staying decision
of the Oberlandesgericht Dusseldorf not to refuse serving a claim for $17 billion in
a proceeding pending in federal court in New York because the claim might violate German public policy and thus Article 13 of the Service Convention).
157 See, e.g., OLG Mtinchen, 39 RIW 70 (1993) (holding that the service of a
claim for punitive damages relates to a "civil or commercial matter" under the
Convention); OLG Dttsseldorf, 38 RIW 846 (1992) (same); OLG Frankfurt, 37 RIW
417 (1991) (same); OLG Mtinchen, 42 RIW 3102 (1989), translated in 29 I.L.M. 1571
(same).
158 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878); see, e.g., Constitutional Court, supra
note 156, at 651. There are also more direct ways in which U.S. courts have frustrated the attempts of German Central Authorities to avoid service of punitive
damage claims on their nationals. See, e.g., Marschhauser v. Travelers Indem. Co.,
145 F.R.D. 605 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (holding that Article 15 of the Service Convention
allowed a U.S. court to enter a default judgment after the German Central Authority had refused to execute the plaintiff's letter of request on a basis that, in the
court's view, was ill-founded under the Convention's language).
159 See, e.g., Melia v. Les Grands Chais de France, 135 F.R.D. 28 (D.R.I. 1991)
(holding that service of process was effective where made on Secretary of State);
see also Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank v. Kassir, 153 F.R.D. 580 (W.D. Pa. 1994) (upholding
service on German corporation via contractually appointed local agent under
Pennsylvania law).
160 See, e.g., Darden v. Daimler Chrysler N. Am. Holding Corp., 191 F. Supp.
2d 382, 387-88 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (service on domestic subsidiary insufficient to serve
process on German parent); Davies v. Jobs & Adverts Online, Gmbh, 94 F. Supp.
2d 719 (E.D. Va. 2000) (holding that substituted service on state corporation commission insufficient under Hague Convention); Kim v. Frank Mohn A/S, 909 F.
Supp. 2d 474 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (voiding service where documents not mailed to for-
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In regard to the Hague Evidence Convention, efforts to bring
U.S. courts to re-adopt a rule of first resort to the Convention along
the lines of Justice Blackmun's concurrence and dissent in A&ospatiale centered on partly lifting Germany's Article 23 objection to the
discovery of documents.' 61 This was to be accomplished by promulgating a regulation under Section 14(2) of the German Act implementing the Hague Evidence Convention, in which the German
legislature delegated to the executive the power to "define the circumstances under which, having due regard to essential principles
of German procedure and to the interests of those affected, letters
of request for the purpose of discovering documents could nonetheless be executed." 162 However, the adoption of such a regulation, which the German government had already promised to the
163
U.S. Supreme Court in its amicus brief in Arospatiale, proved
impossible, however. The most powerful industrial association resisted any regulation that would allow the discovery of documents
from German territory under rules plainly more liberal than those
64 Moreover, several imof the German Code of Civil Procedure
portant industry representatives as well as various scholars did not
think that Germany should unilaterally make concessions to the
United States in the area of judicial cooperation at this time. As a
result, the regulation was never adopted.
In any case, the suggested liberalization of the Article 23 declaration would have been too little, too late. Most post-Airospatiale

eign country's central authority as required by the Hague Service Convention);
Quinn v. Kleinicke, 700 A.2d 147 (Del. Super. Ct. 1996) (where service on secretary
of state is only complete under state law, if secretary of state then sends notice to
the defendant in Germany, Hague Service Convention must be used). Where,
however, state law allows for the involuntary service on a local subsidiary of the
foreign defendant, Schlunk of course remains good law. Volkswagen AG v.
Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988); see, e.g., Hickory Travel Sys., Inc. v. TUI AG, 213
F.R.D. 547 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (denying validity of service on a corporate parent as
service on its subsidiary and on one joint venture partner by service on the other).
Harald Koch & Christian Kirchner, Probleme einer
161 See, e.g.,
Haager
zum
Ausfiihrungsgesetz
dem
Urkundenvorlage-Verordnung nach
Beweisibereinkommen, 33 AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 127 (1988) (discussing possible
regulation under Section 14(2)).
162 Gesetz zur Ausfiihrung der Haager Obereinkommens (Ausftihrunggesetz),
v. 22.12.1977 (BGB1. I. S. 3105)
163 Brief for Germany, supra note 140, at 9-10.
164 See Christoph Bohmer, Spannungen im deutsch-amerikanischenRechtsverkehr
in Zivilsachen, 43 NJW 3049, 3053 (1990) (reporting on resistance by industry).
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decisions of lower U.S. courts' 65 had put the burden on the party
opposing unilateral U.S. discovery to show that proceeding under
the Hague Evidence Convention would produce the evidence as
effectively as under the Federal Rules or state rules of procedure. 66
The German government's draft of the regulation with its limitations and escape clauses, although a bit more liberal than German
procedure, 167 presumably would not have sufficed to meet that
burden.
3.1.3.

The Second Stage: Recognition and Enforcement of U.S.
Judgments

By the time the liberalization of the Article 23 declaration was
discussed, the focus had already turned to an area where the
United States would not usually have the upper hand-the recognition and enforcement of U.S. judgments. Again, industry representatives and their lawyers had much earlier attempted to convince the legal public that there were various reasons why U.S.
165 But see Hudson v. Hermann Pfauter GmbH & Co., 117 F.R.D. 33 (N.D.N.Y.
1987) (finding Justice Blackmun's concurring and dissenting opinion more persuasive, and thus putting the burden on the proponent to show why Convention
procedures should not be used); Knight v. Ford Motor Co., 615 A.2d 297, 299-302
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992) (holding that courts must first use Hague Evidence
Convention procedures before resorting to New Jersey discovery rules in discovery requests from a German corporation).
166 See, e.g., Doster v. Schenk AG, 141 F.R.D. 50 (M.D.N.C. 1991); Haynes v.
Kleinwefers, 119 F.R.D. 335 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Benton Graphics v. Uddeholm Corp.,
118 F.R.D. 386 (D.N.J. 1987); Moake v. Source Int'l Corp., 623 A.2d 263 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1993). Some of these courts have, however, limited discovery requests so as to render them less intrusive upon claimed foreign sovereign interests. See, e.g., Benton Graphics v. Uddeholm Corp., 118 F.R.D. 386, 390 (requiring
further streamlining of discovery requests abroad); Rich v. KIS Cal., Inc., 121
F.R.D. 254, 257-58 (M.D.N.C. 1988) (noting that one factor in deciding whether to
use Hague Evidence Convention procedures is how intrusive the discovery is and
holding that the pared down interrogatories in the case at hand are not intrusive
and thus do not require use of Convention mechanisms). More recent decisions
demonstrate that the approach noted in the text remains good law. See, e.g., In re
Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, 120 F. Supp. 2d 45 (D.D.C. 2000) (holding, after
comity analysis, that plaintiff is not required to have first resort to Hague Evidence Convention procedures); Fishel v. BASF Group, 175 F.R.D. 525 (S.D. Iowa
1997) (allowing jurisdictional discovery to proceed under the Federal Rules rather
than under the Hague Evidence Convention while disallowing one strand of discovery as overbroad).
167 See Referentenentwurf des Justizministeriums zu einer Urkundenvorlageverordnung, reprinted in VORSCHLAGE ZUM ERLASS EINER URKUNDENVORLAGEVERORDNUNG NACH DEM HBEWUBK (Claus-Dieter Brandt ed., 1987).
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judgments, particularly those in the product liability area, should
168
face difficulties when enforcement is attempted in Germany.
This time, their suggestions contravened a published opinion by
the Max Planck Institute on Private International Law that had
failed to find any reason why U.S. product liability judgments
should be refused enforcement, 169 a view that was later reiterated
1 70
in the Institute's standard volume on judgments recognition.
Under these circumstances, the industry's suggestions were of
questionable persuasiveness in future recognition disputes before
German courts. German defendants in U.S. litigation thus preferred to settle rather than to risk a default judgment that might be
enforced against them in Germany.
This situation changed, however, as a number of academics began to revisit the issue in the late 1980s, thus reframing the debate
for the 1990s. Departing from the earlier liberal academic stance,
these scholars, in careful analysis, suggested various reasons for refusing to enforce U.S. judgments on public policy grounds, including: discovery in violation of German sovereignty, imposition of
seemingly absolute liability in product liability cases, low threshold levels for a finding of causation, "disproportionately high"
damages for pain and suffering, and punitive damages (except to
the extent that they compensated for damages not already in171 In 1992, the
cluded in the compensatory portion of the award).
168 See, e.g., Hans-Viggo von HUlsen, Produktehaftpflicht USA 1981, 28 RIW 1, 9
(1982); Rolf A. Schtitze, 1979 WERTPAPIERM=ITEILUNGEN 1167 (1979); Friedrich Graf
von Westphalen, "Punitive Damages" in US-amerikanischen Produkthaftungsklagen
und der Vorbehalt des Art. 12 EGBGB, 27 RIW 141 (1981).
169 Eike von Hippel, Schadenersatzklagen gegen deutsche Produzenten in den
Vereinigten Staaten, 17 AWD 61, 64-65 (1971).

170 DIETER

MARTINY,

HANDBUCH

DES

INTERNATIONALEN

ZIVILVERFAHRENSRECHTS, BAND III/1, at 471 (1984). In this book, Professor Martiny
did, however, tentatively express his view that, depending on the circumstances,
punitive damages might be considered criminal rather than civil in character and
thus be unenforceable. Yet, he also noted that product safety was a legitimate
goal to pursue in civil litigation, implying that the use of punitive damages for
that purpose should not automatically lead to nonrecognition. Id. at 236.
171 See, e.g., Emst C. Stiefel & Rolf Starner, Die Vollstreckbarkeit USamerikanischer Schadensersatzurteile exzessiver Hohe, 38 VERSICHERUNGSRECHT 829
(1987) (An English version of this Article appears in shortened, updated, and considerably muted form as Ernst C. Stiefel et al., The Enforceability of Excessive U.S.
Punitive Damage Judgments in Germany, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 779 (1991)); see also
JOACHIM ZEKOLL, US-AMERIKANISCHES PRODUKTHAFTPFLICHTRECHT VOR DEUTSCHEN

GERICHTEN (1987) (exploring in detail the recognizability of U.S. products liability
judgments in Germany). These suggestions of limiting the enforcement of U.S.
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country's highest civil court, the Bundesgerichtshof,adopted the majority of these limitations on the enforcement of U.S. judgments in
some form or another in its landmark decision on the recognition
of U.S. judgments.172
How did this change come about? There were essentially two
factors at play -business interests and information. First, as exposure of German companies to U.S. liability litigation increased, and
as it became clear that efforts to protect German businesses from
U.S. litigation within the process of judicial cooperation would
lead nowhere, the industry's suggestions for protection in the recognition area began to carry more weight. Second, the available
judgments appeared outright moderate when compared to some of the propositions that had been made earlier. See, e.g., Schtitze, supra note 168, at 1175-76
(suggesting that the mere use of discovery and of contingent fees renders a U.S.
judgment unenforceable in Germany).
172 BGHZ 118, 312 (F.R.G.). For a comment on that case in English, see Peter
Hay, The Recognition and Enforcement of American Money-Judgments in Germany The 1992 Decision of the German Supreme Court, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 729 (1992). At
least the Bundesgerichtshof rendered the opinion as one would a landmark decision, carefully weighing all aspects of possible public policy violations by a U.S.
tort judgment. However, the U.S. judgment to be recognized in the case was
hardly typical of U.S. tort judgments against German nationals. It involved a
$750,260 award for battery against a U.S.-German dual citizen who had lived most
of his life in California, where he had sexually abused a 14-year-old boy in California, then fled to Germany after being convicted for the crime in California, but
before the civil case based on the same facts had been adjudicated. Thus, the case
not only lacked many of the characteristics that industry representatives and
scholars had criticized about U.S. tort law and procedure but was also devoid of a
strong connection to Germany, leading the Court to recognize both the compensatory portion of the award, even though not necessarily justified in its full amount
from the point of view of German law, and the $200,000 portion for pain and suffering. The court made it clear, however, that similarly lenient standards were
unlikely to prevail in a case involving a U.S. product liability award against a
German producer. BGHZ 118, 312 (349) (F.R.G.). Moreover, there had been no
discovery in violation of German sovereignty because the evidence in the case had
been taken from the criminal case, discovery for which had taken place while the
defendant lived in California. The Court nonetheless pointed out that discovery
in violation of German sovereignty, perhaps even discovery involving extensive
fishing, would violate German public policy. BGHZ 118, 312 (323-24) (F.R.G.).
Even in this extraordinary case, however, the Court did refuse to recognize the
$400,000 punitive award. In comparison, the district court of Berlin had refused,
in an earlier case, to execute a $275,000 product liability award against a German
manufacturer imposed by a Massachusetts state court in its entirety, finding that,
since there was no written opinion that indicated whether the U.S. court had imposed absolute liability (the judgment was based on a jury verdict), the lack of clarity in this regard had to be charged against the judgment creditor. LG Berlin, RIW
38 (1989), 988 (F.R.G.), translated in LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION, supra
note 13, at 440.
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information on U.S. law changed over time and was significantly
influenced by industry representatives. As long as the policies underlying U.S. product liability law were studied for purposes of
potential emulation, these policies were largely portrayed in a neutral light and judgments based on them could hardly be argued to
violate a German public policy that was slowly moving in the direction of U.S. law. 173 With increased exposure of German companies to U.S. litigation, however, the scholarly articles of industry
representatives and their lawyers began to control the debate.
Their accounts bristled with cases exemplifying the uncontrolled
imposition of liability by runaway juries and with references to
numerous tort-reform efforts in the United States. 174 This created
the impression of a litigation system largely uncontrolled by the
rule of law-a system that was apparently in such disarray that
even its own most influential lawyers, including former Chief Justice Burger, 175 had stepped up to criticize it.176 This impression was
further corroborated by the academics' earlier experience, during
the "judicial conflict," with U.S. courts unwilling to subject their
procedure to limitations arising from foreign sovereignty concerns
and international law. If, therefore, German businesses, German
law, and German sovereignty needed to be protected from the importation of such untenable practices, the recognition and envon Hippel, supra note 169, at 64-65 (finding that U.S. products
173 See, e.g.,
liability judgments would not ordinarily violate German public policy).
174 See, e.g., Heinz J. Dielmann, ProduzentenhaftungfPr Lebensmittelprodukte in
den USA, 32 RIW 949, 949 (1986) (speaking of "drastic increase of product liability
cases.., exorbitant awards, and the extremely high costs for legal defense," all of
which have led to a "crisis in the insurance and reinsurance business"); HansViggo von Htilsen & TOns Graning-Brinkman, Produkthaflung USA 1983/84, 31
RIW 187 (1985) (reporting on various seemingly outrageous multimillion dollar
awards); Michael Magotsch, Exzessive Entwicklung der Produkthaftung in den USA,
32 RIW 413, 414 (1986) (reporting on numerous efforts by members of Congress to
introduce product liability reform legislation).
175 Chief Justice Burger's efforts to bring about tort reform were frequently
cited in German publications. See, e.g., Peter Heidenberger, Der amerikanische
Juryprozess in Produkthaftungsfdllen, 28 R1W 872, 873 (1982).
176 See, e.g., Stiefel & Stirner, supra note 171, at 835-36 (referring to several
federal reform proposals, listing a considerable number of seemingly inconceivable multimillion-dollar awards, and referring to "the collapse of the U.S. liability
and insurance system"). On the problems with such global characterizations,
atrocity stories cited out of context, and assertions about aggregate patterns unsupported by empirical evidence within the United States, see, for example, Marc
Galanter, An Oilstrike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Civil Justice System,
40 ARIZ. L. REv. 717 (1998).
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forcement of U.S. judgments was the place to exercise some leverage.
This view, by now widely shared by judges and scholars, also
had more subtle effects on the interpretation of recognition requirements other than the public policy test, particularly on the requirement that the rendering U.S. court have had jurisdiction. 7 7 In
a 1988 case, the judgment creditor, with the help of an academic
expert, 178 succeeded in persuading the district court of Munich to
hold that, with regard to judgments from nations having a federal
form of government, the personal jurisdiction of the courts of the
individual state in question rather than the jurisdiction of the
courts of the entire nation must be established for the judgment to
be recognized in Germany. 179 Thus, the court refused to enforce
the judgment of an Arizona state court for lack of jurisdiction, although the courts of California and, arguably, those of Virginia
would have had personal jurisdiction over the defendant under
German law. 180 This interpretation, new at the time,' 8' developed a
177 On the requirement that there be no public policy violation and on the review of personal jurisdiction in European recognition practice respectively, see
Walter & Baumgartner, Recognition, supra note 58, at 22-24, 28-31.
178 The expert, as all experts in German procedure, had been appointed by
the court and was ultimately paid for by the losing party. He thus had no immediate interest in supporting one litigant over the other. On the way experts are
used in German procedure, see, for example, Langbein, German Advantage, supra
note 93, at 836-40. This does not mean, however, that the expert may not have
had a certain sympathy for the plight of the judgment debtor, a large local investment bank, as well as an interest in protecting the integrity of German law.
After all, the case appeared to be a prime example of American unreasonableness,
in which a simple contract dispute over an investment loan had been turned into a
major RICO case.
179 RIW, 34 (1988), 738 (F.R.G.).

180 Id.
181 The reason for the reference to jurisdiction of "the courts of the rendering
state" or "the rendering nation" rather than to jurisdiction of the rendering court
derives from a distinction in the civil law between international jurisdiction, the
jurisdiction of the courts of a particular country, and territorial jurisdiction, the
personal jurisdiction of a court within a particular country. Only the former can
be re-examined at the recognition stage to ensure fairness to the defendant, while
territorial jurisdiction remains an issue of the internal organization of the rendering country and is thus beyond the purview of the recognition tribunal. See, e.g.,
GEIMER, supra note 24, at 871. From this perspective, the Munich court's holding is
difficult to fathom given that "[flor local interests, the several States of the Union
exist, but for national purposes, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we
are but one people, one nation, one power." Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581,
606 (1889).
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considerable following among academics, 82 although the Bundesgerichtshof recently refused to follow it with regard to judgments
183
emanating from U.S. federal courts.
Moreover, a 1993 case involving the judgment of a Washington
state court in a dispute over an exclusive-distribution contract, the
Bundesgerichtshofdecided that if the only conceivable jurisdictional
basis for a foreign default judgment under German law is the place
where the alleged tort had been committed, 184 then the question
whether the tort had in fact been committed in the rendering state
was a question that could be fully litigated before the German rec85
ognition court, in application of the regular standard of proof,
thus allowing a partial re-opening of the foreign proceedings. 86 In
support of its holding, the Bundesgerichtshof argued that the only
alternative would be to forgo any examination of the rendering
court's jurisdiction in default judgments based on an alleged tort an option that would deny German defendants the right to refuse
to appear before a foreign court whose assertion of jurisdiction
they consider exorbitant and subsequently to test the propriety of
that assertion by collaterally attacking the resulting judgment at
home.187 Without this right to default, the court further reasoned,
German law would support plaintiffs who sue German defendants
in favorable fora on trumped-up charges in the hope the defendant
would be unable to mount an effective defense1 88 Combined with
the court's further indication that its holding allowed the defen182 See, e.g., SCHACK, supra note 24, at 389; Oliver Sieg, InternationaleAnerkennungszustfindigkeit bei US-amerikanischen Urteilen, 16 IPRAx 77 (1996); Rolf Sttirner
& Jens Bormann, Internationale Anerkennungszustandigkeit US-amerikanischer
Bundesgerichte und Zustellungsfragen im deutsch-amerikanischen Verhdltnis, 55 JZ 81,
81-85 (2000). But see Bernd von Hoffman & Wolfgang Hau, Zur internationalenAnerkennungszustdndigkeitUS-amerikanischerZivilgerichte, 44 R1W 344 (1988) (arguing
that German courts should look to the United States as a whole rather than to individuals states within it when deciding on personal jurisdiction for recognition
purposes).
183 BGHZ 141, 286 (F.R.G.), reprinted in 52 NJW 3198, 3199-200 (1999).
184 On the locus delicti commissi, the place of the commission of the tort as a
proper basis for jurisdiction under the law of Germany and other civil law countries, see SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra note 90, at 390-92.
185 On the usually higher civil standard of proof in civil law countries compared to that in the United States, see, for example, Kevin M. Clermont & Emily
Sherwin, A Comparative View of Standards of Proof,50 AM. I. COMP. L. 243 (2002).
186

187
188

BGHZ 124, 237 (F.R.G.).
Id. at 242-43.
Id. at 244.
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dant in the present case to avoid the high costs of defending a lawsuit in the United States, 189 its reasoning reflects a thinly veiled reference to prevalent views in Germany of a U.S. litigation system in
which strike suits are rampant and in which defending such suits
is an unreasonably expensive proposition.1 90 As a result, German
defendants with few or no assets in the United States can effectively force U.S. tort claimants to litigate in Germany the issue of
whether, in fact, a tort had been committed.
3.2. Lessons From the German Experience
These German developments demonstrate the extent to which
the law of transnational litigation in one country is interconnected,
via the behavior of groups and individuals, to the approaches to
transnational cases in other nations and vice versa. In the German
case, these interconnections have had serious and unexpected consequences. On the one hand, the German government and, to a
lesser extent, German scholars, in their attempt to protect domestic
business firms along with German law and German sovereignty
from what they viewed as undue U.S. intrusions, helped set in motion legal developments in the United States that have frustrated
those intentions to an extent that, I suspect, many Germans have
not fully grasped to this day.191 While German recognition law
now allows German nationals with no or few assets in the United
States to force U.S. tort plaintiffs to pursue at least part of their
claim in Germany, 192 the majority of large and medium-sized German business enterprises cannot afford to take that risk. In fact, if
189 Id. at 246.
190 See also Harald Koch, Anmerkung, 108 ZZP 367, 372 (1995) (criticizing the
Court for going beyond the requirement of the German recognition statute). The
concern with strike suits reappears in a recent decision of the Bundesgerichtshof
that is otherwise much more lenient in questions relating to the enforcement of
U.S. judgments. See BGHZ 141, 286 (F.R.G.). In that decision, the Court sent the
case back to the lower courts to determine, among other things, whether the defendant had committed fraud in his jurisdictional claims before the District Court
for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. Id., reprintedin 52 NJW 3198, 3202-03 (1999).
191See, e.g., Martin J. Reufels, Pre-trial discovery-Maflnahmen in Deutschland:
Neuauflage des deutsch-amerikanischen Justizkonflikts?, 45 RIW 667, 667-68 (1999)
(expressing surprise at the brevity and clarity with which the court in Fishel v.
BASF Group, 175 F.R.D. 525 (S.D. Iowa 1997) held that discovery against the German defendants could proceed outside of the Hague Evidence Convention procedures).
192 See supra Section 3.1.3.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol25/iss4/3

2004]

TRANSNA TIONAL LITIGATION

1345

such enterprises do become involved in U.S. litigation, discovery of
evidence in their control in German territory is now usually governed entirely by U.S. procedural law whether the case involves a
relatively straightforward contract dispute, 93 a large antitrust
suit, 94 or a complex human rights class action to recover for slave
labor performed under the Nazi regime. 195 This is because, since
Agrospatiale, U.S. courts have effectively relegated the use of the
procedures of the Hague Evidence Convention and thus any control of German law over the taking of evidence from German territory to cases in which discovery is sought from German nonparties. 196 Even the latter category has shrunk to the extent that
U.S. courts have assumed that parties have control over evidence
that under German law traditionally would have been assumed to
be in control of a non-party. 97 To this extent-and this is a large
extent -German law has become irrelevant and the German government has entirely lost its sovereign control over U.S. orders to
concerns
provide evidence from German territory, one of the main
198
of both the German government and German scholars.
The fact that German law and sovereignty have not become
similarly irrelevant in the area of U.S. service on German defendants is largely due to a better understanding of the interconnections of transnational litigation law by German courts. Had they

193 See, e.g., Benton Graphics v. Uddeholm Corp., 118 F.R.D. 386 (D.N.J. 1987)
(addressing alleged fraud and breach of contract in steel sales).
194 See, e.g., Automotive Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litigation, 358 F.3d 288
(3d Cir. 2004) (concerning jurisdictional discovery).
195 See, e.g., Fishel v. BASF Group, 175 F.R.D. 525 (S.D. Iowa 1997) (involving
Holocaust survivors' claims against successors of companies alleged to have benefited from slave labor).
196 Most U.S. courts may have accepted the proposition by Germany and
other civil law nations that, if discovery is to physically take place on the territory
of a member state of the Convention, the Convention procedures must be used.
See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Fellows Gear Shaper Co., 102 F.R.D. 956 (E.D. Pa. 1984);
Graco, Inc., v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 524 (N.D. Ill. 1984). But few U.S. litigants will seek to take depositions in Germany if unilateral U.S. discovery, unencumbered by the procedures of the Hague Evidence Convention and thus with
limitations set by German law, is so easily available. See supra notes 165-166 and
accompanying text.
197 See, e.g., Addamax Corp. v. Open Software Found., Inc., 148 F.R.D. 462 (D.
Mass. 1993) (holding that a non-party witness subsidiary had control over documents in possession of a German parent company and thus that the U.S. subsidiary could be compelled to produce such documents).
198 See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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not stopped German Central Authorities from refusing to serve
U.S. punitive damage claims under the Hague Service Convention,
post-Schlunk decisions in the United States would have likely become more aggressive in allowing U.S. plaintiffs to avoid the procedures of the Hague Service Convention by serving defendants
from Germany and other member states of the Convention within
the United States.9 9
On the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, those who set out to
amend the woefully inadequate 200 provisions on serving process
and on taking evidence abroad in the Federal Rules in the early
1960s were primarily concerned with providing practitioners with
the choices necessary to obtain the best available judicial cooperation from any foreign jurisdiction. 201 In their eagerness to avoid
limiting those choices and in their concomitant disdain for what
they viewed as outdated concepts of judicial sovereignty, 202 the
rulemakers took an approach that promoted attitudes toward foreign sovereignty concerns that ultimately helped evoke legal developments in Germany and elsewhere that have made it difficult
for some U.S. litigants to receive access to needed evidence or to
enforcement proceedings abroad in some cases. By,
199 See supra text accompanying notes 158-160.
200 See, e.g., Burbank, Reluctant Partner, supra note 25, at 112 ("Those concerned about the inadequacy of our mechanisms for seeking and providing assistance in aid of international civil litigation recognized that some provisions in the
Federal Rules on such matters as service were an invitation to disaster for litigants
using them abroad ....
").
201 See, e.g., Benjamin Kaplan, Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1961-63 (I), 77 HARV. L. REV. 601, 635-36 (1964) [hereinafter Kaplan, 1961-63
(I)]; Benjamin Kaplan, Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1961-63
(II), 77 HARV. L. REV. 801, 812-13 (1964) [hereinafter Kaplan, 1961-63 (11)1.
202 See, e.g., Kaplan, 1961-63 (I), supra note 201, at 637 (accusing those who objected "that there ought to be a statement invalidating any manner of service allowed by the rule but forbidden by the law of the country in which the service
was attempted" of "[t]endemess to the sensibilities of foreign countries," and
musing that "[i]t
is not clear that any substantial number of countries are really
concerned to outlaw service within their boundaries to effectuate litigation being
conducted elsewhere...'); Hans Smit, InternationalLitigation under the United States
Code, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1015, 1017-18 (1965) (opining that the attitude of some foreign nations that oppose the performance of procedural acts on their territory by
foreigners "has been influenced by undue stress on abstract notions of sovereignty, by misconception of the nature of foreign procedural acts, and by lack of
concern for the interests of litigants who wish to perform procedural acts in the
most effective and efficient manner" and further suggesting that "nations that do
raise objections have on the whole failed to advance satisfactory reasons for their
positions.").
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(1) permitting service (and, one may add, discovery abroad)
in violation of foreign law (and, in the view of some countries of international law), (2) failing adequately to assist
lawyers in making an informed choice among alternatives,
and (3) neglecting to empower the courts to require resort
to another alternative when that would benefit interna20 3
tional relations,
the 1963 amendments to the Federal Rules (and by implication
their state counterparts) fulfilled the drafters' additional wish to
keep U.S. courts out of difficult issues of foreign law. 20 4 But they
also fostered a continuing lacking awareness of, and nonchalance
about, foreign sovereignty concerns and possible international obligations of the United States among U.S. courts and litigants. Representations made by the U.S. negotiators of the Hague Service and
Hague Evidence Conventions to the U.S. Senate for purposes of
advice and consent failed to change this attitude with regard to
these conventions. 20 5 The resulting disregard for German concerns
of sovereignty and proper treaty interpretation was an important
factor in creating the German reactions during the "judicial conflict." 20 6 Thus, a policy of refusing to "clog lawsuits with threshold
questions about the foreign law that might prove extremely hard to
decide," 207 the politics of advice and consent, and, ultimately, the
federal courts' concern with preserving their power under the Federal Rules and the power of state courts to determine the adequacy
of service under domestic law, 20 8 have contributed to the emergence of attitudes and, German rules that severely disadvantage
not only those U.S. litigants who seek to obtain evidence located in
Germany if that evidence cannot be obtained through direct U.S.
Burbank, Reluctant Partner,supra note 25, at 113.
See Kaplan, 1961-63 (I), supra note 201 at 637; Kaplan, 1961-63 (II), supra
note 201, at 813.
205 See Burbank, Reluctant Partner, supra note 25, at 129-33 (discussing statements made by U.S. negotiators during ratification of the two Conventions in the
Senate).
206 See Volkswagenwerk AG v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 840 (1981)
(describing the willingness of some U.S. courts to enforce procedural rules in the
face of sovereignty objections by foreign governments); supra text accompanying
notes 122-154 (depicting the German response to U.S. unilateralism).
207 Kaplan, 1961-63 (I), supra note 201 at 637.
208 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 122-126.
203

204
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discovery, but also those who seek to enforce U.S. judgments in
Germany. Thus, to the extent that the U.S. negotiators at the
Hague now attempt to improve the lot of U.S. judgment creditors
abroad, 209 they are working on removing obstacles partly initiated
or reinforced by the policies of those who made law for transnational litigation law in the United States in the 1960s.
More importantly, rather than generating the large-scale emulation of the liberal attitudes toward judicial cooperation that the
drafters of both the 1963 amendments to the Federal Rules and the
1964 amendments to the Judicial Code 210 had envisioned, 21 ' their
work product ultimately helped produce the "judicial conflict"
with Germany and similar protective reactions in other civil law
countries. 212 Preoccupation with such protective action has prevented those nations from sincerely reconsidering their approach
to notions of state sovereignty in regard to judicial cooperation in
the face of today's interconnected world. This has left us with rigid
approaches to judicial cooperation in a great number of countries approaches that are clearly inadequate in a world in which it is
technically feasible, through the internet, closed-circuit television,
and similar means, to serve process and take evidence abroad instantly. 213 It has also prevented any meaningful discussion of
much-needed nontraditional forms of judicial cooperation, most
importantly direct judicial interaction across borders. 214
209 See, e.g., von Mehren, Drafting, supra note 9, at 194-95 (discussing "a fundamental discordance" between the United States and the Europeans on the role
of litigation, adjudicatory jurisdiction, and recognition of foreign judgments at the
Hague).
210 Pub. L. No. 88-619, 78 Stat. 995 (1964) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§
1696, 1781-1784 (2002)).
211 See, e.g. Philip Amram, Public Law No. 88-619 of October 3, 1964-New Developments in International Judicial Assistance in the United States of America, 32 J. BAR
ASS'N D.C. 24, 28, 33 (1965); Smit, supra note 202, at 1019 (stating that "the reforms
are premised on the hope that their principle of liberality in rendering aid to foreign courts and litigants will find widespread acceptance abroad").
212 See supra Section 3.1.2. Cf., e.g., BORN, supra note 13, at 850-52 (noting foreign nondisclosure statutes passed in reaction to U.S. discovery).
213 Cf., e.g., Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1017 (9th
Cir. 2002) (upholding service by email upon foreign corporation as acceptable
mode of alternate service under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ["Federal
Rules"]).
214 Cf., e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 191, 213-15 (2003) [hereinafter Slaughter, Community of Courts] (noting
direct judicial communications in global bankruptcies, at least among common
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What went wrong? Both the Germans and the Americans set
transnational litigation policies without (sufficient) awareness of
the forces affecting those policies down the line. They acted as if
they could control the law of transnational litigation unilaterally.
However, the events that transpired demonstrate that such is not
the case. They exemplify some of the pathways through which an
array of public and private actors -domestic, foreign, and international- may affect the making and application of transnational litigation law in a particular country. First, there is the importance of
groups and individuals as consequential actors in transnational
lawmaking. The interest of German business firms in limiting their
exposure to U.S. litigation from their transnational endeavors
played an important role in adapting the traditional German approach to judicial cooperation to the perceived new threats arising
from U.S. litigation. German industry representatives were influential in seeking protection from U.S. litigation,215 and in resisting a
unilateral German liberalization of judicial cooperation for document discovery. 216 With their superior knowledge of U.S. law, they
were also able to influence emerging German perceptions of the
U.S. litigation process and of U.S. tort law. 217 Similarly, it was the
ingenuity of U.S. attorneys that ultimately led U.S. courts to permit
the use of methods of service and discovery that would avoid triggering the procedures of the Hague Service and Hague Evidence
Conventions. 218
But the case of Germany also demonstrates that the role of
groups and individuals in transnational lawmaking is not limited
law courts); Jay L. Westbrook, InternationalJudicial Negotiation, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J.
567, 571-73 (2003) (same). But see, e.g., Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable
Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children, art. 8 (1996), reprinted in
JEREMY ROSENBLATT, INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AFFECTING CHILDREN 15 (2000)

(providing for direct communication between the courts and other authorities of
two member states to determine whether "the authority of another Contracting
State would be better placed in the particular case to assess the best interests of
the child"); Committee on International Civil and Commercial Litigation, Third
Interim Report: Declining & Referring Jurisdiction in International Litigation in
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE SIXTY-NINTH CONFERENCE,
LONDON 33, Principle 5.2 (2000) (suggesting same for determination of appropriate

court in determining whether to refer claim to another court).
215

See supra Section 3.1.2.

216

See supra text accompanying notes 161-164.

217

See supra Section 3.1.3.

218

See supra notes 115-121 and accompanying text.
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to interest-group pressures for the purposes of advancing a particular self-interest as public-choice theory would have it.219 Industrial pressure did not really become influential in German approaches to judicial cooperation for litigation in the United States
until individuals in the German government and in academia responsible for fashioning those approaches perceived a need to protect German law, sovereignty, and industry from U.S. decisions
that threatened to undermine legitimate German control under
traditional German views about transnational litigation, state sovereignty, and international law.220 Thus, policy changes may also

result from perceived threats to important ideational values shared
by the individuals in charge of fashioning transnational-litigation
law in a particular country.
On one hand, these ideational values may derive from the values underlying domestic procedure. Thus, one of the major concerns of German academics and government officials with U.S. discovery orders regarding evidence located in Germany was the
potential of those orders to debase traditional, constitutionally
safeguarded German values of privacy protection in civil litigation.221 Conversely, U.S. courts quickly perceived the procedures
of the Hague Evidence Convention, as interpreted by Germany, as
a severe threat to the policy of open and equal access to evidence
under the Federal Rules and similar state approaches. 222
On the other hand, the ideational values that the local legal
community prefers to protect may arise out of notions of national
sovereignty and proper approaches to transnational litigation as
protected by international law. These latter values, in turn, tend to
be strongly influenced by the procedural approaches and jurisprudential values prevailing in the country in question. In Germany,

219 See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among PressureGroups for
Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983).
220 See supra Section 3.1.1. The two were of course intertwined as are all the
factors noted here. Thus, the perception of a threat from U.S. law was significantly influenced by industry representations. See supra text accompanying note
79. On the other hand, industry representatives, mostly lawyers in a legal environment in which attorneys primarily see themselves as professionals rather than
as hired guns, acted not only in the self-interest of the industry they represented,
but also expressed genuine concern about the protection of German law and sovereignty by participating in the scholarly debate.
221 See supra text accompanying notes 93-96.
222 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 122.
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where service and the taking of evidence are controlled by the
court, 223 those activities have been considered sovereign acts that
foreign judicial officers or their surrogates may not perform on
German territory without violating international law at least since
the advent of European nationalism in the late eighteenth century. 224 Thus, U.S. attorneys who attempted to serve process on
German domiciliaries through direct mail 225 or to depose German
witnesses on German territory with the blessing of U.S. procedural
law 226 and, more importantly, U.S. courts that ordered discovery to
take place on German territory quickly created the perception of a
need to react among German academics and government offi7
cials.22
The preferences relevant to lawmaking for transnational litigation are thus significantly shaped by the ideational values of the local legal establishment. Hence, the effectiveness of group and individual action in influencing lawmaking for transnational
litigation may be determined to some degree by local jurisprudential views and shared norms of discourse. The interest of German
business in achieving protection from increasing liability exposure
in the United States was at first largely unsuccessful. Not only because the legal establishment did not yet perceive a threat to its
preferred values, 228 but also because the industry's interest was not
strong enough to influence the extent of judicial cooperation in a
country with a formalist legal tradition, under which courts and
administrative agencies are supposed to interpret and apply statutes according to preordained rules, while the consideration of the
interests of groups and individuals is deemed to be relegated to the
223 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
224 See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text (describing traditional German position on judicial cooperation); BAUMGARTNER, HAGUE CONVENTION, supra
note 9, at 48-53; JUNKER, supra note 52, at 368-70; SCHACK, supra note 24, at 310;
Stiimer, Justizkonflikt, supra note 132, at 22.
225 See, e.g., Diplomatic Note from the Embassy of the Federal Republic of
Germany to the U.S. Department of State (Sept. 27, 1979), reprinted in BORN, supra
note 13 at 777 (protesting U.S. service on German addressees by direct mail as a
violation of German sovereignty).
226 See, e.g., Bohmer, supra note 164, at 3054 (referring to a 1989 press report
on U.S. attorney Lee Kreindler, who, without permission of the German authorities, flew to Frankfurt to depose a number of German witnesses at an airport hotel).
227 See supra text accompanying notes 84-86.
22 See, e.g., supra notes 219-220 and accompanying text.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

1352

U. Pa.J. Int'l Econ. L.

[Vol. 25:4

legislative process. 229 This did not, however, prevent policymakers
from adjusting accepted interpretations of statutes (including international conventions) where additional pressing interests so
demanded. Yet even then did German scholars stick to traditional
deductive-doctrinal reasoning, 230 as they quickly denounced new
positions of the German government before U.S. courts that apalso untenpeared not only overly aggressive politically but were 23
1
able under German views of proper interpretive power.
However, as the case of Germany also shows, finding out about
the relevant ideational values as well as about the mechanics of
procedural law, the preferred approaches to transnational litigation and international law that those values have produced in a
particular country is a difficult task not usually undertaken by procedural law reformers fashioning law for transnational litigation.
A significant lack of information about the views and approaches
to civil procedure and to transnational litigation in the United
States led German academics, German Central Authorities, and
courts to seriously uninformed decisions. 232 The same fate visited
law reformers and courts in the United States with regard to the
233
procedural law of Germany and other civil law countries.
Finally, there is evidence of power politics playing a role. The
ease with which some U.S. courts dismissed continental European
sovereignty concerns in the service and evidence areas was generally seen in Germany as a result of U.S. economic and political
power. 234 Because of that power and the concomitant German
sense of powerlessness, the preference for protecting German pro229 See supra text accompanying note 78 (noting that German authorities gave
the U.S. legal system the benefit of the doubt). Because the legislative process is
deemed open to pressure-group politics, it is not surprising that open industry
pressure to create a blocking statute in the shipping area (see supra note 73 and accompanying text) and to oppose regulations to unilaterally limit application of
Article 23 of the Hague Evidence Convention (see supra note 164 and accompanying text) was not considered problematic.
230 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
231 See supra note 139 and accompanying text (noting that scholars unsuccessfully urged the German government to take a more moderate view).
232 See supra notes 63-65, 74-78, 147-160, 173-176 and text accompanying.
233 See supra notes 200-209 and accompanying text (discussing efforts in the
United States during the 1960s to amend the Federal Rules).
234 See, e.g., Siirner, Justizkonflikt, supra note 132, at 35-43 (attributing U.S.
procedural approaches to U.S. hegemony and exploring the reasons for that hegemony).
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cedural values and German sovereignty in interpreting the new
Hague Evidence Convention was particularly strong. 235 In addition, when it became clear that German attempts to protect German litigants from having to produce evidence located in Germany
under U.S. procedural rules had largely failed because most of
those litigants had sufficient assets in the United States to be unable to resist U.S. judicial power, efforts to protect domestic firms
shifted to areas in which the United States did not have the upper
hand. 236 Thus, both the strength of state preferences and the resulting strategic policy choices that shape the law of transnational litigation in a particular country may be affected by perceptions of
relative state power.

4.

A SUGGESTED FRAMEWORK

4.1. Insights From InternationalRelations Theory
Having identified some of the factors affecting lawmaking for
transnational litigation in the German case, I now wish to develop
a larger framework for understanding the complex set of actors
and behavior relevant to such lawmaking today. For this purpose,
an international relations perspective promises to be especially
profitable. International relations scholars have considerable expertise in explaining state behavior and in identifying the factors
relevant to state action by way of empirically tested causal hypotheses.237 Moreover, their parsimonious core statements of theory operate on a level of abstraction that is particularly conducive
to rethinking traditional starting points in the law applicable to
transnational cases, both domestic and international.

235

See, e.g., id. at 43 (stressing need to counter American hegemony in proce-

dure).
236 See supra Section 3.1.3 (discussing the effects in the area of recognition and
enforcement of U.S. judgments). In return, the United States may (re)introduce a
general reciprocity requirement in proposed federal recognition legislation to
punish countries with restrictive recognition practices. See ALI Draft, supra note
10, § 5(c) (offering two different reciprocity requirement proposals currently being
considered).
237 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott, International Relations Theory, International
Law, and the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 361,
362-63 (1999) (For a discussion of the operation of theories on state action in international relations, see KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 113 (1979)).
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Scholars of international relations base their causal theories on
larger theoretical approaches, or schools of thought, that each rest
on their own characteristic set of principal assumptions about state
behavior. 238 There are essentially four such schools today: realism,
institutionalism, liberalism, and constructivism. 239 At the risk of
serious oversimplification, their basic assumptions are as follows.
Realism, articulated as a scientific theory in the late 1930s and
1940s, 240 assumes that nation states are the primary actors in international politics, and that the basic organizing principle is anarchy-an unhappy term denoting that there is no higher political
authority-and thus that state action is a function of power, with
the central preference of states to maximize their respective
power. 241 Institutionalism, developed in the 1980s, starts from
these realist premises, 242 but is more optimistic about international
cooperation. Modeling international relations as a multilateral
prisoner's dilemma or coordination problem, institutionalists assume that institutions, that is, "established rules, norms, and conventions," 243 can mitigate the effects of anarchy by reducing transaction costs, promoting iteration, providing information,
238 For a historical account of the development of the major schools in international politics in relation to international law scholarship see Anne-Marie
Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual
Agenda, 87 AM. J.INT'L L. 205, 206-22, 226-28 (1993) [hereinafter Slaughter Burley,
Dual Agenda].
239 See, e.g., Abbott, supra note 237, at 364-68.
240 See, e.g., E.H. CARR, THE TWENTY YEAR'S CRISIS 1919-39 (1939); HANS J.
MORGENTHAU, POLrrIcs AMONG NATIONS (1948). Realism has dominated international relations theory for decades. See, e.g., Slaughter Burley, Dual Agenda, supra
note 238, at 214-17; ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND STATE
POWER 36 (1989) [hereinafter KEOHANE, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS] ("Realism
constitutes the central tradition in the study of world politics.").
241 See, e.g., JOHN A. VASQUEZ, THE POWER OF POWER POLITIcS: A CRITIQUE 18
(1983); WALTZ, supra note 237, at 88-93, 102-28; Greenberg, supra note 21, at 179396.
242 See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, InterdisciplinaryApproaches to International
Economic Law: Liberal InternationalRelations Theory and International Economic Law,
AM. U. J.INT'L L. & POL'Y 717, 726 (1995) [hereinafter Slaughter, Economic Law].
243 KEOHANE, INTERNATIONAL INSTITTIONS, supra note 240, at 1; see also
Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, 36 INT'L ORG. 185, 186 (1982) ("Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures."). For
a discussion on the long debate over the proper definition of institutions, see Beth
A. Simmons & Lisa L. Martin, International Organizations and Institutions, in
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 21, at 192, 193.
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monitoring, issue-linkage, and reputational benefits and thus promote cooperation. 244 Liberalism, restated as a paradigm in the
1990s, 2 45 abandons the view that states are unitary actors and that
they are the only consequential actors. Liberalism instead assumes
that the interests of individuals and groups are analytically prior to
state politics. 246 Thus, while states remain important actors, their
preferences are determined by the interests and the behavior of
groups and individuals acting in domestic and transnational society. 247 It is the state preferences thus resulting that determine outcomes in international relations, although, importantly, within the
248
constraints imposed by the relative preferences of other states.
Liberalism thus acknowledges the importance of subnational and
transnational actors in international relations. Constructivist approaches, finally, oppose the rationalist assumptions more or less
underlying the previous three paradigms and argue that both social reality and knowledge of it are socially constructed. 249 Thus,
they concentrate on ideas, norms, beliefs, and identities as conse250
quential factors in international relations.

244 See COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY (Kenneth A. Oye ed., 1986); Robert 0.
KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DIscORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL

ECONOMY 244-46 (1984) [hereinafter KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY]. As Dean
Slaughter has pointed out, the insight that international institutions can thus promote cooperation was relatively "new only to political scientists," for McDougalLasswell jurisprudes and international legal process scholars "had spent the previous three decades defining international law as something other than an Austinian constraint system." Slaughter Burley, Dual Agenda, supra note 238, at 219. For
an approach that combines institutionalist and constructivist theory with international legal process, see ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995).

245 See Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of InternationalPolitics,51 INT'L ORG. 513,514-15 (1997) (offering a restatement of liberal
theory).
246 Id. at 516-17.

247 Id. at 518-20; Slaughter Burley, Dual Agenda, supra note 238, at 227-28.
248 Moravcsik, supra note 245, at 520-22.
249 Emanuel Adler, Constructivism in International Relations, in HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 21, at 95. A closer view reveals, however,

that choosing between rational choice and constructivism is not exclusively an either/ or proposition once one moves beyond the metaphysical debate. See James
Fearon & Alexander Wendt, Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View, in
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 21, at 52.
250 See, e.g., ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
(1999); John Gerard Ruggie, W'hat Makes the World Hang Together? Neoutilitarianismand the Social ConstructivistChallenge, 52 INT'L ORG. 855 (1998).
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The case of Germany in the previous Section supports at least
some of the tenets of each of the four schools of thought in international relations. The presence of power as a factor influencing state
behavior, both in the United States and in Germany, supports the
realist assumption that relative state power determines outcomes.
The role of groups and individuals in influencing governmental
and court action supports the liberal assumption that groups and
individuals are consequential actors in international relations. The
importance of local ideational values and shared norms of discourse is in line with constructivist theory and its emphasis on the
power of ideas. Finally, information deficits are among the major
problems in international politics that institutionalists argue can be
overcome with international institutions. 251
However, some of these theoretical insights fit the German case
better than others. There are two primary reasons for this. First,
realism and institutionalism are committed to an instrumentalist
optic, 252 a "logic of consequences" over a "logic of appropriate255
ness." 253 This facilitates the building 254 and empirical testing of
rigorous causal theories. Yet the instrumentalist optic makes it difficult for those theories to account for the effect of the ideational
values and shared norms of discourse in evidence in the German
case. 256 Liberalism, although based on instrumentalism as well, at
251 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott, "Trust But Verify": The Production of Information in Arms Control Treaties and Other International Agreements, 26 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 1 (1993).
252 See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, Sovereignty, InternationalRelations Theory, and International Law, 52 STAN. L. REV. 959, 962-65 (2000) (book review); Robert 0. Keohane, International Relations and International Law: Two Optics, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J.
487, 489-91 (1997).
253 James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders, 52 INT'L ORG. 943, 949-52 (1998).
254 Cf. WALTZ, supra note 237, at 6-7 (defining theory); Goldsmith, supra note
252, at 983-85 (arguing for the use of rational choice techniques to achieve methodological sophistication in international law scholarship).
255 Constructivist theories may be difficult to prove with quantitative methods-a notion, however, that has become the subject of controversy. See, e.g.,
Thomas Risse, Constructivism and International Institutions: Toward Conversations
Across Paradigms, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 597, 598 (Ira
Katznelson & Helen V. Milner eds., 2002). Indeed, some constructivists have argued that causal explanations are inappropriate in social inquiry. See, e.g., Fearon
& Wendt, supra note 249, at 57.
256 See supra notes 219-231 and accompanying text (discussing ideational values displayed in the "judicial conflict"); see also Fearon & Wendt, supra note 249,
at 60 (arguing that it is a bad idea to view actions in world politics as based on ei-
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in deterleast allows for ideas, norms, and identities to play a role
257
mining the relevant interests that states may represent.
Second, during much of its history, international relations theory has been no less state-centric in outlook than classical international law.2 58 This is particularly true of realism.2 59 But institutionalists, too, largely start from realist premises 260 and thus are unable
to account fully for transnational individual-individual and individual-state relations.2 61 Thus, these theories have difficulty explaining the role of groups and individuals in affecting lawmaking
for transnational litigation at home and abroad as evidenced in the
263
however, this statecase of Germany.2 62 As in international law,
intermittently been
has
system
international
the
centric view of
ther a logic of consequences or a logic of appropriateness, for, depending on the
circumstances and the issue area, it may now be one and then the other, and often
a combination of both); Thomas Risse-Kappen, Structures of Governanceand Trans-

national Relations: What Have We Learned?, in

BRINGING TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS
BACK IN 280, 281 (Thomas Risse-Kappen ed., 1995) ("In particular the empirical

findings [in the studies of that volume] point to the significance of culture and
norms"). Note that in law and economics, too, there are a number of influential
scholars who have begun to argue that rational choice theory has significant
shortcomings in explaining human behavior and thus needs to be amended with
insights from other fields, such as cognitive psychology and sociocultural studies,
to provide better predictions about the incentive effects of legal rules. See, e.g.,
Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1471 (1998); Russel B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051
(2000); Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1997).
257 See, e.g., Moravcsik, supranote 245, at 513,523,525.
258 See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text (describing traditional views
on international law).
259 See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
260 See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
261 See Slaughter Burley, Dual Agenda, supra note 238, at 225. The reason, as
Professors Simmons and Martin explain, is that "American institutionalists have
largely allowed their research agenda to be defined by responding to the neorealist challenge to show that 'institutions matter.'" Simmons & Martin, supra note
243, at 202.
262 Cf supra notes 215-218 and accompanying text (noting role of groups and
individuals in making and applying law of transnational litigation).
263 See, e.g., Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 178-79 (Apr. 11) (holding that the United Nations, a non-state
actor, has capacity to sue in the ICJ); PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956)
(reevaluating the role of non-state-actors in international lawmaking); Koh, Why
Obey?, supra note 21, at 2656-57 (positing a theory of transnational legal process
involving interaction, interpretation, and internalization by domestic and transnational actors).
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called into question by international relations scholars. 264 Some

constructivists 265 have made particular headway in explaining the
relevance of transnational actors, such as transnational advocacy
networks 266 and knowledge-based communities, 267 who attempt to
change what they consider inadequate practices of states and international organizations. Moreover, with their interest in law and
argument,268 constructivists have a close affinity to the belief systems of laywers 269 and are thus predisposed to research the role of
law in transnational relations. However, its ecclecticism and lack
of a coherent theory 270 make constructivism difficult to use as an
analytical first cut of a coherent and rigorous theoretical framework with which to gain fresh insights into the process of lawmaking for transnational litigation. 271

264 For a concise intellectual history of the role of transnational actors in international politics, see Risse, TransnationalActors, supra note 22, at 256-59.
265 Cf., e.g., Fearon & Wendt, supra note 249, at 56 (pointing out that there are
state-centric as well as non-state centric theories within constructivism).
266

See, e.g.,

MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK,

BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

AcTIvIsTs BEYOND

6-7 (1998) (defining

transnational advocacy networks); AUDIE KLOTZ, NORMs IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS: THE STRUGGLE AGAINST APARTHEID 6 (1995) (same).
267 See, e.g., Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,46 INT'L ORG. 1 (1992) (examining the roles that networks
of knowledge-based communities play in developing and directing state policy).
268 See, e.g., Martha Finnemore, Are Legal Norms Distinctive?, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. POL. 699, 699 (2000); see also FRIEDRICH V. KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS, AND
DECISIONS (1989) (relating norms to law, international relations and political science); NICHOLAS G. ONUF, WORLD OF OUR MAKING: RULES AND RULE IN SOCIAL
THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1989); Thomas Risse, "Let's Argue!":
CommunicativeAction in World Politics,54 INT'L ORG. 1 (2000).
269 Cf.supra notes 219-227 and accompanying text (describing ideational values in the German case); infra notes 342-343 and accompanying text (pointing out
different ideational values of lawyers across borders).
270 See, e.g., Ruggie, supra note 250, at 856 (noting that "constructivists have
not as yet managed to formulate a fully fledged theory of their own" and thus that
"constructivism remains more of a philosophically and theoretically informed
perspective on and approach to the empirical study of international relations").
271 See, e.g., id. at 883 (acknowledging that, while constructivism may help
provide "a richer understanding of some phenomena ...it lacks rigor and
specification"); cf. Moravcsik, supra note 245, at 539-40 (claiming that the
assumptions of liberal international relations theory are analytically prior to
variables deduced from constructivist theory). Note also that constructivists have
as yet spent little time researching the influence of domestic ideas, norms, and
modes of discourse on the preference formation of transnational actors that are in
evidence in the German case above. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 249, at 109-10.
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Liberal international relations theory meets this need best.
While normative liberal international relations theories have been
around at least since Immanuel Kant published his philosophical
sketch toward achieving eternal peace, 272 this particular kind of liberalism seeks to state a theory of how states do behave, rather than
how they should behave. 273 As indicated above, it assumes that the
interests of individuals and groups are analytically prior to state
politics. 274 Thus, states always represent, and respond to, some
subset of society, depending on "the underlying identities, interests, and power of individuals and groups (inside and outside the
Liberals assume that the resulting state
state apparatus)." 275
depending on domestic constitutional
widely,
can
vary
preferences
276
structure, interests represented, and transnational context.
Moreover, in focusing on individual and group interests, some liberal theorists posit that the state is increasingly disaggregated into
its component parts, each representing its own set of interests on

272 IMMANUEL KANT, ZUM EWIGEN FRIEDEN: EIN PHILOSOPHISCHER ENTWURF 1795

(Rudolf Malter ed. 1995). For an attempt to revive Kant's arguments, see, for example, BRUCE RUSSET & JOHN R. ONEAL, TRIANGULATING PEACE: DEMOCRACY,
INTERDEPENDENCE, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (2001); Michael W. Doyle,

Kant, Liberal Legacies, and ForeignAffairs, 12 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 205 (1983). The bestknown example of a normative liberal international theory is probably Wilsonian
liberal internationalism, whose "legal moralist" approach has been derided by the
realists in reaction to the experiences surrounding World War II. See, e.g., Slaughter Burley, Dual Agenda, supra note 238, at 207-08 (giving a historical account of
this criticism). As recent historical international relations scholarship has pointed
out, however, few if any scholars ever held such utopian views. See, e.g., Andreas
Osiander, Rereading Early Twentieth-Century IR Theory: Idealism Revisited, 42 INT'L
STUD. Q. 343 (1998).
273 See Moravcsik, supra note 245, at 515. But see Richard A. Matthew & Mark
W. Zacher, Liberal International Relations Theory: Common Threads, Divergent
Strands, in CONTROVERSIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY,

107, 107-11

(Charles W. Kegley, Jr. ed., 1995) (arguing that liberalism's propositions cannot be
simply deduced from its assumptions).
274 See supranote 246 and accompanying text.
275 Moravcsik, supra note 245, at 518. This does not mean that liberal international relations theory only applies to democratic states. In fact, "every government represents some individuals and groups more fully than others. In an extreme hypothetical case, representations might empower a narrow bureaucratic
class or even a single tyrannical individual .... Id. However, some liberals have
concluded that the quality of the relationship among liberal states is different
from that among non-liberal states and among liberal and non-liberal states. See
infra notes 349-351 and accompanying text.
276 See, e.g., Abbott, supra note 237, at 366; Moravcsik, supra note 245, at 52223; Slaughter Burley, Dual Agenda, supranote 238, at 228-29.
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the international plane. 277 All this allows liberal international relations theory to take full account of the influence of groups and individuals on state action both at home and abroad, and of the interdependence created by transnational trade and investment
patterns, population flows, and social communication.
Liberal theory is thus invaluable in focusing our attention on
the important role that transnational groups and individuals play
in the development of domestic as well as international law and
policy. Once we recognize the significance of this role,278 the need
for a more systematic analysis of the interrelation between transnational actors and the law applicable to them -transnational law becomes apparent. As Dean Slaughter has pointed out, liberal international relations theory provides a powerful theoretical
framework for this purpose. 279 She suggests that " [fl ro m a Liberal
standpoint, transnational law helps structure patterns of individual
and group interaction in transnational society, patterns that in turn
generate interests that shape and constrain state action." 280 This
analytical framework engages all those parts of domestic and international law "that directly regulate transnational activity between individuals and between individuals and state governments." 281 It thus covers not only private and parts of public
international law, but also sizable portions of domestic law, some
of which may have originally been promulgated solely with domestic purposes in mind, but parts of which have become relevant
to transnational actors over time.

277 See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (2003)
(examining international cooperation through transnational networks of governmental agencies); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global Information Agencies, and Disaggregated Democracy, 24 MICH. J.INT'L L. 1041 (2003)
(same); Anne-Marie Slaughter, InternationalLaw in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 503, 524-28 (1995) [hereinafter Slaughter, InternationalLaw] (same).
278 See, e.g., Thomas Risse-Kappen, Bringing Transnational Relations Back In:
Introduction, in BRINGING TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS BACK IN, supra note 256, at 3
[hereinafter Risse-Kappen, Transnational Relations] ("Transnational relations, i.e.,
regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state
agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an intergovernmentalorganization, permeate world politics in almost every issue area." (footnote omitted)).
279 Slaughter Burley, Dual Agenda, supra note 238, at 230.
280 Id.
281 Id.
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Thus, transnational lawmaking may (but need not originally)
represent an attempt to regulate the private endeavors of transnational actors. At the same time, transnational law is itself the result
of individual and group preferences -within and outside of government- exerted either directly through participation in the legislative, administrative, and litigation processes, or indirectly by engaging in transactional or litigation strategies designed to take
advantage of, or frustrate, substantive or procedural policy. This
process runs several ways. Frequently, more than one country attempts to regulate particular patterns of behavior with the result
that state action needs to account for the preferences of other governments in the international system. Moreover, affected transnational actors have more than one government to address their
grievances. Thus, the policy decisions of one state may result in responsive governmental action both at home and abroad.
4.2. Applying Liberal InternationalRelations Theory to Transnational
Litigation
It is within this analytical framework that transnational litigation operates, covering that part of transnational law which deals
with the litigation of disputes among transnational actors. At its
core, to be sure, litigation procedure involving transnational aspects remains domestic procedure, administered by domestic
courts. 282 Yet, the presence of transnational actors triggers the sug-

gested complex inter-relationship among that procedure, transnational groups and individuals, and state action abroad. Moreover,
supranational tribunals have begun to assume part of the role traditionally played by national courts in the administration of transnational litigation because private groups and individuals have increasingly been granted an active role in litigation before tribunals,
such as the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") 283 and the NAFTA
dispute resolution panels. 2 4 This development is likely to acceler282

See supra notes 23-39 and accompanying text.

283 See, e.g., Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J.

2403, 2420-22 (1991) (discussing the role of private parties in helping enforce
Community law through the Article 177 procedure).
284 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S.,
chs. 11 & 19, 19 U.S.C. § 3301, 32 I.L.M. 605, 639-49, 682-93 [hereinafter NAFTA];
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, Can.Mex.-U.S., arts. 14-15, 19 U.S.C. §3472, 32 I.L.M. 1480; see, e.g., Barton Legum, The
Innovation of Investor-State Arbitration Under NAFTA, 43 HARV.INT'L L.J. 531 (2002)
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ate as the negotiators of international treaty regimes, armed with
the insights of research in the liberal international vein, 285 increas-

(discussing the investor-state arbitration under NAFTA); Chris Tollefson, Games
Without Frontiers:Investor Claims and Citizen Submissions Under the NAFTA Regime,
27 YALE J. INT'L L. 141 (2002) (analyzing the role of individuals and groups in the
new NAFTA regime). Dean Slaughter dramatically speaks of a "deep conceptual
shift," due to which international tribunals are no longer viewed exclusively as
venues where disputes between nations are resolved, while transnational litigation is limited to litigation before domestic courts, but rather of a new concept of
transnational litigation that involves both domestic and international tribunals.
Slaughter, Community of Courts, supra note 214, at 191-92. Others have raised
delegation concerns. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, InternationalDelegations,the Structural Constitution, and Non-Self Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557 (2003) (discussing
constitutional implications of U.S. delegation of authority to international institutions).
285 For instance, research in this vein has demonstrated that efforts to engage
private groups and individuals more directly in the implementation of international law in both supranational and domestic litigation have been more successful in bringing about compliance with international law, at least among liberal
democratic states, than traditional avenues of enforcement, such as state responsibility, countermeasures, and state-to-state litigation before an international tribunal. See, e.g., William J. Aceves, Liberalism and International Legal Scholarship: The
Pinochet Case and the Move Toward a UniversalSystem of TransnationalLaw Litigation,
41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 129, 160-71 (2000) (using the Pinochet litigation in Spanish and
English courts as a case study to show the effectiveness of litigation initiated by
private groups in domestic courts to enforce international human rights law);
Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of
Legal Integration, 47 INT'L ORG. 41 (1993) (identifying the ways in which the ECJ
created opportunities for pro-EC subnational actors and national courts and thus
provided them with a stake in the promotion of EC law, thus leading to faster and
deeper integration than most member states would have liked); Carol Harlow,
Toward a Theory of Access for the European Court of Justice, 12 Y.B. EUR. L. 213 (1992)
(describing the way pressure groups have used Article 177 referrals to the ECJ to
further their interests); Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective SupranationalAdjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 282-337 (1997) (tracing
the success of the ECJ and the European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR") in
terms of compliance with their judgments in cases involving private parties versus their compliance record and that of other international tribunals in traditional
state-to-state litigation and isolating the factors contributing to such effective supranational adjudication); Walter Mattli & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Revisiting the
European Court of Justice, 52 INT'L ORG. 177 (1998) (canvassing the literature on the
role of the ECJ in European integration to paint a richer picture of the preferences
and constraints of groups, individuals, and governmental entities that have
played a role in the process of integration); ALEC STONE SwEET & JAMES A. CAPORASO, FROM FREE TRADE TO SUPRANATIONAL POLITY: THE EUROPEAN COURT AND

INTEGRATION, Ctr. for German and European Studies, Working Paper No. 2.45,

1996) (using statistical analyses and case studies to show the close relationship between the behavior of transnational actors and European integration through the
jurisprudence of the ECJ, a jurisprudence mostly at odds with the interests of the
most powerful member
states), available at http://www.ciaonet.org
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ingly provide for the direct involvement of private groups and individuals before international tribunals to help enforce their regimes. 286 Those in charge of promulgating and applying the procedural law applicable to transnational cases thus need to assess
the rules and principles of domestic procedure and the values underlying them within the suggested analytical framework so as to
properly account for the transnational environment within which
those rules and principles operate. This requires both reflection on
the sort of procedural justice that can and should usefully be promoted within this transnational environment and an assessment of
existing procedural rules within the policy objectives to be developed for transnational law as a whole.
Consider the growing interest in the interrelationship between
litigation procedure and patterns of international trade. The Europeans in particular have been concerned with the adverse effects
that some approaches to transnational litigation may have on the
right to the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital
under the EC Treaty. 287 In the early 1990s, scholars eloquently argued that the four freedoms guaranteed by the EC Treaty 28S directly mandate the abolition of procedural rules that in effect oper/frame/wpsfrm (last visited Nov. 14, 2004).
286 For a liberalist-inspired argument in favor of granting individuals and
groups standing before the WTO dispute resolution panels, see G. Richard Shell,
Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 911-22 (1995). For further arguments in favor of increased participation of private groups and individuals before the WTO, both in
the "legislative" and in the dispute resolution process, see Steve Charnovitz, Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in the World Trade Organization, 17 U.
PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 331 (1996); Daniel D. Esty, Nongovernmental Organizations at
the World Trade Organization:Cooperation, Competition or Exclusion, 1 J. INT'L ECON.
L. 123 (1998). But see Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The Misguided Debate over NGO Participation at the WTFO, 1 J. INT'L ECON. L. 433 (1998) (using a detailed description of the
Kodak v. Fuji dispute and other cases before the WTO dispute settlement panel to
show that, behind the scenes and more or less overtly, some private groups and
individuals already do participate in the processes before that body); Joel P.
Trachtman & Philip M. Moremen, Costs and Benefits of Private Participationin WVTO
Dispute Settlement: Whose Right Is It Anyway?, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 221 (2003).
287 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C
340) 33 (1997) [hereinafter EC TREATY]. See, e.g., Commission communication to
the Council and the European Parliament 'towards greater efficiency in obtaining
and enforcing judgments in the European Union,' 1998 O.J. (C 33) 3 passim (suggesting that current obstacles to judgments recognition impedes inter-EC trade).
288 The four freedoms are the free movement of goods, EC TREATY, supra note
287, arts. 9-37; free movement of persons, id. arts. 48-58; free movement of services, id. arts. 59-66; and free movement of capital, id. arts. 67-73h.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

1364

U.Pa.J. Int'l Econ. L.

[Vol. 25:4

ate as barriers to inter-EC trade and, hence, that they require a
much broader approximation of transnational litigation practice in
the various EU member states than previously envisioned. 289 This
goal is now explicitly supported by Article 65(c) of the EC
Treaty. 90 On its basis, a number of directives on issues ranging
from the protection of consumer interests to combating late payments in commercial transactions include procedural minimum
standards regarding aspects such as access to justice, costs of proceedings, effective enforcement of judgments, and group litigation. 291 Moreover, the ECJ hesitantly adopted the argument in a
number of cases reaching from Hubbard v. Hamburger292 to Hayes v.
Kronenberger.293 In most of these cases, the court struck down na289 The groundbreaking article is Manfred Wolf, Abbau prozessualer Schranken
im europdischen Binnenmarkt, in WEGE ZU EINEM EUROPAISCHEN ZIVILPROZESSRECHT
35 (Wolfgang Grunsky et al. eds., 1992).
290 Article 65, in force since January 1, 1999, provides in pertinent part:
Measures in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters having crossborder implications ...shall include:
...(c)

eliminating obstacles to the good functioning of civil proceedings,
if necessary by promoting the compatibility of the rules on civil procedure applicable in the Member States.
EC TREATY, supra note 287. On the difficulties in implementing Article 65 arising
from the reservations declared by the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark to
the Treaty of Amsterdam, TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, THE TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN
RELATED ACTS, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. (340) 1 (1997) [hereinafter TREATY OF AMSTERDAM],
see, for example, Burkhard Het3, Die "Europdisierung" des internationalen
Zivilprozessrechts durch den Amsterdamer Vertrag - Chancen und Gefahren, 53 NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 23, 28 (2000). In Article 111-170, the proposed European Constitution adopts the content of Article 65 of the EC Treaty. See Draft
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe of July 18, 2003, available at
http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/cv00850.en3.pdf
(last visited
Oct. 14, 2004).
291 See, e.g., Council Directive 2000/35/ art. 5, 2000 O.J. (L 200) 35 (requiring
member states to "ensure that an enforceable title can be obtained, irrespective of
the amount of debt, normally within 90 calendar days of the lodging of the creditor's action" if "the debt or aspects of the procedure are not disputed"); Council
Directive 98/27, 1998 O.J. (L 166) 51 (mandating that consumer groups organized
under the laws of one member state be given standing to sue in another member
state); Council Directive 97/5, art. 10, 1997 O.J. (L 43) 25 (requiring member states
to "ensure that there are adequate and effective procedures for the settlement of
disputes" in cross-border credit transfers). For further recent European legislation
regarding trans-border procedure, see also supra text accompanying note 12.
292 Case C-20/92, 1993 E.C.R. 1-3790.
293 Case C-323/95, 1997 E.C.R. 1-1718.
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tional rules requiring foreign plaintiffs to post a bond as a precondition to hearing their claims, holding that such rules discriminated against nationals of other member states and thus violated

Article 6 of the EC Treaty. 294 In Mund & Fester v. Hatrex Interna-

tional Transport,2 95 the Court struck down as covertly discriminatory even a provision of the German Code of Civil Procedure, allowing a defendant's judgment proof status in Germany as
grounds for granting a pre-judgment attachment.
The concern with facilitating international trade in fashioning
rules for transnational litigation is not, however, exclusively a
European phenomenon. 296 The U.S. Supreme Court, for example,
has decided a line of cases on the assumption that closed-minded
approaches to forum selection and arbitration clauses could hamper the interests of U.S. businesses abroad. 297 While the sincerity of
the Supreme Court's international-commerce rhetoric in these
cases may be questioned, 298 the same is not true of a number of recent international trade agreements, most notably the TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Agreement ("TRIPS"), the
299 that
WTO sub-agreement on matters of intellectual property,

contain a significant number of procedural minimum standards on
300
issues ranging from evidence gathering to available remedies.
See, e.g., Data Delecta Aktiebolag v. MSL Dynamics Ltd., Case C-43/95,
1996 E.C.R. 1-4661, paras. 16-22; 1997 E.C.R. 1-1718, supra note 293, paras. 15-25.
295 Case C-398/92, 1994 E.C.R. 1-467.
296 See, e.g., Ronald A. Brand, Recognition of Foreign Judgments as a Trade Law
294

Issue: The Economics of Private International Law, in THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 592 (Jagdeep Bhandari et al. eds., 1998) (discussing the rec-

ognition and enforcement of foreign judgments from the perspective of international trade).
297 Vymar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995);
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985);
Scherk v. Alberto Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,
407 U.S. 1 (1972).
298 See, e.g., Burbank, World, supra note 16, at 1497 (suggesting that the Court's
rhetoric in these cases may "simply [be] a function of calculations about when it is
in the judiciary's interest to share power"). But see, e.g., IDS Life Ins. Co. v. SunAmerica, Inc., 103 F.3d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting "Congress's emphatically
expressed support for facilitating arbitration" not only to "lighten the caseload of
the federal courts" but also to "effectuate private ordering").
299 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round; arts. 41-50, vol. 31, 33
I.L.M. 81 (1994), arts. 41-50.
300 See also NAFTA, supra note 284, art. 2022 (exhorting member states "to the
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As supranational tribunals become more confident in enforcing
these trade regimes, they may well take a closer look at the procedural rules in the various member countries, measuring transnational litigation rules on the policy of free trade. This is well demonstrated by two recent cases in which NAFTA arbitration panels
were asked to consider the compatibility of an award of punitive
damages-against a Canadian company by a Mississippi court 30 1
and the dismissal, by a Massachusetts court, of a suit by a Canadian corporation against the City of Boston for reasons of sovereign immunity, 302 respectively, with NAFTA's investment provisions. NAFTA's Chapter 11, under which these cases were heard,
may be in a "legitimacy crisis" 303 that is partly due to its setup as a
private ad-hoc arbitration without public accountability of the arbitrators and a lack of public access to the proceedings. 304 But the
maximum extent possible [to] encourage and facilitate the use of arbitration and
other means of alternative dispute resolution for the settlement of international
commercial disputes between private parties in the free trade area" and to create
an Advisory Committee on Private Commercial Disputes to study and report on
the availability and effectiveness of arbitration and other ADR methods to resolve
such disputes).
301 See Decision on Hearing of Respondent's Objection to Competence and
Jurisdiction, Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, sec. 137 (ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/98/3), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
3921.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2004) (holding that the decision by the Mississippi
court could itself constitute an expropriation and thus was subject to arbitral review under Chapter 11 of NAFTA). Ultimately, the NAFTA panel dismissed the
case for lack of diversity of nationality and for a failure to exhaust local remedies.
The panel did, however, register its view that the Mississippi trial and its verdict
were "clearly improper and discreditable and cannot be squared with minimum
standards of international law and fair and equitable treatment." Loewen Group,
Inc. v. United States, (ICSIP Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/22094.pdf (last visited Nov. 14,
2004).
302 See Award, Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States, pp 129-140 (ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/99/2), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/14442.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2004) (holding, after close scrutiny of
reasoning of a Massachusetts court, that application of the principle of sovereign
immunity did not violate NAFTA's investment provisions in the case at hand).
303 Charles H. Brower, II, Structure, Legitimacy, and NAFTA's Investment Chapter, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 37, 93 (2003).
304 See, e.g., id. at 68-72. The "legitimacy crisis" of NAFTA's Chapter 11 in the
United States is also due to the fact that the "international standards" of expropriation and "fair and equitable treatment," long imposed on less-developed
countries through bilateral investment treaties, are now for the first time being
applied to regulatory and procedural laws and to decisions of courts and authori-
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point should be clear.
A liberal perspective aids significantly in understanding the
forces that lead to this pressure on domestic procedure by international trade agreements. As the European experience suggests, the
scrutiny of domestic procedure by international trade tribunals is
particularly likely where individuals and groups have themselves
3 5 Moreover,
the opportunity to bring cases before such a tribunal.
future trade talks may yield more specific procedural rules as
transnational groups press proposals for procedural reform that
they have been unable to obtain on a domestic level.
Consider Professor Benvenisti's analysis of collective-action
failures in the transnational system. 30 6 Using public choice theory,
he shows that relatively small but transnationally savvy groups
such as producers, employers, and service providers have effectively utilized the international arena to exploit less organized
groups at home by shifting their activities to different countries or
by cooperating with similarly situated foreign groups to persuade
their home governments to create international treaties or international organizations in order to avoid undesirable regulatory regimes at home. 30 7 He also notes that both international law and
domestic constitutional norms premised upon the traditional statecentric view of the international system perpetuate this scheme,
leading to a laissez-faire approach that effectively undermines doand of standards of envimestic achievements of the welfare state
30 8
ronmental and consumer protection.
Procedural law reformers, both domestic and international,
would do well to consider these developments carefully in devising rules applicable to transnational cases. Process values derived
from policies of free trade, such as attempts to reduce expense and
310
delay, 30 9 may conflict with domestic process values at every turn.
ties in the United States. See, e.g., Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & William W. Park,
The New Face of Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 365
(2003).
305 See supra note 285.
306 Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization, 98 MICH. L. REV.
167, 169 (1999).
307 Id. at 171-84.
308 Id. at 184-96.
309 See, e.g., Wolf, supra note 289, at 35.
310 See, e.g., Gerhard Walter & Samuel P. Baumgartner, Improving the Prospects
of the Transnational Rules of Civil Procedure Project: Some Thoughts on Purpose and
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Even the ECJ has realized that facilitating international trade cannot be the only value, nor even the most important one, served by
transnational procedure. Only two years after Hayes, in E.D. Srl. v.
Fenocchio,3'1 the court upheld the limitation under Italian law of the
Italian order-of-payment procedure 312 to defendants who can be
served with process on Italian territory against a challenge by an
Italian creditor who demanded to use the mechanism against his
recalcitrant Italian debtor who, at the time, resided in Germany. In
the court's view, "the possibility that nationals would therefore
hesitate to sell goods to purchasers established in other Member
states is too uncertain and indirect for that national provision to be
regarded as liable to hinder trade between Member States." 313
Moreover, those involved in the making of transnational law
and policy need to contemplate whether they intend to perpetuate,
modify, or reverse the developments observed by Professor Benvenisti and to design strategies to implement their choice. 314
Whether these strategies are devised for transnational law as a
whole or for specific issue areas within it, they are necessarily interrelated with aspects of procedure. In Dow Chemical Company v.
Means of Implementation, in 18 RITSUMEIKAN L. REV. 169 (2001) [hereinafter Walter &
Baumgartner, Prospects]; see also Brand, supra note 296, at 627 (suggesting that
"fundamental jurisprudential disagreements" may justify non-recognition of a
foreign judgment in spite of a preference for the free movement of judgments
from a free-trade perspective).
311 Case C-412/97, 1999 E.C.R. 1-3845.
312 The procedure, called decreto ingiuntivo, allows a creditor who believes to
have an uncontested claim for the payment of a sum of money to obtain an enforceable judgment within 60 days at minimal cost by simply filling out a form
identifying the debtor, sum of money owed, and a brief description of the cause of
action, thus obviating the need for filing a full complaint. The court then orders
the defendant to either pay the sum of money or to object to its order. In the latter
case, the plaintiff can overcome the objection only by initiating an ordinary civil
proceeding. However, if the defendant neither pays nor objects within the time
identified, the court declares the order an enforceable judgment in the amount
claimed. See CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE [CPC], art. 633 et seq. (Italy). Together
with a similar procedure available in Germany and France, it served as the basis
for the recent European Late-Payment Directive, supra note 291.
313 1999 E.C.R. 1-3845 at no. 11 (citation omitted).
314 Professor Benvenisti, for one, envisions the creation of transnational institutions to coordinate policies. See supra note 306, at 202-211. Professor Trimble,
on the other hand, suggests to tackle "laissez-faire globalism" by moving from a
preoccupation with state authority to a concern with substantive justice by
strengthening and democratizing international institutions. See Phillip R. Trimble,
Globalization, International Institutions, and the Erosion of National Sovereignty and
Democracy, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1944, 1969 (1997) (book review).
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Castro Alfaro,315 for example, Justice Dogget, in a concurrence, engaged some of his colleagues on the Texas Supreme Court in an interesting debate on the issue of whether the doctrine of forum non
conveniens should be abolished so that U.S. corporations that take
advantage of substandard worker and consumer protection arrangements abroad by shifting some of their activities there can be
316 Of course, there are other imheld accountable in Texas courts.
portant policies to be considered when deciding whether to grant a
motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens or whether the doc317
trine serves any useful purpose at all, but the point should be
clear.
In short, procedural law reformers need to act in awareness of
the complex interdependence between transnational actors and the
law applicable to them. Otherwise their work product risks unintentionally supporting patterns of individual and group behavior
they may not wish to condone, such as those observed by Professor
Benvenisti, and unnecessarily hampering others, such as international trade. This, in turn, may lead to individual and group initiatives whose effect is to subject transnational procedure to particular substantive interests, most importantly, the promotion of free
786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990).
Dow Chemical Co., 786 S.W.2d at 688-89 (Dogget, J., concurring). But see
Dow Chemical Co., 786 S.W.2d at 697 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the
court lacks the power to make this policy decision). The Texas legislature subsequently reenacted the doctrine of forum non conveniens in personal injury actions. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 71.051 (1997). So far, the argument has
not had much success in blocking the application of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens in the United States. See, e.g., Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d
Cir. 2002) (affirming dismissal for forum non conveniens); In re Union Carbide Corp.
Gas Plant Disaster, 89 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987) (affirming dismissal for forum non
conveniens); Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61 (S.D.Tex. 1994) (dismissing
complaint on grounds of forum non conveniens). In the English case of Lubbe v.
Cape Plc., 1 W.L.R. 1545 (2000), however, the House of Lords was apparently
swayed by the argument and denied a dismissal on forum non conveniens
grounds in favor of a class of South African plaintiffs who had filed suit at the defendant's place of incorporation in England for claims arising out of the defendant's operation of asbestos-mining operations in South Africa although all the
relevant factors seemed to point clearly toward South Africa as the more convenient forum.
317 See, e.g., Samuel P. Baumgartner, Related Actions, in 3 ZErrsCHRIFr FOR
ZIVILPROZESS INTERNATIONAL 203, 216-23 (1998) (discussing policy considerations
underlying the doctrine of forum non conveniens); Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional
Conflict and JurisdictionalEquilibration:Paths to a Via Media?, 26 Hous. J. INT'L L.
385 (2004) (assessing the roles of forum non conveniens and lis pendens in resolving jurisdictional conflicts).
315
316
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trade. On the other hand, transnational actors may simply choose
to circumvent disfavored substantive and procedural law by structuring their behavior so as to avoid its application. Arbitration and
forum selection clauses, for example, are frequently used by international business firms to stay out of countries with what is considered business-unfriendly litigation procedure and to avoid the
application of domestic law deemed to be insufficiently sensitive to
the needs of international trade. 318 This, in turn, may create pressure either to change the disfavored laws for the benefit of those
transnational actors or, 3 19 conversely, to limit their exit options in
favor of those incurring the negative externalities flowing from
them.32 0 In considering the alternatives for transnational litigation
318

See, e.g.,

INTERNATIONAL

IVES DEZALEY &
COMMERCIAL

TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER

BRIANT

ARBITRATION

G.

GARTH,

AND

(1996) [hereinafter

THE

DEALING

IN

CONSTRUCTION

DEZELAY & GARTH]

VIRTUE:
OF

A

(recounting

how international commercial arbitration, depending on the country in question,
has become more or less of a privatized venue to adjudicate international business
disputes away from the public courts to the extent that those courts are viewed as
unfriendly to particular business interests); Thomas E. Carbonneau, National Law
and the Judicializationof Arbitration:Manifest Destiny, Manifest Disregard,or Manifest

Error, in

INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION
IN THE 21ST CENTURY:
"JUDICIALIZATION" AND UNIFORMITY 115, 116-17 (Richard B. Lillich &

TOWARDS

Charles N.

Brower eds., 1993) (suggesting that if domestic "legal processes are too rigid to
adapt and to undergo reform," they fuel a demand for international commercial
arbitration). This development is further strengthened by the attempts of a number of countries to attract international commercial arbitration and the business it
produces for the local bar and infrastructure services by drafting international arbitration laws that provide for a minimum of judicial interference in the arbitral
process. See, e.g., DEZALEY & GARTH, supra, at 129-81 (discussing how British and
U.S. lawyers have used and developed international arbitration to their business
advantage); GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 30-34 (2d ed. 2001) (describing the Federal Arbitration Act and how
Congress sought to facilitate development of a stable system of international
commercial dispute-resolution favoring business interests).
319 See, e.g., Moravcsik, supra note 245, at 518 (noting that "cost-effective exit
options, such as emigration, noncompliance, or the transfer of assets to new jurisdictions or uses, insofar as they constrain governments, may be thought of as substitutes for formal representation," by which the preferences of those groups are
translated into state policy).
320 See, e.g., Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Exuberant Pathway to Quixotic Internationalism: Assessing the Folly of Mitsubishi, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 263 (1986)
(suggesting that there ought to be genuine limits to the enforcement of arbitration
clauses where the public policy of the forum is concerned); Amr A. Shalakany,
Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for Reassessing Bias Under the Specter of Neoliberalism, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 419 (2000) (critiquing the effect of international
commercial arbitration to resolve trade and investment disputes in favor of the
North).
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law, in particular whether and to what extent facilitating international trade should be its goal, domestic proceduralists may also
wish to consider participating both in fashioning those international free-trade regimes that increasingly promise to control
transnational litigation practice, and in debating their proper interpretation in the relevant transnational tribunals.
4.3. Refining the Suggested Framework
If this were all, one would be hard pressed to contest that the
analysis suggested above is neither particularly novel nor fully
compelling in arguing that there is more that separates transnational litigation from domestic interstate procedure than an opportunity for cross-fertilization. 32' At least in the United States, scholars have "long been alert to the observation that public life consists
' 32
of 'competition among pressure groups for political influence" 2
323 If so, however, these
as well as to the incentive effects of rules.
insights have had surprisingly little effect on lawmaking for transnational litigation. The view that "a sovereign state may fashion
domestic law as it deems fit," 324 particularly prevalent among fed325 has led
eral judges and federal rulemakers in the United States,
to approaches that largely proceed as if transnational litigants had
no transnational exit options at their disposal, no foreign or international tribunals, legislatures, or administrative agencies to address their grievances; and no opportunity to engage in transactional or litigation strategies abroad designed to take advantage of,
or frustrate, domestic substantive or procedural policy. To be sure,
the various interest-balancing tests that have been introduced to
tackle issues as varied as the reach of domestic legislative jurisdic-

See supra text accompanying notes 16-18.
Benvenisti, supra note 306, at 169 (citation omitted).
323 See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (6th ed. 2002). This
does not mean, however, that there is agreement on how to analyze and predict
those incentive effects. See supranote 256.
324 Supra text accompanying note 27.
325 See supra note 39; In re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d 602, 608-09 (5th
Cir. 1985) ("We have a party, we have jurisdiction, and under Rule 34 that party is
required to produce documents which are in its possession, custody or control....
The fact that the documents are in West Germany is, to this court, immaterial."
(quoting the district court)); BAUMGARTNER, supra note 9, at 30-45 (tracing U.S. history of unilateral approaches to transnational litigation).
321
322
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transnational discovery, 327 or dismissals on forum non conveniens grounds 328 would provide opportunities to take these aspects of transnational interconnectedness into account, at least on
the level of judicial lawmaking. 329 Yet, courts as well as commentators have done so only on occasion and without developing a sys330
tematic approach.
But there is more. While similarities do exist between the interstate and the transnational levels in the ways groups and individuals and the interests of foreign states affect the law-making process, 331 there are also significant differences. The first difference
from the domestic interstate situation is that some of the major
players are not the same. As Professor Benvenisti demonstrates,
transnationally savvy groups are more likely to influence policy
than other actors, often outsmarting domestic lawmakers along the
way. 332 This is not only true with regard to the making of international law, where well organized transnational groups can influence state preferences twice: at the negotiation stage and at the ratition

326

326 See, e.g., Timberlane v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976)
(adopting a balancing test to determine whether extraterritorial jurisdiction
should be exercised); Mannington Mills v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d
Cir. 1979) (agreeing substantially with the Ninth Circuit's test and describing the
factors to consider); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 32, § 403 (discussing the limits on domestic jurisdiction).
327 See Soci~t6 Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S.
Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522 (1987) (using an interest-balancing test to determine
whether to require first resort to the Hague Evidence Convention).
328 See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981) (balancing private
and public interests factors for a determination of whether or not to grant a dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens).
329 See, e.g., Slaughter, Economic Law, supra note 242, at 735 (observing that the
development of the law controlling the reach of U.S. legislative jurisdiction from
territoriality to the "rule of reason," which requires the balancing of the relevant
interests, is in line with liberal international relations theory "precisely because it
suggests a shift from a focus on power to a focus on interests"). Whether it is appropriate for a court to engage in the type of policy analysis suggested above is a
different question. See infra text accompanying notes 385-387.
330 Cf., e.g., Slaughter, Economic Law, supra note 242, at 736 (critiquing that the
"rule of reason" remains too closely tied to notions of physical power rather than
truly determining the extent to which the underlying interests of groups and individuals can be harmonized).
331 See supra text accompanying notes 322-323; Burbank, World, supra note 16
passim (analyzing a number of examples of such similarities).
332 Benvenisti, supra note 306, at 184-89; see also Risse-Kappen, Transnational
Relations, supra note 278, at 26 (arguing that "'[c]lever' transnational actors adapt
to the domestic structure to achieve their goals").
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fication or implementation stage, both times with significant advantages of information and access to both domestic and foreign
governments. 333 As the case study above suggests, transnational
334
actors also have an impact at the domestic levels of lawmaking.
For instance, there is a growing transnational bar that is well informed about the procedural traits of various countries and about
their primary exit option- international commercial arbitration.
This segment of the bar has become proficient in playing those
procedural traits and in influencing local law reform in search of
the best option for their clients. 335 A variety of procedural issues,
from approaches to personal jurisdiction and parallel proceedings,
to the availability of discovery and contingency fee agreements, to
the circumstances under which arbitration is available, have
played a role in this scenario. 336 This is not to say that transnational lawyers are engaging in reprehensible behavior. On the contrary, they are doing their job. 337 Rather, the point is that, unlike on
the interstate level, they possess knowledge and access that other
groups and individuals, including those involved in the making of
procedural law, often do not have, and thus are able to influence
the process of fashioning approaches to transnational litigation to a
much greater extent than at the purely domestic level.
The second difference, closely related and nicely supported by
the German case above, is that information about the policies and
approaches of other countries to transnational cases remains a
scarce commodity. 338 This type of information is crucial, for, withBenvenisti, supra note 306, at 184-89; HELEN V. MILNER, INTERESTS,
14-17, 20-23, 67-98 (1997); see also KECK & SIKKINK,
supra note 266 (exploring the role of NGOs in collecting information and in pressuring governments at home and abroad to adopt particular policies).
334 See supranotes 215-218 and accompanying text.
335 As far as arbitration is concerned, see DEZALEY & GARTH, supra note 318
(discussing the role of specialized lawyers in the development of international
commercial arbitration).
336 See, e.g., Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International,
63 TUL. L. REV. 553, 560-74 (1988) (discussing the role of forum shopping in shaping international commercial arbitration).
337 See, e.g., id. at 571-72 (noting that effective representation of clients is a
lawyer's duty).
338 See supra notes 232-233 and accompanying text (describing lack of knowledge as to U.S. litigation approaches). On the many undesirable effects of actors'
inadequate information in international politics, see GEORGE DOWNS & DAVID
333

INSTITUTIONS, AND INFORMATION

ROCKE, OPTIMAL IMPERFECTION: DOMESTIC UNCERTAINTY AND INSTITUTIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1995); ROBERT JERVIS, PERCEPTION AND MISPERCEPTION
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out it, we cannot assess the real and potential effectiveness of our
chosen procedural approaches. 339 While this kind of knowledge
about other states' legal systems is quite easy to obtain within a
federal system, the same is not true on the transnational level. The
problem may be logistical. 340 Mostly, however, it is due to differences in legal history, culture, economy, and procedural philosophy, which severely impede the endeavor of someone trained in
the legal system of one country to locate the rules and principles in
point in another, let alone to gain a proper understanding of their
relevance. Even where the language of a foreign country is the
same, these differences of legal background may easily lead to
misunderstandings. 341 Under these circumstances, it is much easier
for those with a particular agenda to control the information fed to
courts and procedural law reformers.
With that, we have identified the third difference. In domestic
interstate relations, factors such as national identity, national economy, constitutional architecture, a federal or central government,
legal education and practical training, and a discrete legal culture
with its own history and philosophy tend to impose a distinct
IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1976); and KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note

244, at 244-47.
339 For example, the prerequisites for provisional relief differ so widely from
country to country that there may be "a black hole in which a defendant can escape out of sight and become unreachable." Mercedes Benz AG v. Leiduck, [1996]
1 A.C. 284, 305 (P.C. 1995) (appeal taken from Hong Kong) (Lord Nicholls dissenting). In that case, Mercedes Benz was unable to secure an attachment of the defendant's Hong Kong property before the courts of Monaco, the defendant's
domicile, because Monaco law does not allow the attachment of property located
abroad. Subsequently, the Privy Council equally upheld the reversal of the decision of a Hong Kong trial court to grant such an attachment by the Hong Kong
courts of appeal because of a lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant. On
the difficulties with the various national laws in regard to preliminary relief, see,
for example, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE SIXTY-SEVENTH
CONFERENCE HELD AT HELSINKI, FINLAND 185 (James Crawford & Michael Byers
eds., 1996) [hereinafter ILA REPORT].
340 See, e.g., Walter & Baumgartner, Recognition, supra note 58, at 4-5 (noting
difficulties in locating legal materials in some Eastern European countries).
341 See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Foreword to U.S. STATEMENT, supra note 8,
at xiii, xiv (reporting that, "although the United States and Canada share a common language and common source in English law, in this project we discovered
the truth that literal equivalencies sometimes can mask important substantive differences"); Lawrence Collins, The Hague Evidence Convention and Discovery: A Serious Misunderstanding?, 35 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 765 (1986) (suggesting that U.S.
courts misconceived the Hague Convention as being designed to further the process of discovery).
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value system. True, there is often vigorous disagreement among
the legal elite on jurisprudential as well as on policy issues. 342 But
the way lawyers think, the way they draft their laws and legal
opinions, what they consider convincing arguments, and who they
consider important legal actors, as well as a great number of detailed assumptions about the best way to conduct a civil proceeding with and without foreign parties tend to be heavily ingrained.
The same is not true on the transnational level, where there tend to
be significant differences from country to country in the way lawyers think, in what they expect from particular legal institutions,
343
and in those institutions themselves.
The fourth and final difference transnational litigation involves
is the jurisdictions of sovereign nations. Unlike states in a federal
system, these nations are neither subject to a unifying constitutional structure nor to a federal or central government. The precise
content of their sovereignty has, however, become the subject of a
spirited debate. Despite conflicting empirical claims regarding the
status of actual state autonomy, 344 the problem arises from a nor342 See, e.g., DUXBURY, supra note 29 (analyzing the historical development of
various strands of American jurisprudential thought); Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Systems of Belief in Modern American Law: A View From Century's End, 49 AM. U. L. REV.
1 (1999).
343 William Ewald, ComparativeJurisprudence(I): What Was it Like to Try a Rat?,
143 U. PA. L. REV. 1889 (1995) [hereinafter Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence);see
also George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949 (1985)
(distinguishing flat and structured legal reasoning); William B. Ewald, What's So
Special About American Law?, 26 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1083, 1095-96 (2001) (noting
that among the things that puzzle his foreign students about American law are the
civil jury and the resulting complexities of the law of evidence, pretrial discovery,
contingent fees, the death penalty, "intellectual movements such as law and economics or critical race theory," the "practice of electing judges and prosecutors,
and of allowing them to run what is in effect a political campaign, complete with
campaign contributions and the support of a political party"); Linda S. Mullenix,
Lessons From Abroad: Complexity and Convergence, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1, 11 (2001) (suggesting that "American students and the American practicing bar typically recoil
from [the] civil law jurisprudence" that does not provide for things such as trial
by jury, full-fledged discovery, the American rule of costs, entrepreneurial lawyers, punitive damages, class actions, and American-style adversary litigation).
34 Among international law scholars, it has become an article of faith that
state sovereignty has waned significantly within the last fifty years. See, e.g.,
Goldsmith, supra note 252, at 979; see also RICHARD W. MANSBACH ET AL., THE WEB
OF WORLD POLITICS, NON-STATE ACTORS IN THE GLOBAL SYSTEM (1976) (making
claims as to the demise of state sovereignty); JAMES N. ROSENAU, THE STUDY OF
GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE,

ESSAYS ON THE TRANSNATIONALIZATION

OF WORLD

AFFAIRS (1980) (making similar claims). As Professor Krasner has demonstrated in
a careful empirical study, however, states have for centuries encroached upon the
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mative concept of sovereignty that no longer seems practicable in a
world in which domestic lawmaking is increasingly constrained by
international regimes, such as the WTO, NAFTA, and various human rights treaties, some of which may be considered to have constitution-like effects. 345 One may see in these developments a loss
of the protection of national sovereignty 346 under international law,
or a change of its content.34 7 However, to the extent that reconceptualizations of the norm of sovereignty goes beyond that achieved
by the ratification of treaties that limit actual state autonomy and is
instead sought uniliaterally, it tends to be resisted by nationsespecially smaller ones-that continue to value their autonomy in
making law for transnational litigation.
Consider U.S. courts and federal rulemakers, who have long
been impatient with what they consider to be impractical insistence
on formalities. 348 Dean Slaughter's empirical research on the use of
the act of state doctrine puts an interesting spin on this observation, finding that U.S. courts tend to be less reluctant to sit in
judgment on the acts of a foreign sovereign if that sovereign is another liberal democratic state. 349 This confirms her theory that libsovereignty of others by imposing constitutions, rules on the treatment of a state's
own citizens (particularly minorities), and dictates on economic regulation in
connection with the granting of sovereign loans.
STEPHEN B. KRASNER,
SOVEREIGNTY 73-219 (1999).
345 See, e.g., RICHARD FALK, HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY (1981); Pe-

ter M. Gerhart, The Two Constitutional Visions of the World Trade Organization, 24 U.
PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1 (2003); Benedict Kingsbury, The Tuna-Dolphin Controversy,
the World Trade Organization, and the Liberal Project to Reconceptualize International
Law, 5 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 1 (1994).
346 See, e.g., Sol Picciotto, Networks in International Economic Integration: Fragmented States and The Dilemmas of Neo-Liberalism, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1014
(1996-97).
347 See, e.g., CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 244, at 27 (suggesting that sovereignty now exists "in membership in reasonably good standing in the regimes
that make up the substance of international life," while "[ilsolation from the pervasive and rich international context means that the state's potential for economic
growth and political influence will not be realized").
348 See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945)
(holding that the reach of the Sherman Act is not limited by territorial boundaries); In re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d 602, 606 (5th Cir. 1985) (dismissing
German sovereignty concerns that would result in limiting the effectiveness of the
Federal Rules); supra notes 200-207 and accompanying text.
349 Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and
the Act of State Doctrine,92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907, 1961-65, 1975-86 (1992) [hereinafter Burley, Liberal Internationalism]. I add the qualifier "U.S." (courts) here because
her data are culled exclusively from the opinions of U.S. tribunals.
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eral states have been able to shift a significant portion of their
transnational relations with one another from a political level to
one controlled by law.350 Thus, she concludes, "in court, pleas of
the prerogatives of sovereignty are more likely to be honored with
351
respect to nonliberal states than with respect to liberal states."
There is, however, a danger in turning these empirical findings on
the behavior of U.S. federal courts into normative choices for international law binding on the entire world. 352 Groups and individuals in countries less powerful than the United States may view such
undertakings from a more realist perspective. 353 To them, U.S.
courts and lawmakers may simply be calculating when it is in the
best interest of their country to defer to a political solution. 354 From
this perspective, a "shared approach" that suggests substituting
mutual interest balancing for the recognition of "abstract 'sovereign interests"' 355 is apt to increase the view that the power of
mighty states determines the values governing transnational law
356
and litigation at the expense of smaller nations.
Thus, fresh concepts of national sovereignty, whether or not
they distinguish between liberal and nonliberal states, will have to
allow for some measure of self-determination by less powerful

350
351

Id. at 1909-10.
Slaughter Burley, Dual Agenda, supra note 238, at 230 (emphasis in origi-

nal).
But see id. at 229-30.
As Professor Jackson points out, Westphalian sovereignty has always
served to protect weaker from more powerful nations. ROBERT H. JACKSON, QUASISTATES: SOVEREIGNTY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE THIRD WORLD 6 (1990).
354 See supra notes 234-235 and accompanying text. Dean Slaughter acknowledges this view. See Burley, Liberal Internationalism,supra note 349, at 1963 (noting
that "judges respond not to a subconscious identification of a particular state as
'liberal' or 'nonliberal,' but rather to individualized assessments of the particular
economic and political interests at stake on the facts of a given case").
352
353

355 ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND THE QUEST FOR
REASONABLENESS 230 (1996) [hereinafter LOWENFELD, QUEST]; see also Burley, Liberal

Internationalism, supra note 349, at 1980-86 (suggesting that the courts of liberal
states deal with contentious regulatory disagreements between governments by
balancing the interests involved rather than deferring to a political solution).
356 Cf., e.g., Samuel P. Baumgartner, Human Rights and Civil Litigationin United
States Courts: The Holocaust Era Cases, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 835, 846-49 (2002) (noting
instances when transnational public law litigation in U.S. courts has come across
to influential groups and individuals abroad as simply another arrow in the
quiver of a powerful country that attempts to impose its own political preferences
upon others).
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states. 357 Otherwise, negative reactions by groups and individuals
in those smaller states are to be expected. 358 Such reactions do not
need to culminate in responsive legislative and executive action,
such as diplomatic protests 359 and blocking statutes. 360 As the
German case demonstrates, they can affect foreign state action in
much subtler ways that are nonetheless capable of adversely affecting the procedural values chosen for transnational cases else36
where. 1
4.4. What Makes TransnationalLitigationDifferent?
Returning, thus, to the question of the law controlling transnational cases, it becomes clear that, from a strictly positivist point of
view, 362 the law applicable to transnational litigation is indeed
357 Cf. Benedict Kingsbury, Sovereignty and Inequality, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 599
(1998) (arguing that a radical change in the traditional concept of sovereignty will
be hazardous to both international law and international society if not accompanied by the development of an alternative concept that is capable of serving that
concept's function of equalizing inequality among nation states).
358 Cf., e.g., Greenberg, supra note 21, at 1818 (pointing to the realist insight
that "a great nation that in its actions inspires resentment among friendly and
neutral states, generates hatred and humiliation among those who perceive themselves to be subjected to its power and ...will inspire alliances against italliances that threaten to undermine that nation's prosperity and security").
359 See, e.g., Ernest L. Kerley, Contemporary Practiceof the United States Relating
to InternationalLaw, 56 AM. J.INT'L L. 794 (1962) (reporting a Swiss diplomatic protest to the United States when a U.S. agency served a Swiss corporation with
documents by mail, an act that infringed on Switzerland's sovereign power). For
some more obscure sources of such protests, see BORN, supra note 13, at 849-50.
36 See, e.g., BORN, supra note 13, at 850-52 (describing different categories of
foreign blocking statutes).
361 See supra notes 234-236 and accompanying text. As indicated above, the
views on what is considered protected by national sovereignty are to some degree
connected to prevailing jurisprudential views and procedural particularities. See
supra text accompanying notes 44-45. This increases the difficulty of those trained
in one legal system to understand the views on sovereignty in another. See, e.g.,
LOWENFELD, QUEST, supra note 355, at 229 ("I have long wondered how the concept
of sovereignty crept into the subjects here discussed ....Is it really pertinent to
the limits of the effects doctrine, or to procurement of evidence for purposes of
discovery or trial?"). As a leading international law scholar well versed in foreign
approaches, of course, Professor Lowenfeld is expressing more than the view of
an American lawyer by querying whether the civil law insistence on sovereignty
in these matters still makes sense in today's world of transnational interdependence. See id. at 2. This question is perfectly legitimate, but as I have just noted in
the text, it is not the only relevant question. See supra notes 210-214 and accompanying text.
362 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol25/iss4/3

2004]

TRANSNA TIONAL LITIGATION

1379

primarily domestic in nature. From this point of view, nation
states may truly fashion the law of transnational litigation as they
deem fit,363 although their efforts are superseded by a growing
patchwork of rules and standards of international law 364 and are
increasingly controlled by the jurisprudence of supranational tribunals. 365 As a matter of policy, however, once attention is focused
away from state-centric modes of analysis, we detect a strong interrelation between transnational-litigation law and patterns of behavior of transnational actors. This interrelation is complex, running up and down from national governmental entities, to groups
and individuals, to governmental entities both at home and abroad
as well as back and forth among governmental entities of different
nations as they attempt to fashion their substantive and procedural
policies in relation to the perceived preferences of other states.
Through these various channels, one country's approaches to
transnational litigation are likely to affect and constrain that country's own policies and law-making efforts as well as those of other
countries in the future.
Such constraints may be legal as well as factual. To the extent
that this interaction between transnational actors and transnational
366
litigation law partakes of a larger "transnational legal process," it
has normative force. 367 Thus, a particular approach to a problem of
transnational litigation may not only inhibit or facilitate, as the case
may be, group and individual behavior that adversely affects the
substantive or procedural policies in the country in question, it
may also result in the formation of a new norm of transnational
litigation. This new norm may be the result of group and individual pressure on the same governmental body that promulgated the
initial rule, such as when the U.S. courts partly retracted from
overly aggressive assertions of legislative jurisdiction in the anti368
trust area in response to vigorous criticism at home and abroad.
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 287-304 and accompanying text.
365 See supra notes 285-286 and accompanying text.
366 Harold Hongju Koh, TransnationalLegal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996)
[hereinafter Koh, TransnationalLegal Process].
367 Id. at 184 (suggesting the normative quality of transnational legal process);
Koh, Why Obey?, supra note 21, at 2626-27, 2646 (suggesting that transnational legal process is normative, constitutive, and dynamic).
368 Compare United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945), with Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir.
363
364
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More often, however, the new norm emanates from lawmaking in
international or foreign fora, over which the original lawmaker has
no direct control, but which nonetheless constrains that lawmaker's future endeavors. 369
If, therefore, those in charge of lawmaking for transnational
litigation - be they legislators, judges, or court rulemakers - want
to be in control of their efforts, they need to act in awareness of the
possible ways in which their decisions may affect their own policy
choices through this web of transnational interdependence. They
must carefully consider the values that they can and want to usefully pursue for transnational litigation. In doing so, they need to
be mindful of the special circumstances that particularly set procedural lawmaking for transnational cases apart from its sister enterprise in domestic interstate litigation, including: the presence of
different actors, both private individuals 370 and sovereign foreign
governments; 371 differences in legal history, culture, and procedural philosophy; 372 and the scarcity of adequate information
about policies and norms on transnational litigation in other countries.373 Effective lawmaking for transnational litigation therefore
requires a strategy to deal with these particular circumstances.
Before turning to my suggested approach to deal with these is-

1979), and Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
But see Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798 (1993) (holding
that "even assuming that in a proper case, a court may decline to exercise
Sherman Act jurisdiction over foreign conduct (or, as Justice S[calia] would put it,
may conclude by the employment of comity analysis in the first instance that
there is no jurisdiction), international comity would not counsel against exercising
jurisdiction in the circumstances alleged here"). In F. Hoffrnan-LaRoche Ldt. v. Empagran S.A., 124 S.Ct. 2359 (2004), the Supreme Court, possibly in part reacting to
a considerable number of amicus briefs by foreign governments, retreated to a
cautious approach to applying the Sherman Act extraterritorially where the antitrust claim is based entirely on harm suffered abroad. The Court thus sided with
caution regarding foreign sovereignty concerns in a recent circuit split over the
meaning of sections 6a(1) and 6a(2) of the Federal Trade Antitrust Improvements
Act (FTAIA). Compare Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338
(D.C. Cir. 2003); and Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002),
with Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. Heeremac Vof, 241 F.3d 420 (5th Cir.
2001).
369 See, e.g., supra Section 3; notes 287-304 and accompanying text.
370 See, e.g., supra notes 331-337 and accompanying text.
371 See, e.g., supra notes 344-361 and accompanying text.
372 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 342-343.
373 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 338-341.
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sues in Section 5, however, let me briefly clarify a couple of points.
First, notice that I do not claim that taking transnational litigation
seriously as a field means adopting a code of civil procedure specifically for transnational cases, a code that would contain distinct
norms for everything from the filing of the complaint to the enforcement of a judgment. Nor do I mean to suggest that we should
discard the values underlying domestic procedure in dealing with
transnational cases. This would be neither wise nor feasible. As
pointed out above, 374 the mechanics of civil procedure and the values underlying them tend to be deeply ingrained in the minds of
the local bench and bar. Thus, to the extent that suggestions to
change those norms for transnational cases cannot be supported by
convincing arguments, such as their necessity to regulate transnational society in the desired fashion, they are likely to be strongly
resisted. This is particularly true in the United States, where the
ideal of transsubstantive rules has held sway in federal procedure,
whether in the promulgation of the Federal Rules or in case law,
since 1938. 37 5 Strong resistance against what are perceived to be
unnecessary changes was also in plain view in a survey that Professor Walter and I conducted among lawyers in Germany and
Switzerland on the feasibility of adopting, in those two countries,
the Transnational Rules of Civil Procedure, originally drafted by
Professors Hazard and Taruffo and now a project of both the
American Law Institute and UNIDROIT.376 If adopted, the rules
would entirely replace, in transnational cases, the current "judgecentered procedure" 377 in Germany, Switzerland, and other civil
law countries with an adversarial model, albeit one that forgoes
many of the characteristic elements of U.S. civil procedure, 378 a
prospect few of our respondents considered worth contemplating
at this time.379

374 See supra text accompanying notes 340-343.
375 See, e.g., Burbank, Reluctant Partner, supra note 25, at 111-12; Robert M.

Cover, ForJames Win. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J.
718, 722 (1975); Subrin, supra note 2, at 977; see also supra note 19 (noting further
reasons for the resistance to treat transnational cases differently than domestic
ones in the United States).
376 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
377 1998 Draft, supra note 7, § 0.3 cmt.
378 2004 Draft, supra note 7, at 7-8.
379 Gerhard Walter & Samuel P. Baumgartner, Utility and Feasibility of Transnational Rules of Civil Procedure: Some German and Swiss Reactions to the Hazard-
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What we need to do, however, is carefully reflect on the values
we can and should promote for transnational law in general, and
trans-border litigation in particular, and to contemplate which of
those domestic procedural norms need adapting or supplementing
for most effective implementation of those values within the operational constraints imposed by transnational society. This may increasingly lead to the adaptation of procedural norms that casebooks and treatises on transnational litigation do not usually deal
with, thus providing more reason and opportunity for transnational groups to cause transnational-litigation lawmakers to act. If
the European experience regarding payment orders is any indication,380 there may increasingly be pressure on domestic law reformers to provide simplified and inexpensive mechanisms for the
enforcement of transnational debts. 38 ' Similarly, issues that have
received lackluster treatment in courses on transnational litigation,
such as judicial cooperation to secure preliminary relief 38 2 or preliminary relief in transnational litigation in general, 383 may rise to

Taruffo Project, 33 TEx. INT'L L.J. 463, 466-75 (1998) [hereinafter Walter &
Baumgartner, Utility].
380 See supra notes 291, 312 and accompanying text (noting Italian, German
and French procedural amendments that served as the basis for the European Late
Payment Directive and the underlying attempt to speed up transnational debt collection within the EC).
381 Summary judgment, initially introduced into common law procedure as a
means to help creditors enforce uncontested debts (see, for example, Jeffrey W.
Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court's Shimmering View of Summary
Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 136
(1988)), is unlikely to meet this demand fully.
382 In the United States, courts have been unable to agree on whether or not
to provide such cooperation. Compare, e.g., Pilkington Bros. v. AFG Indus. Inc.,
581 F. Supp. 1039, 1047 (D. Del. 1984) (refusing to issue an injunction duplicative
of an interim injunction issued by an English court against a Delaware corporation), with Cardenas v. Solis, 570 So. 2d 996, 1000 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (affirming injunction freezing husband's Florida bank accounts on request of Guatemalan court). See also David Westin & Peter Chrocziel, Interim Relief Awarded by U.S.
and German Courts in Support of Foreign Proceedings, 28 COLuM. J. TRANS. L. 723
(1990).
383 See, e.g., Groupo Mexicano de Desarollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.,
527 U.S. 308 (1999) (holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant a preliminary injunction); ILA REPORT, supra note 339 (exposing gaps in laws that frustrate plaintiffs' civil recovery and proposing a new legal framework); George A.
Bermann, ProvisionalRelief in TransnationalLitigation, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
553 (1997) (providing comparative analysis of provisional relief in transnational
litigation); Stephen B. Burbank, The Bitter With the Sweet: Tradition, History and
Limitations on Federal Judicial Power - A Case Study, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1291,
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prominence as the analysis of law reformers reveals the enormous
importance of these issues in ordering transnational society.384
Second, if in a given jurisdiction procedural law reformers decide to promote their chosen values for transnational litigation by
"adjusting the rules of the game for a larger playing field rather
than playing by different rules," 385 this is a workable alternative as
long as the net is cast wide enough to allow for the profound policy-cum-comparative analysis I suggest is necessary to successfully
anticipate the effects of a particular approach on the behavior of
transnational actors. However, it is an alternative that showcases
the importance of the question of who, inside a nation state, should
have the power to make the rules on transnational litigation. Casting the net wide enough to maintain the same norms for transnational as for domestic litigation in effect requires delegating the
power of making the relevant policy choices to the trial court. 386
Whether this type of ad-hoc decision-making is desirable or even
1334-45 (2000) [hereinafter Burbank, The Bitter With the Sweet] (critiquing Groupo
Mexicano, supra, from the perspective of transnational litigation). In continental
Europe, the issue of preliminary relief in transnational cases has been somewhat
more prominently on the minds of specialists of "international civil procedure"
than in the United States. See, e.g., BUCHER, supra note 24, at 118-32; CAMPEIS & DE
PAULI, supra note 24, at 260-64; SCHACK, supra note 24, at 183-92; WALTER, supra
note 24, at 140-41, 405-06. This may have to do with a strict territorialist approach
to transnational litigation there, see, for example, Walter & Baumgartner, Recognition, supra note 58, at 5. In addition, with Articles 24 and 26 of the Brussels and
Lugano Conventions (and now Articles 31 and 33 of the Brussels Regulation), as
interpreted by the ECJ in Case 125/79, Denilauer v. Couchet Fieres, 1980 E.C.R.
1553 (1980), they have had provisions regulating the most basic aspects of transnational preliminary relief. But Article 24 of the Brussels Convention, too, has recently given rise to more difficult transnational issues before the ECJ. See, e.g.,
Case C-99/96, Mietz v. Intership Yachting Sneek, 1999 E.C.R. 1-2277 (1999) (setting
limits to jurisdiction based on Article 24 so as to disallow its use to circumvent the
jurisdictional requirements of Articles 2-18); Case C-53/96, Hermes Int'l v. FFIT
Mktg. Choice BV, 1998 E.C.R. 1-3637 (1998) (delineating jurisdiction under Article
24 from jurisdiction to enter preliminary relief under Article 50 of TRIPS); Case C391/95, Van Uden Mar. BV v. Deco-Line, 1998 E.C.R. 1-7122 (1998) (allowing a national court to issue preliminary relief in a case governed by an arbitration clause
under certain circumstances).
384 See also supra note 339 (highlighting the difficulties with "various national
laws in regard to preliminary relief").
385 Burbank, World, supra note 16, at 1467; see also LOWENFELD, QUEST, supra
note 355 passim (suggesting that transnational litigation be controlled by the principle of reasonableness).
386 Cf Burbank, Costs of Complexity, supra note 3, at 1473-74 ("Many of the
Federal Rules authorize essentially ad hoc decisions and therefore are transsubstantive in only the most trivial sense").
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acceptable under a particular country's constitutional architecture
of separation of powers is a legitimate question. It is a question
that in transnational cases is complicated by the further inquiry
into the proper role of courts in the interpretation and application
387
of international law.
5.

THE BASIS OF THE FIELD: COMPARATIVE PROCEDURE AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

As we have seen, the law of transnational litigation in one
country can affect the behavior of groups and individuals in transnational society, and, through them, substantive and procedural
law abroad and at home. We have also seen that this reality requires lawmakers to be aware of those interconnections and to act
accordingly if they want to remain in control of their efforts. 388 The
next question, then, is how transnational litigation as a field can
help us better understand this process of transnational interaction
and to predict outcomes.
The discussion thus far has demonstrated that international relations scholarship, both theoretical and empirical, has much to
contribute to such a field. Liberal international relations theory
with its emphasis on the behavior of groups and individuals and
its de-emphasis of the nation state as the primary actor in international relations has particular potential to aid in a better understanding of the functioning of lawmaking for transnational society.3 8 9 Yet, as the case of Germany in Section 3 has shown, other
international relations theories also have important insights to contribute. 390
Interdisciplinary cooperation between international relations
scholars and lawyers specializing in litigation procedure and international law is therefore likely to prove most fruitful in assisting
those who make and apply the law of transnational litigation in
predicting whether their proposals are likely to work the way they
are intended to work.391 Because international relations scholars
387 See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text; infra note 428 and accompanying text.
388 See supra text accompanying notes 370-372.
389 See supra Sections 1 and 2.
390 See supra Section 4.3; supra notes 251-271 and accompanying text.
391 Cf Anne-Marie Slaughter & Steven R. Ratner, The Method Is the Message, 93
AM. J. INT'L L. 410, 417 (1999) (suggesting that International Law/International Re-
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have paid relatively little attention to litigation procedure, the precise pathways through which such procedure may affect the behavior of groups and individuals as well as that of statesparticularly procedural law's correlation with transnational economic interaction-are still relatively poorly understood and thus
would offer interesting avenues of research for international relations scholars interested in the transnational-litigation setting.
Lawyers, on the other hand, can make the most valuable contribution to the field by helping to reduce the gaping informational
deficits regarding foreign legal systems that pervade lawmaking
for transnational litigation today. They can do so by bringing to
bear their relative advantage in understanding both jurisprudential
starting points and the intricacies of procedural approaches. 392 For
if, as we have seen, 393 local ideational values and shared terms of
discourse both affect the impact of group interests on transnational-litigation lawmaking and determine the strength and content of the preferences of procedural law reformers, getting to understand those values is crucial for the development of our field.
Only with such an understanding will lawmakers fully be able to
anticipate the ways in which their suggested norms may affect
transnational actors in conjunction with the norms of other nations;394 to communicate effectively, both directly and indirectly,
with foreign lawmakers; and to anticipate the reaction of other
countries to contemplated approaches to transnational cases. Indeed, the case of Germany explored in Section 3 suggests that lack
of knowledge about foreign procedural systems may be the single
most pervasive barrier to making informed choices in transnational

lations scholars, among others, "ask whether the law as formulated will have an
actual impact on the behavior of state or individual actors, and if so, whether it
will be the intended or anticipated impact").
392 See, e.g., Koh, TransnationalLegal Process,supra note 366, at 206 (suggesting
comparative advantage of lawyers vis-A-vis political scientists in so far as lawyers
"specialize in the close reading of texts, examining the social impact of procedural
rules, understanding the power of norms in civil society, and designing public
policy against a backdrop of law"); Friedrich Kratochwil, Constructivism as an Approach to InterdisciplinaryStudy, in CONSTRUCTING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE
NExT GENERATION 13 (Karin M. Fierke & Knud Erik Joergensen eds., 2001) ("Since
lawyers have been arguing with rules all their lives, their 'style' of argument as
well as their methodologies deserve far greater attention than they have received
from social scientists.")
393 See supra text accompanying notes 219-231, 342-343.
394 See supra notes 370-373 and accompanying text.
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litigation.
What is sorely needed, therefore, is in-depth comparative
analysis to overcome this persistent information deficit. Unfortunately, there has been very little comparative analysis that fits this
need. Indeed, there has been very little procedural comparison,
period. 395 This may partly be the result of a general "malaise" affecting comparative law 396 and a concomitant lack of interest in the
"comparative method," as it is also known, 397 among students,
scholars, and the legal profession. 398 Partly, it may be due to the
traditional view that procedure, whether domestic or transnational, is generally controlled by domestic law, 399 a view that does
not envision a particular need for procedural comparison. If so,
the discussion so far should have exposed the latter assumption as
at least shortsighted,400 and the identified need for comparative
procedural analysis may light the way out of the "malaise." The
comparative enterprise necessary for our purposes would entail a
395 See, e.g., Peter Gilles, Prozessrechtsvergleichung[ComparativeProceduralLaw],
in 3 TRANS-NATIONAL ASPECTS OF PROCEDURAL LAW 969, 987-94 (1998).
396 See Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence, supra note 343, at 1961-90; Mathias
Reimann, The Progressand Failureof ComparativeLaw in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 671, 685-90 (2002).
397 See SCHLESINGER, supra note 90, at 1 (arguing that the term "comparative
method" is preferable to "comparative law"). As a number of comparatists have
recognized, however, the term "comparative method" is as much a misnomer as
the term "comparative law," for there is no one single method, nor even a number
of clearly identified methods or methodologies that practitioners of comparative
law would agree upon as accepted approaches to their field. See, e.g., Hiram
Chodosh, Comparing Comparisons: In Search of a Methodology, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1025
(1999).
398 See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Influence of Comparative Procedure in the
United States, 43 AM. J.COMP. L. 545, 545 (1995) (reporting that "[t]he study of
comparative procedure in the United States has little following in academia, and
virtually no audience in the courts or in legal policy circles"); Mathias Reimann,
The End of Comparative Law as an Autonomous Subject, 11 TuL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 49, 52
(1996) ("There are but very few full-time teachers in the field even at the top law
schools. Students mostly ignore the subject ... This situation is so familiar to
comparatists as well as nonspecialists that I need not describe it at any greater
length.")
399 See supra notes 23-39 and accompanying text. Similarly, the lexfori principle, the choice-of-law principle according to which the court always applies the
law of the forum in matters of procedure, has in part been developed precisely for
the purpose of keeping domestic courts out of the business of inquiring into foreign procedural law and thus is also partly responsible for the lack of in-depth
procedural analysis today. See, e.g., SCHACK, supra note 24, at 16-18.
400 See supra notes 363-373 and accompanying text.
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clearly stated objective (to provide knowledge about foreign ideational values underlying procedural approaches) and a defined
topic (the views relevant to transnational litigation), and would
clearly limit the available methodologies, thus avoiding some of
the chief obstacles facing traditional comparative legal scholarship
401
and teaching.
There is, however, one problem usually associated with comparative law that the analysis needed for our field cannot easily
avoid. It is reflected in the frequent objection that research into the
legal approaches of foreign countries is unduly demanding and
prone to error. 402 To some degree, this problem is defused by having a clear purpose, defined topic, and limited choice of meth401

As Professor von Mehren has observed,

Most subject matters in our curriculum, given focus by the needs of the
practicing profession, experience no difficulty in establishing a core of information and theory that is carried forward, developed, and refined by
succeeding generations of scholars. Work in comparative law, on the
other hand, tends to be scattered and diffuse as to topic, legal system, and purpose. Although much excellent scholarship has been achieved, no shared
body of information and theory, no scholarly tradition susceptible of
transmission to succeeding generations has emerged. One has the uneasy
feeling that comparative-law scholarship is always beginning over again,
that comparatists lack a shared foundation on which each can build.
Arthur T. von Mehren, An Academic Traditionfor Comparative Law?, 19 AM. J.COMP.
L. 624, 624 (1971) (emphasis added). On the issue of methodology, see supra note
397. See also Jennifer Widner, Comparative Politics and Comparative Law, 46 AM. J.
COMP. L. 739, 748 (1998) (suggesting that comparative law, as comparative politics,
may gain an edge in the market for relevancy if its practitioners will be able to offer decision makers "observations that clarify thinking or show the likely empirical results of selecting one course of action over another").
402 Professor Ewald's description of often-heard objections against the teaching of comparative law equally applies to comparative scholarship:
Comparative law is said to be:
(a) Superficial, because not even the teacher, let alone the students, can
master all of the intricacies of two distinct legal systems;...
(d) Futile, because the students will never achieve the proficiency of a
continental lawyer, or even learn to do research in foreign legal materials; and finally
(e) Misleading, because, for all the preceding reasons, both students and
teachers will be tempted by their ignorance to draw false analogies between legal systems, thus undermining the value of the "fresh perspectives" on domestic law.
Ewald, ComparativeJurisprudence,supra note 343, at 1968 (emphasis in original).
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ods, 403

thus allowing for more focused research. Yet, even with
these restrictions in place, it cannot be denied that gaining and imparting knowledge about the ideational values underlying the approaches to procedure and transnational litigation in various foreign countries is an arduous and time-consuming task full of
dangers of reverting to assumptions and simplifications. However,
rather than an argument against conducting comparative procedural analysis, this should be a bugle call to action on developing
the methods and training needed to avoid some of the pitfalls of
procedural comparison. As with empirical research to determine
the efficacy of domestic procedural rules, to argue that it is too
demanding is an odd objection against engaging in the only type of
research capable of producing the knowledge necessary for law reformers to make informed decisions. 4 4 Moreover, once a respectable body of comparative procedural analysis has been accumulated and once research methodologies have been refined and a
certain stock of comparative knowledge has become second nature
for specialists of transnational litigation, further and deeper analy40 5
sis will be much easier to conduct.
Finally, unilateral comparative analysis by academics and individual law reformers is not the only path leading to much-needed
knowledge about foreign litigation systems. As institutionalist international relations scholars have shown, a powerful means to
overcome information deficits and the uncertainty attending them
in the international realm is to increase the quantity and quality of
communication. 406 Perhaps the most effective path toward this
goal on the state-to-state level consists of entering into treaties.
Treaties provide a forum for communication and information exchange not only at the negotiation stage, but also by setting up

See supra text accompanying notes 400-401.
Responding to a similar practical objection against research into domestic
preferences in international relations, Professor Moravcsik points out that "[n]o
respectable philosophy of science recognizes the difficulty of performing relevant
empirical research with current techniques as a legitimate reason to abandon a
promising scientific paradigm. Instead, scientific technique and training should
adjust-an argument for thorough training in languages and primary-source
analysis." Moravcsik, supra note 245, at 544.
405 Cf. Widner, supra note 401, at 746 (relating that in comparative politics as
in comparative law "[t]he greater the extent of prior research on which the investigator may rely, the better a project will perform with regard to quality criteria").
406 See, e.g., KEOHANE, INTERNATIONAL INSTTrUTIONS, supra note 240, at 117, 120.
403
404
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and dismore or less sophisticated mechanisms for generating 407
seminating information and for monitoring state behavior.
There are also many other ways to promote information exchange specifically for purposes of transnational-litigation lawmaking that are less formalized than treaties, from academic conferences 408 to more institutionalized processes of public and private
organizations; from domestic organizations, such as the ALI, to international ones, such as UNIDROIT and UNCITRAL. For example, as mentioned above, the ALI has undertaken the task of drafting Transnational Rules of Civil Procedure to be applied in all
transnational cases in domestic courts. 40 9 Although those rules, as
currently drafted, focus too strongly on harmonizing the phases of
a lawsuit rather than on more pressing issues of transnational litigation, 410 their further discussion on several levels, including in cooperation with UNIDROIT, 411 has the potential of allowing for a
sophisticated information exchange on domestic approaches to
procedure, transnational litigation, and (as far as relevant) international law and the ideational values underlying them among the
impressive array of leading practitioners and scholars involved in
412
the enterprise.
Whether this type of comparative education is gained by way
of transnational communication, comparative scholarship, or both,
its results are likely to benefit transnational-litigation lawmakers
407 See, e.g., CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 244, at 154-96; Abbott, supra note
251, at 36-46; see also Burbank, World, supra note 16, at 1477 (suggesting that the
"framework for dialogue that an international convention establishes" may be "its
most enduring contribution").
408 See, e.g., Burbank, Equilibration, supra note 19, at 204 ("Symposia like [this
one] provide opportunities for scholars from countries with different traditions to
educate each other and, through their writing, domestic and foreign audiences,
including courts, about those approaches and needs.").
409 See supra text accompanying notes 376-379.
410 See Walter & Baumgartner, Utility, supra note 379, at 466-75.
411 See 2004 Draft, supra note 7, at 4-5 (noting partnership with UNIDROIT).
412 From this perspective, the current practice of the ALI to organize meetings
exclusively for the American, European, and Asian advisers, respectively, while
understandable from a logistical point of view, is less than ideal for the success of
the enterprise. It does not allow for direct discussions among the three groups;
indeed it does not allow for much information exchange among those groups at
all, for the contribution of one group largely remains unknown to the others. For
further suggestions to supply the in-depth comparative analysis necessary for a
successful completion of the project, see Walter & Baumgartner, Utility, supra note

379, at 475-76.
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not only directly - by providing information helpful to pinpoint
possible problems with intended policy choices -but also indirectly - by providing scholars of international relations with the
factual material with which to develop and test new and more intricate theories about the effects of lawmaking in transnational society in general and in the transnational-litigation setting in particular. If such international-relations scholarship is to further
assist law reformers in predicting the likely effects of their contemplated actions, it needs to overcome the tendency of rationalist international relations scholars, as of U.S. economists, 413 to base their
work on assumptions and empirical data taken mostly from the
U.S. experience. 414 Some international relations scholars have recently noticed the importance of incorporating comparative insights. 415 Hence, recognizing the importance of comparative
knowledge about the ideational values underlying foreign litigation systems should no longer require a leap of faith. Doing so will
allow international relations theory optimally to contribute to the
further development of transnational litigation as a field.
6.

CONCLUSION

For far too long, judges and procedural law reformers have approached transnational litigation exclusively from the precepts of
domestic procedure, failing to engage the larger implications of
lawmaking in a transnational setting. This has produced suboptimal lawmaking, at times severely so. It has led to unnecessary international tensions, 416 the perpetuation of approaches and concepts that are not in line with some of the declared values that
lawmakers want to pursue in transnational litigation, 417 to the stall-

413 See Ronald Dore, Goodwill and the Spirit of Market Capitalism, 34 BRrr. J. Soc.
459, 469 (1983) (quipping that American economists "write as if the world were
America").
414 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 352-361.
415 See, e.g., Helen V. Milner, Rationalizing Politics: The Emerging Synthesis of
International,American, and Comparative Politics, 52 INT'L ORG. 759 (1998); Moravcsik, supra note 245, at 543-44 (noting the necessity of research into domestic preference formation).
416 See supra Section 3 (tracing judicial conflict).
417 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 210-214 (discussing major unintended effects in the long run of the 1963 amendments to the Federal Rules and
1964 amendments to the Judicial Code).
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ing of important treaty negotiations, 418 and, most often, to unin419
tended consequences, large and small.
Depending on one's jurisprudential vantage point, there is
nothing wrong with the view that the law of transnational litigation is controlled primarily by domestic law. However, together
with state-centric assumptions about lawmaking and with the traditional belief that there is a clear line separating domestic and international law, 420 this view tends to mask the transnational interconnectedness of lawmaking for transnational litigation. 421 For, as
a matter of fact, lawmaking in one country, through the behavior
of transnational actors, may affect lawmaking in another as well as
on the international stage, where more and more treaties and conventions on substantive issues of transnational law, particularly on
trade law, contain provisions affecting domestic procedure and allow transnational groups to help enforce those provisions by filing
suit in both domestic and international tribunals. Thus, in effect,
the process of lawmaking for transnational litigation involves
groups and individuals at home and abroad, whether private or in
government service, as well as state power. It is different from the
purely domestic lawmaking process in that it involves different actors and nation states with their own lawmaking power and in that
it requires overcoming severe information deficits about foreign
litigation systems and the jurisprudential views underlying
them. 422 Approaching transnational litigation in one country in
disregard of these interconnections may result in reactions abroad
that can hamper future transnational policies in the originating
country for quite some time.
Therefore, it is time that we take transnational litigation seriously on its own. This requires that we attempt to better understand the causal pathways through which lawmaking for transnational cases in one country is interconnected with that in others
and with transnational lawmaking as a whole. 423 This task is com418 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 41 (noting difficulties with the
Hague Jurisdiction and Judgments Project).
419 See, e.g., supra Section 3 for many examples.
420 See supra text accompanying notes 27-42 (outlining notions underlying the
traditional approaches to the subject).
421 See supra Section 4.
4n See supra Section 4.3.
423 See supra text accompanying note 391.
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plicated by the reality, neglected by rationalist international relations theory and underestimated by much of the traditional international-law scholarship, that law is socially constructed by the legal elite in a particular country. Thus, the views on what are
proper approaches to problems of transnational litigation under international as well as under domestic law depend heavily on local
jurisprudential values and traditions, particularly on those underlying domestic procedure. Thus, we need to inform ourselves and
then teach our students- the next generation of law reformers 424 more extensively about foreign procedural systems and their underlying values. 425 On the basis of such newly gained knowledge,
we can then make informed choices on the values that we want
transnational litigation to serve.
This is not to suggest that courts and lawmakers must choose a
multilateral approach to making law for, or interpreting treaties
relevant to, transnational litigation.426 That is, they may not necessarily be "willing to apply the laws of [other nations] under specified conditions" so as to "balance the advantages accruing to individual citizens operating transnationally with a minimum
assurance that the policies embedded within their own laws will be
effectuated by other states." 427 Separation of powers concerns,
constraints arising from federalism, or simply their good judgment
may prevent judges in particular from engaging in what might be
perceived as a giveaway. 428 My suggestion is simply that we gain
the necessary knowledge to allow judges and procedural law reformers to make informed decisions. If the process of gaining that
knowledge results in a loss of overly self-regarding attitudes about
one's own approaches to procedure and thus to an increased use of
multilateral approaches, to treaty negotiations, and, ultimately, to

424

See, e.g., Burbank, Costs of Complexity, supra note 3, at 1471.

425 See supra text accompanying notes 392-415.

On multilateral and unilateral approaches in private international law,
see, for example, LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF Laws 17-19 (2d ed. 1995); ALBERT A.
EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 312-13 (1962) (distinguishing
"unilateral" and "universal" approaches); Friedrich K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW
AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE 6-46 (1993); and William S. Dodge, Extraterritorialityand
Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An Argument for Judicial Unilateralism,39 HARv. INT'L L.J.
101, 106-21 (1998).
427 Burley, Liberal Internationalism,supra note 349, at 1949.
428 See, e.g., Burbank, The Bitter With the Sweet, supra note 383, at 1339; Burbank, World, supra note 16, at 1465-66, 1480.
426
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increased procedural harmonization, all the better.
Moreover, taking transnational litigation seriously as a field
will require proceduralists to engage in policy discussions far beyond those they have traditionally contemplated. Most importantly, proceduralists will need to take an active role in discussing
the relationship between domestic approaches to transnational litigation and supranational and international trade organizations. It
will no longer suffice simply to observe supranational courts, such
as the ECJ, and international trade organizations, such as the WTO
and NAFTA, as they regulate one aspect of procedure after another, often from narrow vantage points. Otherwise we run the
risk of yielding control over transnational procedure to those few
groups and individuals in transnational society that do have access
to the type of information domestic lawmakers have not cared
about and thus are learning quickly to play the policy-making
429
game, as occurred in early international law.

429 See, e.g., Benvenisti, supra note 306, at 175-77 (describing how seventeenth
century international merchants engaged the services of the great international
lawyers of the time to help fashion international law in their favor and thus to
cause the externalization of their costs upon domestic society).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

